Ortiz v. Cornetta
Decision Date | 06 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 322,D,322 |
Citation | 867 F.2d 146 |
Parties | Antonio Miranda ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Victor CORNETTA, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer, John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 88-2321. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Antonio Miranda Ortiz, Attica, N.Y., pro se.
Elizabeth I. Freedman, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the City of New York (Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel for the City of New York, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Before TIMBERS, PIERCE and PRATT, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Ortiz appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Kevin Thomas Duffy, Judge, dismissing as untimely his complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Ortiz alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when, on June 21, 1984, while in custody at police headquarters, he was beaten and then denied adequate medical care by New York City police officers.
Pointing out that Ortiz's complaint had been stamped by the pro se clerk's office as "received" on June 26, 1987, and that it had been filed with the district court clerk on July 1, 1987, defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for dismissal of Ortiz's action on the ground that the applicable three-year statute of limitations had run on June 21, 1987, five days before the complaint was stamped "received" by the pro se office. Ortiz, who was incarcerated during this period, responded that he initially had mailed the complaint to the pro se office on June 9, 1987, but that the clerk, upon receiving the complaint on June 18, 1987--three days before the statute of limitations expired--had returned the complaint to plaintiff for "correction". After making the requested changes, Ortiz claimed that he had mailed the complaint back on June 23, 1987, and that it was the corrected copy that the clerk received on June 26, 1987.
The district court referred the matter to Magistrate Naomi Buchwald, who, after investigation, recommended that defendants' motion be granted and that the complaint be dismissed. Recognizing that the complaint would be timely if the dates provided by Ortiz were correct, see Toliver v. Sullivan, 841 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir.1988) ( ), the magistrate proceeded to "ascertain the truth of plaintiff's factual allegations" by examining files in the pro se office. Finding no evidence in those files that the complaint had arrived any earlier than June 26, 1987, she ultimately rejected Ortiz's version "as contrary to the contemporaneous documentary record".
Over Ortiz's objections, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
Ortiz argues on appeal that dismissal of his complaint was improper. To support this contention, he submits two documents which apparently were never before the magistrate or the district court: (1) a prison mail log showing that he received correspondence from the "U.S. District Court NY, NY" on June 22, 1987, and (2) a document suggesting that prison officials confiscated some of plaintiff's legal papers which could shed additional light on when the complaint was actually received. These, Ortiz argues, coupled with his earlier explanation regarding the mailing of the complaint and its return for correction, make improper a summary dismissal of his action. We agree.
At the outset, we note the general standards--some of which have only recently emerged from both Supreme Court and second circuit decisions--which hold a pro se litigant to less stringent standards than those governing lawyers. Such has long been the case with rules governing pro se complaints, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ( ); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1151 (2d Cir.) (pro se complaint held to "less stringent standards of pleading"), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 469, 54 L.Ed.2d 323 (1977), but it has only been in the past year that courts have extended this principle to form a general standard. Once a pro se litigant has done everything possible to bring his action, he should not be penalized by strict rules which might otherwise apply if he were represented by counsel. See Houston v. Lack, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) ( ); Toliver v. Sullivan County, 841 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.1988) ( ).
We commend the magistrate for recognizing these principles in determining that, because there were conflicting versions as to when the pro se office received the complaint, a summary dismissal without further investigation was inappropriate. Hishon v. Kino & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ( ); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This left her with two choices: either (1) she could recommend that the motion be denied because some doubt still existed as to when the complaint actually arrived in the pro se office, see Abdul-Alim Amin v. Universal Life Insurance Co., 706 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir.1983) () (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Egelston v. State University College, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir.1976) ( ), or (2) as she presumably did in this case, she could consider ...
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