Orient Ins. Co. v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 19 May 1896
• Citation: 25 S.E. 560,98 Ga. 464
• Parties: ORIENT INS. CO. v. WILLIAMSON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

25 S.E. 560

98 Ga. 464

ORIENT INS. CO. v. WILLIAMSON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 19, 1896

Syllabus by the Court.

It being stipulated in a policy of fire insurance issued to a woman, covering a building described in the policy as "her one-story frame, shingle-roof dwelling," that the policy should be void "if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated therein," or "if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership," it was error, upon the trial of an action brought upon the policy by the insured, to reject a plea, offered in due time, alleging that when the policy was issued the plaintiff was not the owner of the property, because she had previously conveyed the same to another by a fee-simple deed, and that if the defendant had known this fact it would not have issued the policy. This is true although the deed in question may have been made to secure a debt, its effect being to pass the title.

Error from city court, Floyd county; G. A. H. Harris, Judge.

Action by Janie R. Williamson against the Orient Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed.

Fouché & Fouché and Glenn, Slaton & Phillips, for plaintiff in error.

McHenry Nunnally & Neel, for defendant in error.

SIMMONS C.J.

Mrs Williamson sued the Orient Insurance Company for loss by fire, upon a policy of insurance covering a building described in the policy as "her one-story frame shingle-roof dwelling." The policy contained a stipulation that it should be void "if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated therein," or "if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership." On the trial of the case, and at the close of the testimony for the plaintiff, the defendant offered to amend its plea by alleging that "at the time of procuring the policy sued on the plaintiff represented that she was the owner in fee of the property insured, and that her interest was that of unconditional and sole owner thereof; and the defendant has just discovered that at that time she was not the owner thereof, but on the 1st day of August, 1892, she conveyed said property to the Security Investment Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut, by deed in fee simple, and that at the date of the destruction of the property she was not the owner thereof," and that "said policy was void by reason thereof," and that "if it had known that said property had been so deeded, or that it was incumbered, no policy would have been issued on the same." The court refused to allow the amendment, on the ground that it came too late, and on the further ground that it set up no sufficient defense. We think the court erred in refusing to allow the amendment. The acceptance by the insured of a policy containing the stipulation above quoted amounted to a representation on her part that she had truly stated therein her interest in the property insured, and that her interest was that of unconditional and sole ownership; and if at that time the title of the property was in another, to whom she had conveyed it by deed in fee simple, the representation was untrue, and according to the terms of the contract the policy was void. In reply to the argument that the stipulation referred to would not render the policy void, unless inquiry as to the title was made of the insured, we quote from an opinion of the United States circuit court of appeals, delivered by Sanborn, J., in the case of Insurance Co. v. Bohn, 12 C.C.A. 531, 65 F. 165, where it is said, in discussing this question: "It is contended that the contracts in these policies, which exclude the Bohns from fire insurance under them upon any interest but that of unconditional ownership, are without binding force, because no inquiry respecting their title was made by the companies, and no statement concerning it was made by the Bohns when these policies were issued. But neither inquiry nor statement before the...