Harris v. Schriro

• Decision Date: 11 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. CV 06-0755-PHX-GMS (ECV).,CV 06-0755-PHX-GMS (ECV).
• Citation: 652 F.Supp.2d 1024
• Parties: Ronald J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. Dora SCHRIRO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

652 F.Supp.2d 1024

Ronald J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. Dora SCHRIRO, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 06-0755-PHX-GMS (ECV).

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

August 11, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald J. Harris, Phoenix, AZ, pro se.

Kelley Joan Morrissey, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ronald J. Harris, who was formerly confined in the Arizona State Prison system, filed this civil rights action against various officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). The remaining Defendants—Schriro, ADC Director; Bartos, Warden at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis during the relevant time period; Linderman, Administrator of Pastoral Activities; Johnson, Deputy Warden ASPC-Bachman Unit during the relevant time period; and Suwinski, Contract Management Specialist at ASPC-Lewis during the relevant time period—move for summary judgment.¹ (Doc. # 152.) Although the Court issued a Notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), advising him of his obligation to respond and granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file his response, Plaintiff did not respond. (Doc. ## 155, 158.) The motion is ready for ruling.

The Court will grant the motion and terminate the action.

I. Procedural History and Summary of Motion

In his Complaint, Plaintiff, who is Jewish, alleged that, he was denied regular kosher meals (Count I) and religious services (Count II). The Complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Doc. # 1.) The Court directed Schriro, Bartos, Johnson, Linderman, Suwinski, and Morrison² to answer Count I and dismissed Count II because it did not state a claim.

A. First Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants' first motion for summary judgment addressed only the First Amendment claims. The Court noted that Plaintiff raised numerous complaints regarding the provision of kosher meals and that, on the one hand, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants "allege the state has a valid set of policies and procedures for kosher meals. Plaintiff agrees that this is so." (Doc. # 138 at 7.) Thus, as to some allegations, Plaintiff appeared to claim that Defendants deviated from their valid policies. On the other hand, some of his allegations and his specific requests for relief appeared to ask for more stringent procedures than those required by ADC policy. In his request for relief, Plaintiff asks for "kosher food in approved recognized original kosher packaging only, unopened by [ADC] staff with [specified kosher symbols] on their packages. . . . Vegetables untouched by staff in any manner that I can wash myself." (Doc. # 1 at 16.) The Court also noted that Plaintiff had confused the issues by agreeing that ADC policies are valid and simultaneously criticizing and complaining about some of them yet not specifically asking for changes, e.g. the cleansing of the oven and the heating of kosher foods with non-kosher foods. The Court separately addressed the different types of claims—deviations from policies and requests for modification of policies—and limited the requests for modification of the ADC policies to those requests specifically set forth in the request for relief in the Complaint.

As to claims for violation of the First Amendment, the motion was denied regarding allegations that, in violation of ADC policies, Plaintiff was served meat and cheese items together and that he saw food items being prepared without saran barriers between the food and counter tops. It was denied as to claims for damages for failure to modify the kosher diet policy regarding food packaging and labeling and regarding the serving of uncut vegetables; the Court found that it could not determine on the record before it whether ADC would prevail on the third factor under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987): the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have upon guards, other inmates, and prison resources. And the Court determined that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to these allegations. (Doc. # 138.)

Summary judgment was granted in all other respects. The Court dismissed Schriro and Bartos as to claims that Plaintiff's rights were violated by service and preparation of food in violation of ADC policies; Plaintiff provided no evidence to establish a link between their conduct and any alleged violation. The Court also dismissed Suwinski as to claims requesting modification of ADC policies; there was no evidence that she had any authority to modify ADC kosher-diet policies. Id.

Defendants moved for reconsideration of so much of the Order arguing that Plaintiff's claims for the modification of the kosher diet policy regarding food packaging and labeling, and regarding the serving of uncut vegetables are injunctive in nature and should be dismissed because Plaintiff is no longer in ADC's custody. (Doc. # 139 at 3.) The Court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff's request regarding modifications was fairly construed as one for damages for failure to provide those modifications as well as injunctive relief as to those modifications. The Court held that although the injunctive relief is moot, the damage claims are not. (Doc. #154.)

B. Second Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) there is no individual liability under RLUIPA; (2) money damages are not available under RLUIPA; (3) claims for injunctive relief are moot; (4) Plaintiff's religious exercise was not substantially burdened; (5) Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's Free Exercise of religion under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); and (6) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the RLUIPA claims.

II. RLUIPA and Individual and Official-Capacity Claims for Damages and Claims for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Doc. # 1 at 16.) Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims should be dismissed because (1) the injunctive relief is moot due to Plaintiff's release; (2) there is no individual liability under RLUIPA, so damage claims against Defendants in their individual capacity fail; and (3) damage claims against Defendants in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. # 152 at 4-7.) Plaintiff filed no response.

As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot bring individual or official-capacity damage claims under RLUIPA and the claims for injunctive relief are moot. Therefore, the Court will dismiss all RLUIPA claims.

A. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff was released to his term of community supervision on May 24, 2007. Because Plaintiff has been released from custody, his request for injunctive relief is now moot. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n. 8 (9th Cir.2005) (prayers for injunctive relief are mooted by a prisoner's release or transfer to another facility).

B. Individual Liability for Damages

1. Defendants' Contentions

Defendants argue that although RLUIPA created a private cause of action for inmates whose free exercise rights are violated, the statute was not intended to create a private cause of action against prison officials in their individual capacity. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 328-29 (5th Cir.2009); see also Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1067 (D.Haw.2002); Boles v. Neet, 402 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1241 (D.Colo.2005). (Doc. # 152 at 4.)

Defendants also argue that if the Court concludes that Defendants may be sued in their individual capacities, Plaintiff must prove that the Defendants acted intentionally, as opposed to negligently. See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 194, 196 (4th Cir.2006) (Prison officials did not act with requisite degree of culpability to be liable in their individual capacities under RLUIPA where, at most, they acted negligently.) (Doc. # 152 at 4.)

2. Analysis

The only Courts of Appeals to have squarely addressed this issue—the Fifth, Seventh, and the Eleventh Circuits—have held that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages against individuals. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29; Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir.2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2007). The Third Circuit has declined to address the issue. Brown v. Dep't of Corr., 265 Fed.Appx. 107, 111 n. 3 (3d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("We also find it unnecessary to reach the questions whether individuals may be liable for monetary damages under the RLUIPA and whether qualified immunity applies here."). The Fourth Circuit noted a split in the district courts over the issue, but did not resolve it. Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006). And as the Fifth Circuit noted in Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 327 n. 23, "[t]he Ninth Circuit appears to have assumed that a cause of action for monetary relief against state actors in their individual capacities exists, but its cases contain no analysis and are unpublished," citing Campbell v. Alameida, 295 Fed.Appx. 130, 131 (9th Cir.2008) (mem.) (unpublished); Von Staich v. Hamlet, Nos. 04-16011 & 06-17026, ___ Fed.Appx. ___, ___, 2007 WL 3001726, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2007) (mem.) (unpublished). In addition, in Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir.2008), the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in a case involving several defendants sued in their individual capacities, and in Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.2005), the court reversed the denial of injunctive relief. See also Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir.2008); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (9th Cir.2008).

RLUIPA creates a cause of action for suits against "a government"; government is defined as "(i) a State county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) a branch,...