Ottumwa Bridge Co. v. Corrigan
Decision Date | 31 May 1913 |
Citation | 158 S.W. 39 |
Parties | OTTUMWA BRIDGE CO. v. CORRIGAN et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Plaintiff contracted to furnish and erect the cast-iron bases and steel construction work for an addition to a hotel 12 stories high, involving the use of nearly 666 tons of steel according to drawings and specifications furnished by the owner. The contract provided that, if the drawings and specifications should appear contradictory or contain apparent errors, the contractor must not attempt to adjust them himself but must refer the matter to the architect for adjustment; that all figures shown on drawings should be checked by the contractor before executing work, to the end that all work should be reconciled within itself and to adjoining work; that, if any portion or detail of the work should not be fully shown on the drawings or shown sufficiently clear for the proper execution of the work, the contractor must call for detail drawings; that such work executed without details or specific instructions, if not fully satisfactory to the architect, would be taken down and replaced at the contractor's expense; that the owner would have the excavation done and concrete beds prepared for the reception of cast-iron plates on a certain date; that the complete erection of the steel work should be finished by October 10th and should progress as nearly as practicable according to the limiting horizontal lines shown on the drawings relating to top levels of floor construction; and that any delays caused by the progress of the brick work should be taken into consideration and an equal time added to the date specified, plaintiff thus being required to await, not only the progress of others working on the building, but the pleasure and convenience of the architect in correcting and reconciling discrepancies existing in the plans or in the work of others. Held, that time was not of the essence of the contract, and hence a delay in completion did not prevent a recovery on the contract but merely entitled the owner to recover damages for the delay, since the law will not presume an intention to make time of the essence, unless there is something in the nature of the work making the completion at a particular time an element in its permanent value, or unless the date serves a temporary purpose that is an important inducement to the undertaking.
3. CONTRACTS (§ 213) — CONSTRUCTION — BUILDING CONTRACTS.
A provision of a contract to furnish and erect the steel construction work for a building that the contractor's proposition was based upon their statement that 90 per cent. of the steel involved was then in stock in their yards and should enter into such work was not a guaranty that 90 per cent. of the steel to be furnished and erected was then in the contractor's yards ready for shipment and erection where the material was to be fabricated into members of the structure from drawings made from the plans as the combined work developed.
4. CONTRACTS (§ 211)—TIME AS OF THE ESSENCE.
Where the parties to a contract agree that time shall be treated as an essential element of performance, such expressed intention will be enforced by the courts.
5. CONTRACTS (§ 211)—TIME AS OF THE ESSENCE.
Time will be presumed to be of the essence of a contract when it is known by both parties, at the time it is entered into, that without a strict performance in that respect the contract will not accomplish its ultimate object.
6. CONTRACTS (§ 211)—TIME AS OF THE ESSENCE.
Where a building contract provides that one party shall furnish valuable material and labor in the construction of a building for another which is completed in all respects according to the contract and accepted and used by the owner as an improvement designed for the benefit of his own premises, time will not be considered of the essence but will be presumed to have been entered into as an independent agreement, on account of which compensation in damages will put the owner in a position as favorable as would strict performance with respect to time.
7. CONTRACTS (§ 305)—DELAY IN PERFORMANCE —WAIVER.
Where time is of the essence of a contract, the failure to perform within the time stated may be waived like any other breach.
8. CONTRACTS (§ 345)—ACTIONS—PLEADING— WAIVER OF STIPULATIONS AS TO TIME.
In an action on a contract of which time is of the essence, where the answer pleads a breach of the stipulation as to time, a waiver may be and should be pleaded in the reply.
9. CONTRACTS (§ 345)—ACTIONS—PLEADING— WAIVER OF STIPULATIONS AS TO TIME.
In an action on a building contract, where time was not of the essence, it was proper to allege performance of the stipulations other than that as to time and the completion and acceptance of the building, pleading a waiver of delay in performance, and that such performance was due to defendant's fault in the reply to a counterclaim for damages caused by such delay.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; W. O. Thomas, Judge.
Action by the Ottumwa Bridge Company against Bernard Corrigan and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
The petition, so far as is necessary to understand the questions presented in this appeal, is as follows:
The time for completion of the work is stated as follows:
The following proposal and acceptance, written on the specifications, are pleaded as the contract:
The petition then proceeds:
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...2372], 'there is no reason why the courts should not enforce their clearly expressed intention to that effect.' Ottumwa Bridge Co. v. Corrigan, 251 Mo. 667, 688, 158 S.W. 39, 45. But, for time to be of the essence of a contract, it must have been so intended by the parties [Erie City Iron W......
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