Ortiz v. Amazon.Com LLC
Decision Date | 24 May 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-03820-JSW |
Citation | 389 F.Supp.3d 728 |
Parties | Michael ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Scott Edward Cole, Scott Cole & Associates, APC, Cesar A. Alvarado, Law offices of Scott Cole, Oakland, CA, Laura Grace Van Note, Scott Cole and Associates, Concord, CA, for Plaintiff.
Michele Leigh Maryott, Megan M. Cooney, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Irvine, CA, Eric Meckley, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jason C. Schwartz, Pro Hac Vice, Washingon, DC, Katherine V.A. Smith, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Nancy Villarreal, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendants.
JEFFREY S. WHITE, United States District Judge Now before the Court for consideration is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Golden State FC LLC ("Golden State") and Amazon.com LLC ("Amazon") (collectively "Defendants"). The Court has considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it has had the benefit of oral argument. The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendants' motion on Plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") but DENIES Defendants' motion on the state law claims.
In his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Plaintiff, Michael Ortiz ("Ortiz"), on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleges that Defendants, acting as joint employers, misclassified him as an exempt employee under federal and state law.2 As a result, Ortiz alleges that Defendants: (1) failed to pay him overtime in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. section 207 ; (2) failed to pay him overtime in violation of California Labor Code ("Labor Code") sections 510, 1194, and 1198 ; (3) failed to provide rest and meal breaks in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7, 512, and 558 ; (4) failed to provide itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code sections 226 and 1174 ; (5) failed to timely pay wages on termination in violation of Labor Code section 203 ; and (6) violated California's Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.3
Ortiz was employed as a "Level 4 Manager" at three delivery stations (South San Francisco, San Leandro, and Richmond), from February 1, 2016 until his employment ended on or about December 11, 2016.4 (Meckley Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. B, Deposition of Michael Ortiz ("Ortiz Depo.") at 31:2-19; Ortiz Depo. Ex. 1 ("Offer Letter"); Declaration of Michael Ortiz ("Ortiz Decl."), ¶ 25 ; Murrow Decl., ¶ 5; Declaration of Mark Lopez ("Lopez Decl."), ¶ 3.) Ortiz acknowledged that he accepted "employment with Golden State FC, LLC under the terms set forth in this letter," which included a statement that his position was exempt from overtime pay. (Offer Letter at 1-2; see also Meckley Decl., Ex. B, Ortiz Depo. at 33:2-7.)
(Meckley Decl., Ex. B, Ortiz Depo. at 134:1-13; Ortiz Depo. Ex. 2 ("Job Description" at 1).)
The Job Description also outlines a shift manager's key job duties as:
Ortiz testified that some, but not all, of the responsibilities listed in the job description were consistent with his understanding of his responsibilities. (Meckley Decl., Ex. B, Ortiz Depo. at 134:2-135:23.) Ortiz also testified that a shift assistant and a "Tier 2" associate reported to him, that the station manager was on site part of the time, and that occasionally an area manager was present at a delivery station. (Id. , at 57:13-58:18, 59:24-60:9, 114:11-12.) Ortiz testified that, in general, he was the only shift manager on duty at the San Leandro and Richmond facilities. (Id. , at 196:20-197:3.)
The Court will address additional facts as necessary in the analysis.
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense ... on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Freeman v. Arpaio , 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro , 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "genuine" only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must "identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment." Keenan v. Allan , 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. , 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995) ); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Ortiz will have the initial "burden of proving [he was] not properly compensated for work performed." Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n , 59 Cal. 4th 1, 25, 40, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916 (2014). The issue of whether an employee is subject to an exemption is an affirmative defense, and Defendants will bear the burden of proving that defense if the matter proceeds to trial. Id. See also Bargas v. Rite Aid Corp. , 245 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2017). Therefore, in order to prevail on their motion, Defendants must establish there are no genuine issues of disputed facts about whether Ortiz is exempt. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (). See also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) ( ).
Under both the FLSA and the California Labor Code, an employee is entitled to overtime pay, unless an employer establishes the employee is subject to a statutory exemption. See Solis v. Washington , 656 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) ; Heyen v. Safeway Inc. , 216 Cal. App. 4th 795, 816, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 (2013). Defendants contend Ortiz falls within the executive exemption under the FLSA and the Labor Code. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) ; 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 ; Cal. Lab. Code § 515 ; 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11070 ("Wage Order 7-2001"). Wage Order 7-2001 sets forth six elements that an employer must satisfy to show an employee is subject to that exemption. The FLSA sets forth four elements that an employer must satisfy to show the employee is subject to the exemption.6 Defendants must show that each element is satisfied to show the exemptions apply to Ortiz. Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc. , 299 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) ; Heyen , 216 Cal. App. 4th at 817, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 280.
Under California and federal law, courts had construed the exemptions narrowly. See, e.g., Solis , 656 F.3d at 1083 ; Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. , 59 Cal. 4th 662, 667, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 287, 328 P.3d 1028 (2014). However, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected that "principle as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA," reasoning that the FLSA "gives no ‘textual indication’ that its exemptions should be construed narrowly" and that it had "no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading." Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142, ...
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