Ottumwa, C. F. & St. P. R. Co. v. McWilliams

• Decision Date: 09 March 1887
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: OTTUMWA, C. F. & ST. P. R. CO. v. MCWILLIAMS AND ANOTHER.

71 Iowa 164

32 N.W. 315

OTTUMWA, C. F. & ST. P. R. CO.

v.MCWILLIAMS AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 9, 1887.

Appeal from district court, Poweshiek county.

This is an action in equity, in which the plaintiff demands the specific performance of a written contract entered into by the defendant Robert McWilliams, by which he bound himself to convey to the plaintiff the right of way for a railroad over certain land owned by him. There was a decree in the district court for the plaintiff, and defendants appeal.Thos. A. Cheshire, for appellants.

Hubbard, Clark & Dawley, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J.

1. The written contract upon which the action is founded is as follows:

“$120.00.

In consideration of one dollar in hand paid, and a further consideration of $120, to be paid before work is commenced, and of the location and construction of the Ottumwa, Cedar Falls & St. Paul Railroad, and the benefits to be derived therefrom, I do hereby release to said railroad company the right of way through the land owned by me in sections 22 and 28, Tp. 79, R. 13, Poweshiek county, Ia., together with all necessary width for embankment, excavations, slopes, spoil banks, and borrowing pits; and I, for myself, and for my heirs, executors, and assigns, do hereby covenant and agree to and with said railroad company to convey, by metes and bounds, at any time the said railroad company shall call for the same, by deed in fee-simple, a strip of ground not less than 50 feet in width on each side of the center of the track of said railroad, over and through the above-described land.

Witness my hand this twentieth day of August, 1883.

+-----------------------------+
                ¦[Signed]¦ROBERT MCWILLIAMS.” ¦
                +-----------------------------+
                

The defendants answered the petition by setting up a number of defenses, some of which are not necessary to be considered, for the reason that counsel for appellants in his argument confines himself to three grounds upon which he demands a reversal of the decree of the district court.

The first ground is that the contract is too indefinite and uncertain to be enforced by an action for specific performance. It is true the agreement does not describe the land to be conveyed by metes and bounds. But the evidence shows that the railroad was not constructed when the contract was entered into. The construction of the road had not then been commenced, but the plaintiff had surveyed two lines across the defendants' land, and staked out the center of the lines so surveyed. These lines were nearly over the same ground, being not more than 15 or 20 feet apart. The road was afterwards constructed over the land upon one of these lines. It became necessary to make a cut for part of the way through defendants' land, and at that point the plaintiff appropriated more than 100 feet in width. It was doubtless to provide for this very contingency that the contract was not made definite in this respect. Contracts are to be construed in the light of the facts surrounding the transaction, and known to the parties. The defendants knew, by the surveys and stakes, where the road was to be constructed; and, not knowing the exact width required, they contracted for so much as would be necessary for a right of way.

We do not understand, however, that counsel makes a specific claim that the contract was too uncertain in the description of the quantity of lands by metes and bounds. His contention, in the main, is that the description of the land owned by defendants, and through which the road was constructed, was too indefinite and uncertain, as to section, township, and range, to authorize a decree for specific performance. He claims that the description, “sections 22 and 28, Tp. 79, R. 13, Poweshiek county, Iowa,” does not describe any land, because “ Tp. 79, R. 13,” does not locate the land anywhere. It appears to us that there is no uncertainty or indefiniteness in these contractionsof words. They are in almost universal use in this state in describing lands, and everybody understands that they mean “township” and “range.” It is true the contract does not state whether the range is east or west, but that was wholly unnecessary, as the land was described as in Poweshiek county, and the courts of this state take judicial notice that all the land in that county is in range west. Besides, the land is described as owned by the defendant Robert McWilliams, and the plaintiff took possession of the very land described and intended by the parties as the right of way...