Oshana v. Aer Lingus Ltd.
| Docket Number | 20 C 2041 |
| Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
| Parties | MARY OSHANA, Plaintiff, v. AER LINGUS LIMITED, a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Pending before the court are five motions in limine: three filed by Plaintiff [34, 35, 36] and two filed by Defendant [37, 38]. For the reasons explained here, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
On April 26, 2018, Plaintiff Mary Oshana was a passenger on board a flight from Chicago to Dublin that was operated by Aer Lingus, Defendant. (App. Stipulated Facts, Ex. 1 to Proposed Pretrial Order [31-1] at 1.) The plane pushed back from the gate nearly an hour after it was scheduled to depart. (Id.) After the plane had pushed back from the gate, but before it took off, Oshana got up from her seat and entered the plane's lavatory. (Id.) What happened next is disputed. Oshana claims that, while she was seated on the toilet with her pants and underpants around her ankles, a crew member of the plane ordered her to return to her seat immediately. (App. Pl.'s Trial Brief, Ex. 7 to Proposed Pretrial Order (hereinafter “Pl.'s Trial Brief”) [31-7] at 1-2.) She contends that before she had time to pull her pants up, the crew member unlocked the lavatory door from the outside, grabbed Oshana, and pushed her into her seat. (Id. at 2.) She claims to have experienced physical pain from “hitting the armrest when the flight attendants threw her into her seat.” (Id. at 4.) She also claims emotional distress from “having her genitals exposed in front of others.” (Id.)
Aer Lingus says “this account is a fabrication.” (App. Def.'s Trial Brief, Ex. 8 to Proposed Pretrial Order [31-8] at 1.) It contends that when the crew member unlocked the lavatory door, Oshana had her pants “pulled up” and was “fixing her trousers.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant further claims that while Oshana was verbally directed to take a seat, “[a]t no time did any crew member make physical contact with Plaintiff.” (Id. at 2-3.)
Oshana brings suit to recover money damages under an international treaty known as the Montreal Convention. (Pl.'s Trial Brief at 1.) Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides that an international carrier “is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (hereinafter “Montreal Convention”), art. 17, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc 106-45, ICAO Doc. No. 9740. Article 20 of the Convention states that if the damage “was caused or contributed to” by the passenger, “the carrier shall be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability.” Id. art. 20. As explained here, the parties disagree about the admissibility of a variety of evidence and seek pretrial rulings on these issues.
Excluding evidence before trial is generally disfavored. The court will grant a motion in limine to bar evidence only where that evidence is clearly not admissible for any purpose. Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The moving party carries the burden of meeting this high standard. Euroholdings Capital & Inv. Corp. v. Harris Trust & Sav Bank, 602 F.Supp.2d 928, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2009). If the burden is not met, the evidentiary ruling should be deferred until trial. Green v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am Ltd., No. 08-472-GPM, 2010 WL 747501, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2010). Even if the burden is met and the court grants the motion, the court can change its ruling at trial. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). In considering or reconsidering evidentiary issues at trial the court will have the benefit of understanding “the context, foundation, and relevance of the contested evidence within the framework of the trial as a whole.” Casares v. Bernal, 790 F.Supp.2d 769, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
In its minute entry of August 2, 2021, the court noted that the parties disputed “whether Articles 20 or 21 [of the Montreal Convention] apply and support an instruction to the jury on the issue of exoneration or comparative/contributory fault.” (Aug. 2, 2021 Minute Entry [33].) In briefing this issue, the parties now appear to be largely in agreement that Article 20 and pure comparative negligence apply to this case. Accordingly, the parties agree to language set forth in Plaintiff's new Requests to Charge Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, proposed jury instructions that contain the language of comparative negligence. Oshana has withdrawn her earlier proposed Charge No. 4 and her earlier proposed Verdict Form A. (
The remaining disagreement relates to the parties' competing proposed verdict forms. Oshana's proposed Verdict Form, [1] she contends, “incorporates defendant's claim of contributory negligence.” (Pl.'s Mot in Lim. on Article 20 at 2.) Defendant contends that its proposed Verdict Form[2] “more clearly addresses the elements of Plaintiff's claim and already adequately addressed comparative fault.” (Def.'s Resp. on Article 20 at 1.) Oshana states that her proposed form is “based on the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil), ” it is “simpler for the jury to understand and easier to follow, ” and it avoids “[t]he multiple problems with the defendant's proposed form.” (Pl.'s Reply Regarding the Application of Articles 20 and 21 [52] at 1.)
Having reviewed the proposed forms, the court agrees that Oshana's proposed verdict form (set forth as Proposed Charge No. 10) is appropriate. As Oshana notes, it makes sense to use the word “cause” rather than the less-familiar (and sometimes confusing) expression “proximate cause” which appears in Defendant's proposed form. (See id.) The court also agrees with Plaintiff that the fourth question on Defendant's proposed form is misleading because it states that if Oshana's injury was caused by her refusal to comply with Defendant's request, then she is not entitled to any damages. As noted, the parties have agreed that pure comparative negligence applies in this case, meaning that this language in Defendant's proposed form is overbroad; if her refusal to comply with Defendant's request was less than the sole cause of her injury, she may nevertheless be entitled to recover from Defendant.
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding the Application of Article 20 and 21 [34] is granted.
Oshana moves to bar evidence or argument of certain facts related to an incident that predated this case. Specifically, on August 26, 2017, Plaintiff and her mother went to the United Center to see a concert but were “wrongfully accused of possessing counterfeit or stolen tickets.” (Id.) Following that accusation, Oshana and her mother were allegedly “physically escorted” out of the venue, which was “emotionally upsetting and caused her anxiety.” (Id.) In her motion, Oshana acknowledges that “[i]n light of the emotional damages claimed in this case, she agrees that the fact[ ] that she had an experience which caused her emotional upset and anxiety, and that she was prescribed medication to help her cope with those feelings, are relevant.” (Id.) But Oshana moves to exclude any additional facts, such as “the details of the United Center incident” or “the fact that a claim for damages was made.” (Id. at 2.)
Defendant opposes the motion. Defendant acknowledges that Oshana's prior acts, including filing a lawsuit, may not be admitted as evidence of her character, but contends it is admissible for other purposes. Specifically, Defendant contends that this evidence shows that Oshana's present claim is nearly identical to one she made before, which demonstrates a “modus operandi” and “bears on her credibility.” (Id. at 2-3.) Second, Defendant argues the United Center incident “provide[s] an alternative explanation for Plaintiff's continuing stress and anxiety during the period after the April 2018 Aer Lingus incident.” (Id. at 3.)
In addressing these arguments, the court notes, initially, that the parties disagree about the legal framework to be used for admitting evidence of prior acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Defendant urges the court to apply a four-part test outlined 20 years ago by the Seventh Circuit. (Id. at 2 (citing Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2001)).) As Plaintiff observes, however, that four-part test was abandoned by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). (Pl.'s Reply Regarding the Aug. 26, 2017 Event (hereinafter “Pl.'s Reply on Aug. 26”) [51] at 1.) In Gomez, the court stated that the “four-part test for evaluating the admissibility of other-act evidence has ceased to be useful” and thus the court “abandon[ed] it in favor of a...
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