Orendick v. Chiodo

Decision Date10 May 2000
Citation272 A.D.2d 901,707 N.Y.S.2d 574
PartiesMARIANNE ORENDICK et al., Plaintiffs,<BR>v.<BR>FRANK CHIODO et al., Defendants.<BR>LAW FIRM OF PAUL WILLIAM BELTZ, P. C., Appellant;<BR>GLENN E. MURRAY, Formerly Doing Business as MURRAY & COLEMAN, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Hayes, Scudder, Kehoe and Balio, JJ.

Order unanimously reversed on the law and facts without costs, motion granted in part and judgment ordered in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiffs, Marianne Orendick and Michael Orendick, each had a personal injury action pending in Supreme Court, in which the other asserted a derivative cause of action. They were represented by the Law Firm of Paul William Beltz, P. C.; Paul Beltz had declined an offer of $100,000 in Marianne's case. The cases were scheduled for trial, with Michael's case to be tried first and Marianne's case to be tried immediately following. On the eve of Michael's trial, plaintiffs telephoned and discharged Beltz, following up that conversation with a letter dated the same day. According to plaintiffs, the discharge was precipitated by Beltz's poor treatment of them during a trial preparation session in Beltz's office the day before, when Beltz intimated that Michael was not being truthful in his answers to questions concerning his educational background. Several days after being discharged, Beltz admittedly contacted another local attorney who was related to plaintiffs and had represented plaintiffs in the past, to discuss the cases with her. According to Beltz, the telephone contact was merely to advise plaintiffs of the need to obtain subsequent representation and to impress upon plaintiffs the importance of being entirely truthful in their testimony. Supreme Court, however, determined that Beltz had made the contact to obtain the attorney's assistance in recovering plaintiffs as clients.

Plaintiffs subsequently retained the law firm of Murray & Coleman (Murray) to represent them in these actions. After being reimbursed for disbursements on behalf of plaintiffs, Beltz released plaintiffs' files to Murray and an order was issued providing that any fees to which Beltz was entitled would be determined at a hearing after the conclusion of the actions.

Murray tried Michael's action and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Marianne's action was then settled for the sum of $100,000, which, after disbursements, resulted in an attorney's fee in the amount of $28,261.03. Murray sent Beltz a check in the amount...

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9 cases
  • Doviak v. Finkelstein & Partners, LLP
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • December 13, 2011
    ...discharge may serve as a basis for a fee forfeiture’ ” ( Coccia v. Liotti, 70 A.D.3d at 757, 896 N.Y.S.2d 90, quoting Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 902, 707 N.Y.S.2d 574). This rule is [934 N.Y.S.2d 471] intended to “ ‘promote public confidence in the members of an honorable professio......
  • Coccia v. Liotti
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • February 9, 2010
    ...on the client's file ( see Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d at 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611; Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 707 N.Y.S.2d 574; Matter of Leopold, 244 A.D.2d 411, 664 N.Y.S.2d 323). “Misconduct that occurs before an attorney's discharge but is not......
  • Bode & Grenier, L.L.P. v. Knight
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 20, 2011
    ...may not be warranted where a purported breach of fiduciary duty occurs after an attorney's discharge. Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 902, 707 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y.App.2000) (reversing trial court's judgment for clients in a disgorgement action, in part because the purported breach of fidu......
  • Stern v. Westerman Ball Ederer Miller & Sharfstein, LLP
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • July 24, 2017
    ...a charging or retaining lien. For example, "an attorney who is discharged for cause is not entitled to a fee[.]" Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 902 (4th Dep't 2000) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[p]rior acts or inaction discovered after the substitution [of counsel] which constitute ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • 1.73 - 7. Attorney Liens To Protect Fees
    • United States
    • New York State Bar Association Preparing for & Trying the Civil Lawsuit (NY) Chapter One Ethical Considerations
    • Invalid date
    ...E.2 below. [368] . 50 N.Y.2d 149, 155–57, 428 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1980). See also 1B Carmody-Wait 2d § 3:558. [369] . Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 707 N.Y.S.2d 574 (4th Dep't 2000); Stern v. Westerman Ball Ederer Miller & Sharfstein, LLP, 2017 WL 3130415 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). [370] . De Luccia ......
  • 1.83 - A. Discharge For Cause
    • United States
    • New York State Bar Association Preparing for & Trying the Civil Lawsuit (NY) Chapter One Ethical Considerations
    • Invalid date
    ...access to the file if C objects unless an exception to the duty of confidentiality applies.446 --------Notes:[435] . Orendick v. Chiodo, 272 A.D.2d 901, 707 N.Y.S.2d 574 (4th Dep't 2000); Stern v. Westerman Ball Ederer Miller & Sharfstein, LLP, 1:17-CV-34, 2017 WL 3130415 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).[4......

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