Otradovsky v. Board of Equalization of Colfax County

• Decision Date: 24 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 42865,42865
• Parties: Editha OTRADOVSKY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF the COUNTY OF COLFAX, State of Nebraska, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 334

294 N.W.2d 334

206 Neb. 559

Editha OTRADOVSKY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF the COUNTY OF COLFAX, State of Nebraska, Appellee.

No. 42865.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 24, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Taxation: Appeal and Error. An appeal from a county board of equalization is heard as in equity and is tried de novo in this court.

2. Taxation: Valuation: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from a county board of equalization on the ground that the property has been valued in excess of its actual value, the sole issue to be determined is the actual value of the property.

3. Taxation: Presumptions. There is a presumption that the valuation made by the board of equalization is correct. However, this presumption disappears when competent evidence to the contrary is introduced. The reasonableness of the valuation then becomes a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.

4. Taxation: Valuation: Burden of Proof. The burden of proof remains upon the party contesting the valuation to establish that the valuation was incorrect.

5. Taxation: Valuation. The classification of the land as irrigated or dryland does not alone establish the actual value of the land. The classification is only one of many factors to be considered in determining the actual value.

L. F. Otradovsky of Otradovsky & Bieber, Schuyler, for appellant.

J. H. Hoppe, Schuyler, for appellee.

Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON, BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS, JJ.

BOSLAUGH, Justice.

This appeal involves a dispute over the valuation for tax purposes of 74 acres of farmland in Colfax County, Nebraska, owned by the plaintiff, Editha Otradovsky. In 1978, the plaintiff filed a protest with the County Board of Equalization requesting that the assessed value of the 74 acres be reduced from $60,980 to $58,516. The protest alleged that the land had been erroneously classified as irrigated land because 59 of the 74 acres could not be irrigated from any well on the plaintiff's land.

The County Board of Equalization made no change in the valuation, and on appeal to the District Court for Colfax County, Nebraska, the order of the County Board of Equalization was affirmed. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

An appeal from a county board of equalization is heard as in equity and is tried de novo in this court. H/K Company v. Board of Equalization, 175 Neb. 268, 121 N.W.2d 382 (1963).

In an appeal from a county board of equalization on the ground that the property has been valued in excess of its actual value, the sole issue to be determined is the actual value of the property. Chudomelka v. Board of Equalization, 187 Neb. 542, 192 N.W.2d 403 (1971).

There is a presumption that the valuation made by a board of equalization is correct. However, this presumption disappears when competent evidence to the contrary is introduced. The reasonableness of the valuation then becomes a question of fact to be determined from the evidence. Boss Hotels Co. v. County of Hall, 183 Neb. 19, 157 N.W.2d 868 (1968). The burden of proof remains upon the party contesting the valuation to establish that the valuation was incorrect. Leech, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 176 Neb. 841, 127 N.W.2d 917 (1964).

The plaintiff produced no direct evidence in this case as to the actual value of the land. The parties stipulated that the 59 acres in dispute had been classified as irrigated land by the J. M. Cleminshaw Co.; 51 acres had been classified 2A and valued at $565 per acre; 8 acres had been classified as 3A and valued at $450 per acre; the county assessor had adopted these classifications and valuations; the plaintiff contended that the 59 acres should be classified as nonirrigated land; 51 acres should be classified as 2DI and valued at $445 per acre; and 8 acres should be classified as 2D and valued at $365 per acre. The stipulation attempted to limit the determination by the trial court to a choice between the two valuations.

The plaintiff called as a witness Roland Langemeier, a real estate broker who has leased the land since 1970. Langemeier and his associates now own adjoining property and farm it as a unit with the plaintiff's land. The land leased from the plaintiff is irrigated by a center pivot system located on the Langemeier land and supplied by a well located on the Langemeier land.

Langemeier testified that the 59 acres was unsuited for gravity irrigation and it was doubtful whether it would be practical to irrigate the 59 acres by a sprinkler system from a well on the land. If the land were to be rented or sold to someone else, it was probable that it would be considered to be dryland.

The problem in this case is that there is no evidence as to the actual value of the land in question or that the value established by the County Board of Equalization was excessive or unreasonable. The classification of the land as irrigated or dryland does not alone establish the actual value of the land. The classification is only one of many factors to be considered in determining the actual value.

As we stated in County of Gage v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 749, 178 N.W.2d 759 (1970):

The Constitution requires that such a property tax be " * * * levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property * * *." Examination of the record discloses extensive divergence among witnesses of all categories in their understanding of the meaning of uniform values in the constitutional tax context. Many witnesses seem to assume that real property taxes may be equalized if property is classified, and the same values applied to the same classifications of property in all counties. The Constitution itself flatly contradicts such a conclusion. Art. VIII, § 1, Constitution of Nebraska.

The Legislature has attempted to define "actual value" for purposes of taxation by application of a formula "where applicable." § 77-112, R.R.S.1943. While the items of the formula are all related to value, those which are factors in determining value are by no means the only factors which enter...