Osness v. Dimond Estates, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 4192,4193,s. 4192 |
| Citation | 615 P.2d 605 |
| Parties | Patricia OSNESS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. DIMOND ESTATES, INC., Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Timothy H. Stearns, Legal Clinic of Timothy H. Stearns, Anchorage, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Terry L. Johnson, Groh, Eggers, Robinson, Price & Johnson, Anchorage, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, BOOCHEVER, * BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.
This case concerns a forcible entry and detainer action brought pursuant to AS 09.45.060-.160 and Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 85 to evict a mobile home owner from a trailer park space occupied on a month-to-month tenancy.
On April 8, 1976, Mrs. Osness and her three children moved into a mobile home she was purchasing located in Dimond Estates Mobile Home Park. A rental agreement was signed. On December 14, 1977, Dimond Estates served her with a Notice of Default and Notice to Quit (hereinafter referred to as Notice) pursuant to AS 34.03.220(a) and AS 34.03.225(3) which alleged numerous violations of the rental agreement:
Failure to Supervise children; Local Hangout for kids Resulted in a Gun Fired thru Trailer at Space 612. Failure to Maintain yard. Garbage dump. Generally unsanitary. Failure to keep dog confined. Turns Dog out on Regular Basis. Has distributed Garbage over several trailers. Failure to keep Motorcycles and Snow Machines off streets and Lawn Area.
The Notice demanded cure within ten days or possession within twenty days.
On January 16, 1978, Dimond Estates filed a complaint in district court for forcible entry and detainer which alleged rental agreement violations similar to those contained in the Notice. After trial, eviction was ordered. The district court found that Osness had remedied all violations with two exceptions: her dog had not been adequately restrained, and she kept a junk car in her parking space.
Osness appealed and Dimond Estates cross-appealed to the superior court, asserting that irrespective of the junk car and failure to restrain the dog, other incidents involving the failure of Mrs. Osness to supervise her children were irremediable violations of the rental agreement which justified eviction. The superior court affirmed the judgment of the district court, and subsequently execution was stayed pending this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the superior court.
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, AS 34.03, applies to this case. In McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1976), we held that the general rule with regard to termination of month-to-month tenancies that a landlord may terminate without cause on thirty days written notice was not changed by the Uniform Act. A subsequent amendment to the Act, AS 34.03.225, does change this rule with respect to mobile homeowners.
AS 34.03.225 limits a landlord's right to evict a mobile home tenant to only four reasons. 1 Several other states have similar laws, the rationale of which has received considerable attention. Such legislation provides mobile homeowners with a measure of protection in their dealings with mobile home park operators. 2 Mobile homeowners are thought to need more protection than do ordinary renters because the general shortage of mobile home spaces 3 places them in an unequal bargaining position 4 which can lead to abuses by the landlord, 5 and because eviction entails the expense of moving a mobile home 6 which could result in a loss of equity in the mobile home. 7
Evictions permitted by AS 34.03.225(3) should therefore be limited to situations involving a substantial violation, inuring to the harm of other tenants, of a properly established and reasonable park rule or regulation. 8 AS 34.03.220(a) sets out the proper procedure to be followed in an eviction under AS 34.03.225(3). 9 It expressly requires material noncompliance.
Under this approach, we conclude that the problems with the Osness dog were not sufficiently material to warrant eviction. After Notice was given, only one incident, involving the dog scratching a neighbor's door but doing no real damage, occurred. The dog was immediately put on a shorter chain to prevent a recurrence and has since been given away.
Likewise, the fact that for several months the Osness car remained parked and inoperable in the space assigned to her would not support an eviction, given her testimony that the car's value exceeded the cost to repair it and that it could not be repaired until parts she had ordered arrived. The rental agreement stated only that "(j)unk cars as determined by the management are prohibited." Normally, a junk car is one which cannot be economically repaired. 10 Any contrary, special meaning had never been included in any park rules, nor communicated in any way to Mrs. Osness, and therefore cannot be regarded as a part of a "properly established" rule under AS 34.03.225(3). 11
We agree with Dimond Estates, however, that the district court erred in finding that, with the exception of the violations relating to the dog and car, Osness had complied with all requirements and conditions imposed upon it by law, and by the rental agreement. " Under AS 34.03.220(a), a landlord is not prohibited from evicting a tenant for a violation of the rental agreement if it is both material and not "remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise. " 12 In our opinion, two violations of the rental agreement involving the Osness children are of this character.
The rental agreement entered into by Mrs. Osness contains regulations which clearly hold tenants responsible for the conduct of their children and guests, and which prohibit unnecessary disturbances. 13 The evidence in this case is undisputed that a guest of the Osness children accidentally discharged a rifle in the Osness trailer, resulting in a bullet passing through the trailer next door which was occupied by a mother and her young child. In another incident, it is undisputed that property stolen from other park tenants was discovered by the police in the Osness trailer after being brought there by a friend of Mrs. Osness' teenage son.
Both these incidents directly and seriously threatened the safety either of persons or of property in the trailer park. Such occurrences disturb the peace and harmony of a neighborhood to a degree and in a manner that we believe is "material," and not "remediable" under the language of AS 34.03.220(a). Return of the property stolen and repair of the physical damage caused by the bullet cannot alleviate the serious distrust and fear which at least some neighbors must continue to harbor as a result of these incidents. Mrs. Osness testified to steps she had subsequently taken to more closely monitor her children. But no reassurances by Mrs. Osness, payment of money, or other plausible attempts at restitution can remove the insecurity and ill-will which such events spawn. No incidents of this nature recurred in the brief time between service of Notice and trial. However, this fact is of little consequence when instances of conduct which seriously threaten the health and safety of others, who must live in extremely close proximity to the offending party, have left their indelible imprint on the atmosphere of the neighborhood.
We normally will not reverse a trial court's factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). However, since the facts relating to the incidents discussed are not in dispute, determination of whether these violations of the park rules were material and without remedy under AS 34.03.220(a) is basically a question of legal analysis. Further, we may review a trial judge's application of legal doctrine to the uncontroverted facts of a case without the deference associated with review of factual findings themselves. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 833-34 (Alaska 1974). We believe that the district court erred in its legal conclusions regarding the gunshot and stolen property incidents in this case. 14 Thus, we conclude that the district court's judgment of eviction is sustainable on these two incidents.
The judgment of the superior court affirming the district court's order of eviction is Affirmed.
While I agree with the majority that the incidents pertaining to the dog and the car do not justify eviction, I disagree with the majority's rejection of the trial court's finding that appellant had otherwise "complied with all requirements and conditions imposed upon it by law and the rental agreement." The majority, unlike the trial court, concludes that two incidents involving failure to supervise children justify appellant's eviction. A discussion of those incidents is in order.
On November 17, 1977, when Mrs. Osness was not home, a twenty-two caliber rifle went off in her trailer. The bullet went through the front door and broke a window in a neighbor's trailer. Fortunately, no one was injured. The rifle was brought to Mrs. Osness' trailer by a friend of her children. It is undisputed that the rifle discharged accidentally. The rifle and person who brought it were removed from the trailer park by an investigating state trooper. There is no evidence or allegation that Mrs. Osness' children normally play with or have access to guns.
On November 23, 1977, an Alaska state trooper searched the Osness trailer and found a number of stolen items, some of which were claimed by park tenants, including a wristwatch and television set. Mrs. Osness testified that much of the property was hidden in a manner that prevented her discovering it. She testified that a television set, the stolen property in plain view, was loaned to her by a teenage friend of her older son who claimed that his family owned it. She testified that since her discovery of the stolen property she had made efforts to keep her children away from others who might be a...
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Coleman v. Thomas
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