Osborne v. State of Florida, 87

• Decision Date: 04 January 1897
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: 41 L.Ed. 586,17 S.Ct. 214,164 U.S. 650
• Parties: OSBORNE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

164 U.S. 650

17 S.Ct. 214

41 L.Ed. 586

OSBORNE

v STATE OF FLORIDA.

No. 87.

January 4, 1897.

From the order committing plaintiff in error to the custody of the sheriff, and appeal was taken to the supreme court of the state of Florida, and that court affirmed the order. Osborne v. State, 33 Fla. 162, 14 South. 588. The plaintiff in error then sued out a writ of error from this court.

John E. Hartridge, for plaintiff in error.

W. B. Lamar, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The criminal proceedings against the plaintiff in error were taken by virtue of a statute of Florida, known as 'Chapter 4115,' approved June 2, 1893. The ninth section of that chapter provides that: 'No person shall engage in or manage the business, profession or occupation mentioned in this section, unless a state license shall have been procured from the tax collector, which license shall be issued to each person on receipt of the amount hereinafter provided, together with the county judge's fee of twenty-five cents for each license, and shall be signed by the tax collector and the county judge, and have the county judge's seal upon it. Counties and incorporated cities and towns may impose such further taxes of the same kind upon the same subjects as they may deem proper when the business, profession or occupation shall be engaged in within such county, city or town. The tax imposed by such city, town or county shall not exceed fifty per cent. of the state tax. But such city, town or county may impose taxes on any business, profession or occupation not mentioned in this section, when engaged in or managed within such city, town or county. No license shall be issued for more than one year, and all licenses shall expire on the first day of October of each year, but fractional licenses, except as hereinafter provided, may be issued to expire on that day at a proportionate rate, estimating from the first day of the month in which the license is so issued, and all licenses may be transferred, with the approval of the comptroller, with the business for which they were taken out, when there is a bona fide said and trans- fer of the property used and employed in the business as stock in trade, but such transferred license shall not be held good for any longer time, or for any other place, than that for which it was originally issued.'

There are various subdivisions to this section not herein set forth, and they enumerate divers occupations and professions, the members of which are required to procure a license, and to pay annually therefor the amounts stated in those subdivisions.

The twelfth subdivision provides, among other things, that 'all express companies doing business in this state shall pay in cities of fifteen thousand inhabitants or more a license tax of two hundred dollars; in cities of ten thousand to fifteen thousand inhabitants, one hundred dollars; in cities of five thousand to ten thousand inhabitants, seventy-five dollars; in cities of three to five thousand inhabitants, fifty dollars; in cities of one to three thousand inhabitants, twenty-five dollars; in towns and villages of less than one thousand and more than fifty inhabitants, ten dollars. Any express company violating this provision, and any person that knowingly acts as agent for any express company before it has paid the above tax, payable by such company, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, or confined in the county jail not less than six months.'

In addition to the criminal penalty above set forth, section 10 provides that the payment of all licenses taxed may be enforced by the seizure and sale of property by the collector.

The plaintiff in error assigns two grounds upon which he seeks for a reversal of the judgment of the state court. One is based upon the allegation that the statute, so far as regards the Southern Express Company or himself as its agent, violates the commerce clause of the federal constitution, in that it assumes to regulate interstate commerce. The second ground is that the statute is not sufficiently determinate, definite, and certain in its character upon which to ascertain the amount to be paid for licenses.

It may be here assumed that, if the statute applied to the express company in relation to its interstate business, it would be void as an attempted interference with, or regulation of, interstate commerce.

The particular construction to be given to this state statute is a question for the state court to deal with, and in such a case as this we follow the construction given by the state court to the statutes of its own state. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, 541; Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U. S. 367, 372, 17 Sup. Ct. 110, and cases there cited.

The supreme court of Florida has construed the ninth section of this act, and has held in express terms that it does not apply to, or affect in any manner, the business of...