Oram v. Linderman
| Decision Date | 09 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-12-02450-PHX-FJM (BSB),CV-12-02450-PHX-FJM (BSB) |
| Parties | Jimmy Oram, Plaintiff, v. Mike Linderman, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Plaintiff Jimmy Oram, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Mike Linderman, Charles Manning, Wexford Health Services (Wexford), Dr. Thomas Bell, and Cameron Lewis, Facility Health Administrator (FHA). Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the remaining claims—Counts I through III. (Doc. 72.) Defendants Linderman and Manning, who are Defendants in Counts I and II only, file a separate cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 99.) This Order addresses Counts I and II. Count III is addressed in a separate order.
In Count I, Plaintiff claims his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) are violated by Defendants Linderman and Manning's policy of allowing religious groups to meet on their own for no more than 60 minutes once per week. Plaintiff claims that thispolicy substantially burdens the practice of his religion because it does not allow him to complete his weekly prescribed observances.
In Count II, Plaintiff claims his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights were violated when Linderman and Manning denied Plaintiff's request for an adult-sized prayer shawl.
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a material factual. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
"Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, 'including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.'" Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To implicate the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief at issue is both "sincerely held" and "rooted in religious belief." Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). If the inmate makes his initial showing, he must establish that prison officials substantially burden the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.
A regulation that burdens the First Amendment right to free exercise may be upheld only if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). This determination requires analysis of four factors: (1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact the accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. Id. at 90.
The inmate bears the burden of establishing prima facie that RLUIPA has been violated and that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. The government then bears the burden of proving that the substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice both furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. at 995 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b)).
The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. An equal protection claim may be established by showing that prison officials intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Imp. v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008).
In addition, an inmate "'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue' as to whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared to prisoners of other faiths" and that "officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner." Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Taking from Turner, the Court must consider whether "the difference between the defendants' treatment of[Plaintiff] and their treatment of [other] inmates is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891.
Damages are not available for official-capacity RLUIPA claims. Sossamon v. Texas, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011). In addition, this Court has consistently held that damages are not available against Defendants sued in their individual capacity under RLUIPA. See e.g., White v. Linderman, CV 11-8152-PCT-RCB (SPL) (Doc. 68); Harris v. Schriro, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Ariz. 2009); Abdullah v. Schriro, CV 08-0255-TUC-CKJ. Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on the issue, it has observed that four other circuit courts have held that RLUIPA does not provide for damage claims against prison officials. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 639 F.3d 916, 922 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011). Other district courts within this Circuit have also found that RLUIPA does not provide for individual-capacity damage claims. See, e.g., Florer v. Bales- Johnson, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1205-1206 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Parks v. Brooks, 2010 WL 5186071, at *1-2 (D. Nev. 2010); Sokolsky v. Voss, 2010 WL 2991522, at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ().
Because damages under RLUIPA are not available as a matter of law, claims for damages under RLUIPA are dismissed.
An action against a state official in his official capacity is not an action against the official but rather is an action against the official's office, so damages are unavailable. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacity. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007). Official-capacity damage claims for First Amendment violations will be dismissed.
Plaintiff asserts that he is a gentile practitioner of Torah Observant Messianic Judaism (TOMJ). (PSOF ¶ 6.) He contends that one of the core tenets is observance of the Sabbath (Shabbat), which begins on Friday at sunset and ends on Saturday at sunset. (Id. ¶ 8.) He claims that the Friday evening observance consists of about 25 prayers and blessings and lasts 60-90 minutes and the Saturday morning observance involves prayers and blessings, readings from the Bible, and discussion by the congregation, all of which lasts up to 4 hours. (Id.) In his SAC, Plaintiff alleged that Shabbat also includes an evening convocation known as Ma'arn. (Doc. 41 at 5.) Religious services for TOMJ are currently limited to 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff argues that Native Americans are permitted Sweat Lodge ceremonies that are 3 to 4 hours long because they cannot complete the ceremony in only 60 minutes. (PSOF ¶ 10.)
Defendants assert that ADC incarcerates over 40,000 prisoners in ten prison complexes throughout Arizona, as well as in private and contracted facilities. (DSOF ¶ 52.) The current ADC inmate population represents over forty different religions as declared by the inmates. (Id. ¶ 55.) Department Order (DO) 904: Inmate Religious Activities/Marriage Requests governs inmate religious practice. (Id. ¶ 54.)
The current policy for religious services provides that when no volunteer is assisting or conducting services, services are scheduled for 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 74.) The 60-minute time limit was established before Linderman and Manning became employed by the ADC. (Id. ¶ 75, Manning Decl. ¶ 17, Linderman Decl. ¶¶ 33, 48.) The Defendants are not aware of the specific considerations that went into making the decision to limit the time to an hour. (Manning Decl. ¶ 17, Linderman Decl. ¶ 48.)
Multi-faith gatherings are generally held once a week at each institutional unit, as arranged through the Chaplain in consultation with the Warden, Deputy Warden, or Chief of security. (DSOF ¶ 77.) Multi-faith services are scheduled for 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 8.) Multi-faith gatherings are for religious groups that do not have identified volunteer leadership, that are not already scheduled for weekly ceremonies, and that have a sufficient number of inmates requesting group ceremonies. (DSOF ¶ 78.) Inmatespracticing a religion that does not have a volunteer are generally required to have their services during the Multi-faith services. (Id. ¶ 79.) An exception is made for the Jewish and Messianic Jewish inmates to observe Shabbat because Shabbat is observed on Friday evenings. (Id.)
In his SAC, Plaintiff seeks 3 hours to conduct Shabbat services on Friday. In a grievance, he proposed a...
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