Orgel v. Stewart Title Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Parties: Eva ORGEL, appellant, v. STEWART TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 00760

91 A.D.3d 922

938 N.Y.S.2d 131

Eva ORGEL, appellant,

v.STEWART TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Jan. 31, 2012.

Robert Teitelbaum & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

Solomon & Siris, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Stuart Siris and Keith S. Garret of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, ARIEL E. BELEN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.

In an action for a judgment declaring that the defendant is obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in an underlying action entitled Sudit v. Lefferts Homes, Inc., pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No. 22592/01, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated August 16, 2010, as denied those branches of her motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 which were to strike the answer or direct the defendant to provide additional discovery, and granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 which was to strike the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“ ‘The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” ( Giano v. Ioannou, 78 A.D.3d 768, 770, 911 N.Y.S.2d 398, quoting Fishbane v. Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 A.D.3d 1079, 1081, 885 N.Y.S.2d 718; see Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 N.Y.2d 118, 123, 700 N.Y.S.2d 87, 722 N.E.2d 55). However, “the ‘drastic remedy’ of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be imposed unless the failure to comply with discovery demands or orders is clearly willful and contumacious” ( Rock City Sound, Inc. v. Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 A.D.3d 685, 686, 920 N.Y.S.2d 394 [citation omitted], quoting Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d 798, 801, 914 N.Y.S.2d 196 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Commisso v. Orshan, 85 A.D.3d 845, 925 N.Y.S.2d 612; Morgenstern v. Jeffsam Corp., 78 A.D.3d 913, 914, 912 N.Y.S.2d 231; Giano v. Ioannou, 78 A.D.3d at 770, 911 N.Y.S.2d 398; Jenkins v. Proto Prop. Servs., LLC, 54 A.D.3d 726, 726–727, 864 N.Y.S.2d 79; Carabello v. Luna, 49 A.D.3d 679, 853 N.Y.S.2d 663). “Willful and contumacious conduct may be inferred from a party's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, coupled with inadequate explanations for the failures to comply or a failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time” ( Rock City Sound, Inc. v. Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 A.D.3d at 686–687, 920 N.Y.S.2d 394 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Commisso v. Orshan, 85 A.D.3d at 845, 925 N.Y.S.2d 612; Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d at 800, 914 N.Y.S.2d 196; Morgenstern v. Jeffsam Corp., 78 A.D.3d at 914, 912 N.Y.S.2d 231; Giano v. Ioannou, 78 A.D.3d at 771, 911 N.Y.S.2d 398; Savin v. Brooklyn Mar. Park Dev. Corp., 61 A.D.3d 954, 954–955, 878 N.Y.S.2d 178).

“The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 rests within the discretion of the motion court” ( Rock City Sound, Inc. v. Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 A.D.3d at 686, 920 N.Y.S.2d 394; see Commisso v. Orshan, 85 A.D.3d at 845, 925 N.Y.S.2d 612; Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d at 800, 914 N.Y.S.2d 196; Morgenstern v. Jeffsam Corp., 78 A.D.3d at 914, 912 N.Y.S.2d 231; Savin v. Brooklyn Mar. Park Dev. Corp., 61 A.D.3d at 954, 878 N.Y.S.2d 178). Thus, although “[s]trong public policy ... favors the resolution of cases on the merits” ( Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d at 800, 914 N.Y.S.2d 196), “[a] determination to impose sanctions for conduct which frustrates the disclosure scheme of the CPLR should not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion” ( Savin v. Brooklyn Mar. Park Dev. Corp., 61 A.D.3d at 954, 878 N.Y.S.2d 178 [internal quotations and citations omitted] ).

Here, the court, which has “ ‘broad discretion to oversee the discovery process' ” ( Maiorino v. City of New York, 39 A.D.3d 601, 601, 834 N.Y.S.2d 272, quoting Castillo v. Henry Schein, Inc., 259 A.D.2d 651, 652, 686 N.Y.S.2d 818), determined that the defendant had produced all the discovery to which the plaintiff was entitled. The record supports the court's determination that the defendant made “a good-faith effort to address the [plaintiff's] requests meaningfully” ( Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 N.Y.2d at 123, 700 N.Y.S.2d 87, 722 N.E.2d 55). Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 which were to strike the defendant's answer or direct it to provide additional discovery.

By contrast, the plaintiff's refusal, over a period of nine months and despite three court orders, to appear for a deposition, coupled with her failure to proffer a reasonable excuse for that refusal, supports an inference that her conduct was willful and contumacious ( see Rock City...