Ostanek v. Ostanek

Decision Date13 July 2021
Docket Number2020-1037
Citation181 N.E.3d 1162,166 Ohio St.3d 1
Parties OSTANEK, Appellant, v. OSTANEK, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Kubyn & Ghaster and R. Russell Kubyn, Painesville, for appellant.

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Kenneth J. Cahill, Painesville, for appellee.

Kennedy, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, we are asked whether an order issued by a domestic-relations court that violates R.C. 3105.171(I) is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 2} When a court has the constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Corder v. Ohio Edison Co. , 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14. If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, any order issued by that court in that case is void ab initio. State v. Harper , 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23.

{¶ 3} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants the General Assembly the power to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas courts, stating: "The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law." The General Assembly exercised that power in granting the common pleas courts, and where applicable, their divisions of domestic relations, subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce actions and the division of marital property. R.C. 2305.01, 2301.03, 3105.011, 3105.17, 3105.171.

{¶ 4} We have recognized that the General Assembly's power to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas courts includes the power to deny it altogether by explicitly divesting the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See generally Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman , 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9. R.C. 3105.171(I) provides that "[a] division or disbursement of property or a distributive award made under this section is not subject to future modification by the court except upon the express written consent or agreement to the modification by both spouses." However, R.C. 3105.171(I) does not explicitly divest the domestic-relations court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, any error in the domestic-relations court's exercise of its jurisdiction in issuing an order that divides retirement benefits in a way that modifies a divorce decree in violation of R.C. 3105.171(I) renders the resulting order voidable, not void. See Harper at ¶ 26.

{¶ 5} Appellee, Gregory F. Ostanek, moved to vacate an order that set forth how his federal retirement benefits would be shared with his former spouse, appellant, Julia M. Ostanek. In that motion, he asserted that the order had improperly modified the divorce decree's division of marital property. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, concluding that it had been untimely filed and that the order had not modified the divorce decree. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the order had modified the divorce decree and was void (and therefore subject to challenge at any time) because the domestic-relations court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree's division of marital property.

{¶ 6} However, because the domestic-relations court had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the order, any error in its exercising its jurisdiction in violation of R.C. 3105.171(I) rendered the order voidable, not void. For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District to the extent it determined that the trial court's order was void and remand the cause to the court of appeals for it to review the assignment of error that it declined to address as moot.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 7} Julia and Gregory Ostanek's 23-year marriage ended in divorce on October 17, 2001. In stipulations incorporated into the divorce decree, the Ostaneks agreed that Gregory's pension with the Federal Employees Retirement System would "be divided 50/50 with the court reserving jurisdiction to issue a QDRO [qualified domestic-relations order]." The court clerk served the divorce decree on Gregory at his mother's address, 2250 Greenridge Drive in Wickliffe, Ohio. Gregory had used that address because he had moved out of the marital home, which was located at 2597 Townline Road in Madison, Ohio, and was relocating to the Washington, D.C. area. Julia lived in the Townline Road home until the Ostaneks sold it in late 2001 as ordered by the divorce decree.

{¶ 8} At the time the court issued the divorce decree, and continuing today, federal law has required the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), which administers the Federal Employees Retirement System, 5 U.S.C. 8461, to abide by the terms of a state court's divorce decree providing for federal retirement benefits to be paid to a former spouse, 5 U.S.C. 8345(j)(1). See also 5 C.F.R. 838.101(a)(1) ; 57 Fed.Reg. 33570, 33575, effective Aug. 28, 1992. OPM's regulations require a former spouse seeking eligibility for a court-awarded portion of a federal employee's retirement benefits to submit "[a] certified copy of the court order acceptable for processing [‘COAP’] that is directed at employee annuity." 5 C.F.R. 838.221(b) ; 57 Fed.Reg. at 33578. The regulations further provide that "[i]n executing court orders under [ 5 C.F.R. 838.101 ], OPM must honor the clear instructions of the court. Instructions must be specific and unambiguous. OPM will not supply missing provisions, interpret ambiguous language, or clarify the court's intent by researching individual State laws." 5 C.F.R. 838.101(a)(2).

{¶ 9} On January 10, 2013, the domestic-relations court received a proposed order meant to qualify as a COAP under the federal regulations. The proposed order had been prepared by a company called QDRO Group (then known as QDRO Consultants) exclusively at the direction of Julia's counsel—the same attorney who represented Julia in the divorce action—because Gregory was planning to retire the next month. It was not signed by Gregory or his counsel but indicated that Gregory had been "served per attached." The certificate of service attached to the proposed order stated that Julia's counsel had mailed a copy to Gregory at the former marital home on Townline Road.

{¶ 10} Civ.R. 5 requires pleadings (other than the original complaint) and other papers to be served on an opposing party's attorney or the opposing party if he or she is not represented by counsel. Civ.R. 5(A) and B(1). When service is made by mail, it must be sent to the person's last known address. Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c). And Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(e) permits service to be made by "leaving it with the clerk of court if the person has no known address." Julia's attorney did not comply with any of these provisions.

{¶ 11} At oral argument before this court, Julia's counsel explained that he had used the Townline Road address because that was the address listed for Gregory on the court docket from 12 years earlier. He said that he had not retrieved Julia's case file from storage to determine whether he had a more recent address for Gregory, because of the "urgency" of obtaining the order before Gregory retired. Nonetheless, he had a copy of the divorce decree—which both listed the Greenridge Drive address for Gregory on the first page and ordered the sale of the Townline Road home—that he provided to the QDRO Group when he asked it to draft the COAP in 2012. Julia's counsel also represented to this court that he had asked his client for an updated address for Gregory but had not gotten one from her; yet the unrebutted evidence presented in this case shows that Julia knew that the Townline Road property had been sold and that Gregory had moved to Washington, D.C. in 2001. And although counsel faulted Gregory for failing to update his address on file with the court, Gregory had caused the divorce decree to be mailed to the Greenridge Drive address, where Gregory's mother still lived in 2013.

{¶ 12} The domestic-relations court adopted and signed the order, and the clerk filed it on January 22, 2013. Among other things, the order directed OPM to pay Julia 50 percent of the marital portion of Gregory's monthly retirement benefit, with the marital portion calculated by the coverture method, i.e., multiplying the monthly benefit amount by "a fraction, the numerator of which is the total number of months of Creditable Service earned by the Employee during the marriage (from February 25, 1978 to April 23, 2001) and the denominator of which is the total number of months of the Employee's Creditable Service accrued under the Federal Employees Retirement System." (Emphasis sic.) The order also required OPM to provide Julia a survivor benefit and for Julia and Gregory to share the cost of that benefit equally.

{¶ 13} The domestic-relations court did not direct the clerk to serve the order on Gregory, nor is there an entry on the docket indicating that the clerk served it on him. See Civ.R. 58(B) ("When the court signs a judgment, the court shall endorse thereon a direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal"); App.R. 4(A) (setting forth the time for appeal from an order based on the date of service); State ex rel. Thomas v. Nestor , 164 Ohio St.3d 144, 2021-Ohio-672, 172 N.E.3d 136, ¶ 8 (explaining that the clerk's failure to serve an entry on a party under Civ.R. 58(B) meant that the party's time period for appealing from the entry had not yet started).

{¶ 14} Gregory retired on January 31, 2013. A few months later, he received a booklet from OPM showing that Julia was receiving $2,065—45 percent—of his monthly retirement benefit. He contacted OPM multiple times but was unsuccessful in changing the apportionment of his retirement benefit. Gregory took no...

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