Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club

• Decision Date: 09 April 1952
• Citation: 110 Cal.App.2d 340,242 P.2d 660
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ORLOFF v. HOLLYWOOD TURF CLUB et al. ORLOFF v. LOS ANGELES TURF CLUB, Inc. et al. Civs. 18807, 18808.

Page 660

242 P.2d 660

110 Cal.App.2d 340

ORLOFF v. HOLLYWOOD TURF CLUB et al.

ORLOFF v. LOS ANGELES TURF CLUB, Inc. et al.

Civs. 18807, 18808.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

April 9, 1952.

Rehearing Denied April 25, 1952.

Hearing Denied June 5, 1952.

William Katz, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Freston & Files, and Eugene D. Williams, Los Angeles, for respondents Hollywood Turf Club and others.

Victor Ford Collins, Los Angeles, for respondents Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. and others.

PER CURIAM.

This is just another appeal in that large category of appeals, wholly devoid of merit, which come to this court for decision.

The appellant, as plaintiff below, instituted two actions, one against the Hollywood Turf Club and the other against the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., which he submits for decision on consolidated briefs. On January 31, 1946, plaintiff after having purchased a ticket from the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., was ejected after his admission from its Santa Anita race track for a cause, not stated by him, but which he avers, by way of conclusion and not ultimate fact, was unlawful and unjustified. Likewise, after purchasing a ticket and being admitted on February 2, 1946, he was again ejected. He avers that on both occasions he was told by the agents of the Los Angeles Turf Club, the owners of the Santa Anita race track, that even though he should thereafter, at any time, purchase a ticket or tender the cost of admission he would not be admitted to the track and, if by chance he should happen to be admitted he would be ejected. As a result of these alleged statements appellant on April 6, 1951, instituted an action against the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., as the owner along with its agents to recover damages and penalties predicated upon Civil Code, secs. 51, 52, 53 and 54. The action was not based upon the two particular acts of ejectment as narrated (as the statute of limitations had run) but on the theory that he was entitled to damages for his non-admission or ejection on each and every racing day the track was open thereafter within three years of the date of the filing of his complaint, even though he had not personally appeared at the track or purchased a ticket or been ejected on any of such days. The basis for this claim of damages and penalties is rested (1) on the statement made by the owners of the racing track, or their agents, that even if plaintiff purchased a ticket he would not be admitted and, if he succeeded in being admitted, that he would be ejected; (2) that the defendants waived any legal obligation of the plaintiff to purchase a ticket and seek admission thereafter because in suits for injunction to restrain the defendants from refusing to admit him to the racing arena the defendants resisted the suits. This then is the sole basis for his alleged cause of action.

The trial court ruled that the amended complaint did not state a cause of action and plaintiff having declined in writing to amend the court entered a judgment against him.

The amended complaint against the Hollywood Turf Club, to which a demurrer was likewise sustained, does not differ in any material particular from that against the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., except for the allegation that the plaintiff appeared at the Hollywood Park race track, purchased a ticket, was admitted and ejected on May 24, 1947.

Section 51 of the Civil Code expressly provides, as interpreted by our decisions, that all citizens are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, privileges and facilities of race tracks subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens, and by Section 52, that any such failure or discrimination by reason of color or race or otherwise creates for each and every such offense a liability in damages in an amount not less than $100. No question of race or color is involved in the cases before us.

It is at once apparent that under the provisions of Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code that if a charge is made for admission to a race track, equally applicable to all citizens, that a failure or refusal by a citizen to pay such charge does not create a liability under the statute. It is the privilege of an inn, a railroad or a race track to demand, in advance, pay for the accommodation, facility or the privilege to be rendered. Hence, a failure of a person to comply therewith is not a refusal of any equal accommodation, facility or privilege accorded to those who do comply. The statute expressly provides that the equality called for by the statute is subject 'to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.' Among such conditions and limitations applicable to all citizens is that they shall pay the charges imposed, equally and without discrimination, upon all citizens.

Civil Code, secs. 53 and 54, expressly provide that a refusal by a racing course to admit a person 21 years of age or over presenting a ticket, or the price thereof, is unlawful unless the person is under the influence of liquor, is guilty of...