Otten v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't
| Decision Date | 29 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:16-CV-82-PRC |
| Parties | DAVID OTTEN and RENEE OTTEN, Plaintiffs, v. LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SERGEANT BOSSE in his individual and official capacity, OFFICER B. ZABRECKY in his individual and official capacity, and SHERIFF JOHN BUNCICH in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants [sic] Sheriff John Buncich and Lake County Sheriff's Department Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [DE 26], filed by Defendants Sheriff John Buncich and the Lake County Sheriff's Department ("the Department") on May 25, 2016. Plaintiffs David Otten and Renee Otten filed a response on June 9, 2016, and Defendants filed a reply on June 20, 2016.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on April 25, 2016, against Defendants Lake County Sheriff's Department, Sergeant Bosse, Officer B. Zabrecky, and Sheriff John Buncich. Plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and of Indiana state law. As part of their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs request that the Court award punitive damages to Plaintiffs.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs make the following allegations. On or about February 14, 2015, Sergeant Bosse and Officer Zabrecky responded to a radio dispatch in the area of 6200 West 85th Street in Crown Point, Lake County, Indiana. Upon arriving, Bosse and Zabrecky observed Ms. Otten walking along the road. Bosse and Zabrecky approached Ms. Otten and ordered her into their vehicle so that they could take her home. Bosse and Zabrecky took Ms. Otten to her home, and they requested consent to enter the home without advising Ms. Otten of her right to consult with an attorney. Ms. Otten did not give her consent. Bosse and Zabrecky then entered the home and followed Ms. Otten to her bedroom where Mr. Otten was sleeping.
Bosse and Zabrecky woke Mr. Otten and ordered him to provide his identification although Mr. Otten had not violated any law. In the attempt to obtain Mr. Otten's identification, Bosse and Zabrecky pushed Mr. Otten back into his bed. A fight ensued, and Bosse and Zabrecky used a stun gun on Mr. Otten several times and struck him over the head. Mr. Otten was then placed in handcuffs. During the altercation, Ms. Otten voiced her displeasure regarding the treatment of her husband, and she was arrested.
Bosse and Zabrecky's actions were taken as the result of a policy developed and implemented by Buncich that required Lake County police officers to demand identification from all persons that they come into contact with. Bosse and Zabrecky testified under oath that the Department had this policy and that they were acting in accordance with it. In addition, Buncich developed and implemented a policy that subjected an individual to arrest if he or she refused to provide identification.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. See Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on such a motion, the Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008).
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must first comply with Rule 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Second, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"1 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082.
ANALYSIS
In the Motion to Dismiss, Buncich contends that he is entitled to dismissal of all claims in Counts I through XII because Plaintiffs do not allege that Buncich personally participated in any of the acts alleged by Plaintiffs. The Department claims that Plaintiffs' § 1983 Monell claims against it contain boilerplate allegations of de facto municipal policy and do not allege the specific pattern or series of incidents necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. The Department also contends that the state law claims against it in Counts IX, X, XI, and XII do not give fair notice of the claims that are asserted and that the claims are not permissible under the Indiana Tort ClaimsAct. Finally, the Department asserts that the demand for punitive damages must be dismissed because such claims are not permitted by law. The Court considers each argument in turn.
Buncich, sued only in his individual capacity in the Amended Complaint, argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against him in Counts I-XII. His sole argument is that Plaintiffs have not alleged personal participation by him, and, therefore, he cannot be held liable under § 1983.
The theory of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims. Shields v. Ill. Dep't. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 790 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, to recover damages under § 1983 against Buncich individually, Plaintiffs must establish that Buncich "was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right." Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012). To show personal involvement, Buncich, as a supervisor, must "know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see." Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988); see also Smith v. City of Chi., 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2015). "[T]he plaintiff must show that the supervisor's action or inaction was 'affirmatively linked' to the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights" Snyder v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 3d 842, 864 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)). If a supervisor "devised a deliberately indifferent policy that caused a constitutional injury," then individual liability might flow from that act. Lee v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 13 C 3255, 2016 WL 302151, at *3 (quoting Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also Doyle v. Camelot Car Ctrs, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs do not allege that Buncich personally took part in the alleged misconduct on February 14, 2015. However, they do allege that Buncich developed and implemented specificpolicies, namely a policy to obtain identification from all persons Lake County police officers come into contact with and a policy to arrest individuals who refuse to provide identification. Plaintiffs allege that Buncich knew or should have known that the policies violate a citizen's right to privacy, would constitute an illegal search and seizure if an individual was arrested for failure to provide his or her identification, and would result in making false arrests and subjecting individuals to false imprisonment. Plaintiffs also allege that Buncich "acted or failed to act with reckless disregard" of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights in developing and implementing these policies.
Buncich contends that Trowbridge v. Civil City of South Bend, Ind., No. S91-484(RDP), 1992 WL 559656 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 1992), and Jackson v. Elrod, 655 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1987), are analogous to the claims against Buncich and show that the claims should be dismissed. These cases, however, are both nonprecedential and differentiable from the allegations in the instant litigation. In Trowbridge, the conduct at issue was allegedly "ratified" after the fact by the chief of police, and the court found that ratification was not sufficient to show personal participation. Trowbridge, 1992 WL 559656, at *3, *4. In the instant matter, however, Buncich is alleged to have personally implemented the unconstitutional policy which caused the alleged injuries and not to have merely ratified conduct after it occurred.
In Jackson, claims against three defendants in their individual capacity were dismissed because the plaintiff made only a "bald assertion that Hardiman, Elrod, and Glotz encouraged, authorized, directed, ratified, or acquiesced in their subordinates' acts," and the court found that this assertion alone does not satisfy the pleading requirement. Jackson, 655 F. Supp. at 1136. Here, the allegation of personal participation by Buncich is more fleshed out. The allegation is thatBuncich developed and caused to be implemented two specific policies that led to deprivation of constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged personal participation by Buncich in his individual capacity. The request to dismiss the claims brought under § 1983 based upon illegal search and seizure, false imprisonment, and false arrest is denied.
However, Plaintiffs have failed to connect Buncich to their claims of excessive force in violation of § 1983. The policies that Plaintiffs describe do not pertain to the use of force, and there are no other allegations that Buncich personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiffs allege that Buncich knew or should have known that a confrontation between citizens and police would be likely to occur...
To continue reading
Request your trial