Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Mcdaniel

• Decision Date: 14 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. CV 09–369–PK.,CV 09–369–PK.
• Citation: 751 F.Supp.2d 1151
• Parties: OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,v.Kenny McDANIEL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

751 F.Supp.2d 1151

OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,

v.Kenny McDANIEL, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 09–369–PK.

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Jan. 14, 2011.

Peter MacNamara Lacy, Oregon Natural Desert Association, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff.Bradley Grenham, U.S. Department of the Interior Office of the Solicitor, Sean E. Martin, U.S. Attorney's Office, Portland, OR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PAPAK, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA) brings this action arising from the travel management planning process for the Steens Mountain. ONDA names as defendants the United States Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), Kenny McDaniel, District Manager for the Burns District of BLM, and Joan Suther, Field Manager for the Andrews Resource Area of the Burns District of BLM,¹ Specifically, ONDA alleges that BLM's adoption of the Travel Management Plan violates the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000 (“Steens Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 460nnn et seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701– 87, the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131– 36, and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321– 61. Now before the court is ONDA's motion for summary judgment (# 52), BLM's cross-motion for summary judgment (# 67), BLM's motion to strike extra-record materials (# 59), and ONDA's motion for leave to file an amended complaint (# 84). I have considered all of the parties' briefs and all of the evidence in the administrative record relevant to questions of amendment,² For the reasons set forth below, ONDA's motion is granted and ONDA is instructed to file its amended complaint as proposed.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On November 28, 2007, BLM issued a Decision Record adopting the proposed Transportation Management Plan (TMP) for the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area. AR 783. On January 4, 2008, ONDA appealed from and petitioned for stay of the effect of that decision to the Department of Interior's Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). AR 619–690, 242–294. On April 2, 2008, the IBLA granted a stay as to the part of the BLM decision to open Obscure Routes to public vehicle traffic, but denied ONDA's petition for stay as to all other challenged aspects of BLM's decision. AR 202. On My 28, 2008, ONDA filed a motion to expand the stay granted by the IBLA, arguing that two subsequent court rulings required the IBLA to enjoin any implementation of the TMP decision. AR 82–201. On February 19, 2009, the IBLA issued a ruling reversing BLM's decision to permit motorized traffic on the Obscure Routes within the CMPA, affirming BLM's TMP decision in all other respects, and denying ONDA's motion to expand the stay as moot. AR 53–57, 65.

ONDA filed this action on April 13, 2009, challenging BLM's Decision Record as the final agency action. On November 9, 2010, this court heard oral arguments on the limited issue of which agency action—BLM's Decision Record or the IBLA ruling was subject to judicial review. (# 80.) Subsequently, this court issued an opinion and order concluding that the IBLA's February 19, 2009 ruling was the single final agency action subject to judicial review. (Opinion and Order, # 80.) On November 23, 2010, a scheduling conference was held during which this court discussed with the parties potential options for proceeding efficiently in this case, including simply construing ONDA's complaint as against the IBLA ruling or, alternatively, permitting ONDA to amend its complaint to challenge the IBLA's decision. (# 83.) In that conference, the court also recognized that ONDA might prefer to proceed by amending its complaint to ensure that the record was clear for any potential appeal ONDA wished to file. During that conference, this court also requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the question of issue exhaustion. Id. On December 9, 2010, ONDA moved to amend its complaint to add the IBLA as a defendant and plead its claims in the alternative, challenging both the BLM and IBLA decisions as final agency actions. (# 84.) Defendants resist plaintiff's motion on ground that permitting the amended complaint would cause undue delay in the final resolution of this action, would prejudice defendants, and would be a largely futile exercise.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course before being served with a responsive pleading or within 20 days after serving the pleading but thereafter may only amend by consent of the opposing party or leave of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, but that discretion “should be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15(a) which was to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on technicalities or pleadings.” In re Morris, 363 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). “A district court may, however, take into consideration such factors as bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously amended his pleadings.” Id. (citation omitted). “An outright refusal to grant leave to amend without a justifying reason is ... an abuse of discretion.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A motion for leave to amend should be granted unless there has been a showing that to permit the amendment would produce an undue delay in the litigation, that the motion was brought in bad faith or out of dilatory motive, that the movant has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in the complaint by previous amendments, that the proposed amendment would unduly prejudice an opposing party, or that the proposed amendment would result in futility for lack of merit. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Moreover, it is well settled that, of these factors, the most important is the potential for prejudice to opposing parties. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330–31, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971)). However, futility alone is sufficient grounds for denying a motion to amend. See Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.2003)). Undue delay alone cannot justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend. See Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1999).

BLM argues generally that ONDA's motion should be denied because granting leave to amend would cause undue delay in the litigation and substantial prejudice to BLM. Additionally, BLM contends that ONDA failed to exhaust many of its legal issues contained within its proposed amended complaint and argues, therefore, that ONDA's proposed amendment is futile. Regarding BLM's general concerns, I find that ONDA's proposed amendment will neither unduly delay this litigation nor substantially prejudice BLM. Moreover, I conclude that ONDA's proposed amended complaint is not futile because ONDA properly exhausted all the legal issues disputed by BLM.³

I. Undue Delay

ONDA's proposed amendment will not cause undue delay in this case. Although summary judgment motions are already before this court, granting ONDA leave to amend will not delay resolution of those motions. This court specifically requested supplemental briefing to address the threshold question of issue exhaustion. Now, by simultaneously granting leave to amend and ruling on issue exhaustion, this court ensures that the pending summary judgment motions will be not be delayed on account of ONDA's motion for leave to amend. Moreover, ONDA provides a reasonable explanation for the timing of its request to amend. During oral argument on the “final agency action” issue, ONDA clarified its position that both the BLM decision and the IBLA ruling were reviewable final agency actions. Although this court ultimately found otherwise, the precise issue was one of first impression in this circuit, with conflicting statutes, regulations, and case law confounding the analysis. Thus, ONDA cannot be faulted for its decision to challenge only the BLM decision in its initial complaint. Lastly, the cases relied upon by BLM concerning delay are inapposite to the situation here.⁴ In sum, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend.

II. Prejudice

Further, granting ONDA leave to amend would not unfairly prejudice defendants. BLM argues that it will be prejudiced because it will have to prepare a new answer to ONDA's complaint, new summary judgment briefing, new briefing to strike extra-record materials, and because ONDA stands to gain a windfall in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) if it eventually prevails on any of its claims. First, although granting ONDA leave to amend would require BLM to prepare and file a new answer to ONDA's amended complaint, such additional legal work will likely be minimal, since ONDA alleges no new facts or legal theories. Second, BLM does not explain why it will need entirely new summary judgment briefing. Indeed, BLM's original summary judgment briefing framed the IBLA ruling, not the BLM decision, as the final agency action and addressed whether that ruling was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. I do not see how permitting ONDA to amend its complaint to conform to BLM's legal theory would create a hardship for BLM. Third, since BLM has already moved to strike the extra-record materials ONDA presented from the period after the IBLA ruling, additional briefing on that topic would be superfluous. Finally, BLM's concern about exposure to additional attorney fees under the EAJA is exaggerated. This court's ruling on the final agency...