OSCEOLA COUNTY SCHOOL BD. v. Arace, 1D03-3177.
| Citation | 884 So.2d 1003 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D03-3177.,1D03-3177. |
| Parties | OSCEOLA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Florida School Board Insurance Trust, Appellants, v. Dawn ARACE, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Danni Lynn Germano, and Sarah P. Reiner of Broussard, Cullen & Degailler, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.
Dennis J. Hunter of the Law Office of Dennis J. Hunter, Orlando, for Appellee.
This workers' compensation appeal presents a question of first impression: the definition of the phrase "initial provision of benefits" in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000). From the plain meaning of the wording, we conclude that the phrase refers to the first examination or treatment by an authorized treatment provider.
Appellants seek review of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensability and awarding evaluation of Appellee/Claimant by an allergist. Appellants raise two arguments on appeal: that their denial of compensation was timely under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000); and that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the industrial accident is the major contributing cause of Claimant's injury. Because the second argument was not preserved for appeal by argument below, we address only the first argument. Because we disagree with the trial court that Appellants' denial of compensability was untimely, we reverse.
§ 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2000). The phrase "initial provision of benefits" is not explicitly defined in this version of the statutes.1 However, the meaning of the statute can be determined by examination of the plain meaning of the wording. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984)
.
The use of the disjunctive "or" makes clear that the words "compensation" and "benefits" refer to two distinct entities. It is clear that payment of compensation refers to the payment of temporary or permanent, partial or total, disability benefits because section 440.20(1)(a) states that "the carrier shall pay compensation directly to the employee as required by ss. 440.14, 440.15, and 440.16 ...," and those statutes refer to the payment of disability or death benefits as calculated from the average weekly wage. Accordingly, the term "benefits" as used in section...
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...the distinction between "authorization" and "provision" in other statutory sections of Chapter 440. In Osceola County School Board v. Arace , 884 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the plain meaning of "initial provision of benefits" in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, the "120-day ......
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...2005) ("[T]he benefit that triggers the 120-day period must actually be provided, not merely authorized."); Osceola County Sch. Bd. v. Arace, 884 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("[T]he first authorized doctor's visit by a claimant is the `initial provision of benefits,' beginning the ......
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...752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). A claimant's first authorized visit to a physician begins the 120–day period. Osceola Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Arace, 884 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). To accept or deny a claim, the E/C must "advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial." City of Ocoee v.......
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Tomaskovich v. Lapointe, 1D04-3318.
...However, the benefit that triggers the 120-day period must actually be provided, not merely authorized. See Osceola County Sch. Bd. v. Arace, 884 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the record unequivocally indicates Dr. Wolff performed an IME. Dr. Wolff's report is labeled, "Independent ......