Osban v. State

• Decision Date: 19 April 2019
• Docket Number: S-18-0137
• Citation: 439 P.3d 739
• Parties: Joshua C. OSBAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

439 P.3d 739

Joshua C. OSBAN, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-18-0137

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 19, 2019

Representing Appellant: Mitch Guthrie, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; Christyne Martens, Deputy Attorney General; Caitlin F. Harper, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Russell Farr, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Farr.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Joshua C. Osban of possession of methamphetamine. Mr. Osban appeals his conviction, arguing the State failed to bring him to trial within 180 days following his arraignment as required by Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 48. He also claims the district court should have suppressed the methamphetamine found in a container inside his truck because the search of the container was unreasonable. We reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Osban raises two issues:

I. Whether Mr. Osban’s right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48 was violated when his trial commenced 194 days after his arraignment.

II. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Osban’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine officers discovered in his truck.

Because we reverse on the speedy trial issue, we do not address the motion to suppress.

FACTS

[¶3] Cheyenne Police Officer Jonathan Smith responded to a report that a man had fired a gun at a party. When he arrived at the scene, the homeowner told Officer Smith that her ex-husband, Mr. Osban, had come to the house and argued with her boyfriend, Christopher Cash. She said the argument ended when Mr. Osban shot a gun at Mr. Cash and then drove away. Another witness told Officer Smith that she saw some mud splatter beside Mr. Cash’s leg after the shot was fired. Officers found a .22 Super X casing in the area where witnesses indicated Mr. Osban had fired the shot.

[¶4] Mr. Osban was later apprehended at his home, and a search revealed a .22 caliber pistol, cartridges, and methamphetamine. The State charged Mr. Osban with one count of aggravated assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017), and one count of possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2017). Mr. Osban filed a demand for speedy trial, and he pleaded not guilty to both charges at his arraignment on May 5, 2017. In its criminal case management order, the district court acknowledged that Mr. Osban’s 180-day trial deadline under Rule 48 would run on November 1, 2017, and it set Mr. Osban’s trial for August 14, 2017. The district court later reset the trial for October 16, 2017.

[¶5] On October 2, 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke Mr. Osban’s bond after he tested positive for methamphetamine and alcohol. On October 5, 2017, the district court ordered the clerk of court to issue a bench warrant, which it did the next day. Defense counsel met with Mr. Osban and informed him it was important he turn himself in to law enforcement in order to maintain the October 16, 2017 trial date. On October 12, 2017, Mr. Osban surrendered himself at the Laramie County Detention Center, where he was served with the warrant. The next day, Mr. Osban’s counsel filed a notice that the bench warrant had been executed and Mr. Osban was in custody. Later that day, counsel was informed by district court staff that Mr. Osban’s October 16, 2017 trial date had been vacated. Written notice of the vacated trial setting was not filed until October 25, 2017, when an order on scheduling conference and an order resetting the jury trial were filed. The latter order stated the October 16, 2017 trial had been vacated because Mr. Osban had "absconded in violation of his bond," and both orders reset the trial for November 13, 2017. On November 6, 2017, Mr. Osban filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him because his trial had not taken place on or before November 1, 2017—his Rule 48 deadline. On November 9, 2017, the district court held a hearing on the matter and denied the motion. The district court determined it had not violated Rule 48(b) because when a warrant is issued, the "defendant is unavailable" for trial. It also mentioned that the trial stack required the continuance in the due administration of justice.

[¶6] After being reset one last time, Mr. Osban’s trial commenced on November 15, 2017. The jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine but acquitted him of the aggravated assault and battery charge. The district court sentenced Mr. Osban to two to five years of imprisonment but suspended the sentence in favor of three years of supervised probation.¹ Mr. Osban filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

W.R.Cr.P. 48 Speedy Trial

[¶7] Mr. Osban claims his right to a speedy trial was violated when the district court sua sponte vacated the October 16, 2017 trial setting without giving him an opportunity to object, resulting in his trial taking place after the 180-day deadline required by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).² Mr. Osban filed a motion to dismiss on this basis, and the district court denied the motion. We review speedy trial claims under Rule 48 de novo. Castellanos v. State , 2016 WY 11, ¶ 48, 366 P.3d 1279, 1294 (Wyo. 2016).

[¶8] The constitutional right to a speedy trial has amorphous contours. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The purpose of W.R.Cr.P. 48, and similar rules across the country, is to provide structure to that right. See Castellanos , 2016 WY 11, ¶ 49, 366 P.3d at 1294. The rule’s provisions "are mandatory." Rodiack v. State , 2002 WY 137, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1, 3 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted). The rule provides for trial within 180 days of arraignment, with certain exceptions. Mr. Osban was arraigned on May 5, 2017, and the district court acknowledged that Mr. Osban’s trial must be held on or before November 1, 2017, to comply with the rule. Continuances beyond the 180 days are excusable in certain situations:

(b)(4) Continuances exceeding 180 days from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:

(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; or

(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court if:

(i) The defendant expressly consents;

(ii) The state’s evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or

(iii) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; and

(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense.

W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4). Despite its mandatory nature, neither the rule nor this Court imposes a "set of specific procedural requirements to which a court must adhere in re-setting a trial date[.]" Castellanos , 2016 WY 11, ¶ 63, 366 P.3d at 1298.

[¶9] The district court continued the trial because it believed that Mr. Osban had "absconded in violation of his bond," making him unavailable for the proceedings under Rule 48(b)(6). We cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion. The arrest warrant was not issued because Mr. Osban had absconded or failed to appear for testing or other proceedings; instead, the State alleged he violated his bond because he had tested positive for alcohol and methamphetamine. We do not believe the rule’s phrase "unavailable for any proceeding" is so broad as to encompass an outstanding arrest warrant for a bond violation unrelated to the location of a defendant, particularly when the defendant has not actually missed any proceedings. The district court’s statement that Mr. Osban was unavailable under Rule 48(b)(6) is not supported by any facts in the record.

[¶10] We turn to the State’s argument that the due administration of justice under (b)(4)(B)(iii) required the continuance, and perhaps it might have. We appreciate that the district court was aware of the speedy trial deadline in Mr. Osban’s case, and specifically left his case on the October 16, 2017 trial stack despite defense counsel’s suggestion that "I’m not in a rush to try it on the 16th of October."³ As the trial date approached, the court had to account for the "17 or 18" other cases on the October 16, 2017 trial stack in conjunction with the fact that there was an unexecuted warrant for Mr. Osban’s arrest. Rule 48(b)(4)(B)(iii) recognizes that continuances beyond the 180-day threshold are appropriate when "[r]equired in the due administration of justice," and the district court’s ability to manage a crowded docket can fall into this category. Germany v. State , 999 P.2d 63, 66 (Wyo. 2000).

[¶11] Here, however, the district court ignored the procedures required when a continuance is proposed "in the due administration of justice" under (b)(4)(B)(iii), and instead found retroactively that its crowded docket compelled the continuance. Most district courts have very crowded dockets. If they are permitted to ignore the speedy trial rule and retroactively justify the delay, Rule 48 ’s speedy trial requirement is rendered meaningless.⁴ Further, the language of the rule does not permit the lack of formality that occurred here.

[¶12] Rule 48(b)(4)(C) requires that the court provide the defendant notice of a proposed continuance and an opportunity to object and establish how the delay "may prejudice the defense."

(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense.

[¶13] The district court did not comply with this requirement. On October 13, 2017, court staff informed Mr. Osban’s attorney, not that the court proposed moving his trial date, but that the court had already vacated the original setting. There is no indication in the record that the court informed Mr. Osban’s attorney at that time that the court had...