Orrick v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 31 October 1863
• Citation: 34 Mo. 226
• Parties: PHILIP P. ORRICK AND WIFE, Appellants, v. JOSIAH PRATT, ADM'R OF THOMAS J. ROBBINS, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

34 Mo. 226

PHILIP P. ORRICK AND WIFE, Appellants,

v.JOSIAH PRATT, ADM'R OF THOMAS J. ROBBINS, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1863.

Appeal from St. Charles Probate Court.

T. W. Cunningham, with Lewis & Alexander, for appellants.

I. Dower is defined to be, “the portion which a widow hath of the lands of her husband at his decease for the sustenance of herself and education of her children.” (Toml. Law Dic. 578.) The “child's part” is, therefore, nothing more than a measure of quantity. The election to take it does not change the nature or origin of the title--does not metamorphose “dower” into “inheritance.” It is assigned as dower, and derives no odor from the statute of descents and distributions. The words of the statute are conclusive of the question. The widow may “elect to be endowed ab-“solutely in a share of such lands equal to the share of a “child,” &c. (R. C. 1855, p. 670, § 11.) It is difficult to perceive the basis of the first instruction given for the defendant, unless it be that the Legislature intended to provide for the widow a means of rejuvenation at their option.

II. The statute provides that, until dower be assigned, the widow may remain in and enjoy, &c. No condition appears as to the kind or quantity of dower, or whether with or without election of any sort. The privilege of election would be a mere snare for the unwary widow if she were thus to be deprived of the home and appurtenances which are unequivocally assured to her by a distinct and independent provision of law. (R. C. 1855, p. 672, § 21.)

Quere--If the widow “remain in and enjoy,” &c., for a year or two previous to making any election, must she on such election pay over back rents?

III. The expression “messuage or plantation thereto belonging” means at least the whole tract under cultivation belonging to deceased on which his mansion-house is situated. If there be only a “messuage,” it means that; if there be a “plantation,” it means that just as clearly. (R. C. 1855, p. 672, § 21.) The right to “remain in and enjoy” implies the right to receive the profits for the time being. (1 Lomax on Real Prop. 91; Latham v. Latham, 3 Call. 181; Graham v. Graham, 6 Mon. 561; Chaplin v. Simmons, 7 Mon. 337, 338; Driskel v. Hanks, 18 B. Mon. 864, 865.)

Coalter and Krekel, for respondent.

I. The widow is entitled to dower under the statute R. C. 1855, p. 668, § 1, and, under the 21st section, to remain in the mansion-house of her husband, and the messuage or plantation thereto belonging, until dower be assigned, without being liable to pay rent for the same, unless she takes by election under the 11th section of the same act. Her right is absolute until divested by election.

II. The widow has no right to the possession under the claim of quarantine until dower is assigned of lands of which her husband was not seized in fact at the time of his death, and which were severed by lease in the actual possession of tenants detached and disconnected from the mansion, messuage or plantation.

III. That the widow, when she elects to take, in lieu of dower, a child's part in the lands of her deceased husband equal to the share of a child under the 11th section of the dower act, subject to the payment of debts, all her rights and claims under the 1st and 21st sections are extinguished by her election.

The widow retained the possession of the mansion-house and the messuage thereto belonging of her deceased husband from April, 1859, till March 1862; and she never was deforced therefrom or required to pay rent for the same, and her possession was a continuation of the intestate's.

The sixty-six acres, alleged in the plaintiff's petition to be part of the plantation belonging to the mansion-house tract, were not in the actual possession of the intestate at the time of his death, but were severed therefrom by lease and in the possession of tenants; her claim of quarantine does not extend to the ambit of the tract, as evidenced by title deeds, but only to the part enclosed by fence; and the term messuage is held to include a few acres adjoining the dwelling-house and peculiarly appropriate thereto. (Carey v. Buntain, 4 Bibb, 217; 1 Lomax, 91; Grayson & Wife v. Moncure, 1 Leigh, 449; Smith v. Smith, 13 Ala. 329; 5 Munf. 348; 4 Black. 334; 5 Black. 261.)

Under the 45th section of the 2d article concerning the administration of estates, “the administrator, under the direction of the court, shall lease the real estate for any term not more than three years, and the slaves for a period not more than one year at a time, and shall receive and recover such rents, hire and wages;” and, under the 14th section of article 6th of said act, “the court shall order such sum to be paid to her (the widow) out of the hire of slaves and the rent of real estate as shall be in proportion to her interest in the slaves and real estate.” These are limited until dower shall be assigned, or otherwise, until she makes her election under the 11th section of the “Act concerning dower.” Under this section, she elects to take a child's part of the real estate absolutely, subject to the charge of the debts of the intestate.

Whenever real estate is by statute made liable for the payment of debts of the deceased, there it constitutes legal assets, and as legal assets are such as come into the hands and power of the executor or administrator, or such as he is entrusted with by law, by virtue of his office, to dispose of in the course of administration; or, in other words, whatever an executor or administrator takes by virtue of his office, is to be considered as legal assets. Therefore, the rents were rightly incorporated into the funds of the estate and administered as assets. (1 Sto. Eq. § 51, 52; Williams on Exec'rs, § 1433; Zoller on Exec'rs, Ch. 8, p. 409.)

By the 4th section of the “Act concerning dower,” the widow would be entitled to one-third of the rents and profits on the distribution of the personal estate. The instructions of the plaintiffs not being supported by the evidence were lawfully refused. (19 Mo. 408; 8 Mo. 707; 27 Mo. 26; 32 Mo. 411, 366; 33 Mo. 340.)

By the common law, dower is an inchoate title, and is created by the concurrence of marriage and seizen, and is consummated by the death of the husband, and this title is merely a chose in action to one-third part of the lands, during her natural life, whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage to which she shall not have relinquished her right of dower in the manner prescribed by law; and as an incident to dower the widow has the privilege, by law, to remain in the capital messuage or mansion-house, or other house whereof she is dowable, forty days after her husband's death: this right of quarantine being an incident of dower, was confirmed by Magna Charta, Ch. 7. The 1st section of the “Act concerning dower” is an affirmative statute, discharged of debts; and the 21st section of said act gives to the widow a personal privilege as an incident to dower. To authorize the widow to claim the privilege to remain in the mansion-house and the messuage or plantation thereto belonging, she must have a title upon which to base her claim. Now her title to dower may become extinguished under our statute: 1st, by the relinquishing her dower in the manner prescribed by law; 2d, electing in lieu of dower to take an absolute estate in the lands of her deceased husband equal to the share of a child under the 11th section of the ““Act concerning dower;” 3d, by a devise accepted by her under the 15th section; and 4th, by jointure under the 17th section. Now, it is evident, that whatever and whenever the widow elects to take under any one of these sections, that which she takes is not dower, but a substitute for dower, and does not pass under the name of dower. (1 Kentucky Digest, 518; Still v. Swan, Lit. Select Cases, 156.) Then when she elects to take under the 11th section, she evinces her election by deed to take part of the land charged with the debts of the intestate. Dower the widow takes under title by law: a child's part is different in its character and tenure; this she takes by contract, an absolute fee simple, an acquisition of real estate by her own act or agreement. This 11th section being repugnant to the 1st and the 21st, being an adjunct of the 1st, they both cease to operate in her behalf by her own choice; she cannot claim the privilege held out to her in the 21st section, because she has nothing upon which to base her claim; she is not a doweress--her dower is extinguished by her own election, and she has no title upon which to base her claim under any statute; her dower is merged in the inheritance by release, and she is vested with a fee simple absolute, and holds her right by title purchased in...