Otworth v. The Florida Bar

Decision Date29 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99-908-CIVT-17B.,99-908-CIVT-17B.
Citation71 F.Supp.2d 1209
PartiesClarence OTWORTH, Plaintiff, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Clarence Otworth, Clearwater, FL, plaintiff pro se.

Barry Scott Richard, Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, Tallahassee, FL, for Florida Bar, defendant.

Frank R. Jakes, James W. Humann, Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Frank Robert Jakes and James Willaim Humann, defendants.

ORDER

KOVACHEVICH, Chief Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on:

(1) Defendant, Larry Claxton Flynt's (hereinafter "Flynt"), Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.8), filed on June 4, 1999.

(2) Defendants, the Honorable Crockett Farnell, the Honorable Catherine Harlan, the Honorable Charles Weaver Cope, VI, and Assistant Attorney General Alison Becker's, Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.9), filed on June 8, 1999.

(3) Defendant, the Florida Bar's, Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.21), filed on June 16, 1999.

(4) Defendants, Frank R. Jakes and James W. Humann's, Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.22), filed on June 17, 1999.

(5) Plaintiff, Clarence Otworth's, responses thereto. (Dkts. 18, 19, 28, and 29).

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint, (Dkt.1), filed on April 16, 1999. On September 2, 1999, Plaintiff filed a suit against Defendant Flynt in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida, alleging breach of contract. At some point after the original Sixth Circuit cause of action was filed, Plaintiff added Defendants Farnell and Harlan to the action. On March 16, 1999, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Sixth Circuit cause of action.

On April 16, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Florida Bar, the Honorable Crockett Farnell, the Honorable Catherine Moore Harlan, the Honorable Charles Weaver Cope, VI, Frank Robert Jakes, James William Humann, Alison L. Becker, and Larry Claxton Flynt in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Defendants Farnell, Harlan, and Cope are judges in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida who heard some portion of Plaintiff's Sixth Circuit case. Defendant Becker is an Assistant Attorney General who appeared as counsel for Defendants Farnell and Harlan in the Sixth Circuit case. Defendants Jakes and Humann are private attorneys who were retained by Defendant Flynt in the original Sixth Circuit case. Defendant Flynt is the publisher and principal agent of LFP, Inc., a large publishing, media, and entertainment corporation. The Florida Bar Association is a self-governing organization of Florida lawyers.

Count I of Plaintiff's fifty (50) page Complaint alleges that the Florida Bar unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed to deprive Plaintiff of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. In connection with the alleged conspiracy, Plaintiff alleges that the Florida Bar has violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (hereinafter "the Sherman Act") by: engaging in a "group boycott" of non-lawyer pro se Plaintiff and others; monopolizing the jury trial market; suppressing and eliminating competition in the form of non-lawyer pro se plaintiffs; overcharging captive rate-paying non-lawyer customers; creating an unlawful monopoly over justice; depriving Plaintiff of his right to sue and enforce a contract in the Circuit Court; and requiring Plaintiff to have his pleadings signed by a member of the Florida Bar.

Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint also makes allegations concerning Defendants Farnell, Harlan, and Cope. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Farnell, Harlan, and Cope acted in excess of their jurisdiction by: disregarding the rotation for assigning cases; appointing themselves to the previously dismissed state case; engaging in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his right to sue and to enforce a contract; knowingly and willfully making and causing to be made false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations; never allowing a pro se non-lawyer plaintiff to have a jury trial in their respective courtrooms; engaging in a "group boycott" of Plaintiff's jury trial; assisting lawyers in their monopolization of the jury trial market; agreeing with the Florida Bar to suppress and eliminate non-lawyer pro se plaintiff competition; agreeing with the Florida Bar to overcharge its captive rate-paying non-lawyer customers; being unfair and partial due to their mandatory membership in the Florida Bar; agreeing with the Florida Bar members to deprive Plaintiff of his right to sue and to enforce a contract; agreeing with the Florida Bar to deprive Plaintiff of equal justice; and by requiring Plaintiff to have all of his pleadings signed by a member of the Florida Bar.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harlan: allowed Defendant Jakes to schedule a hearing without clearing the time with Plaintiff first; held a hearing on Defendant Jakes' motion while Plaintiff was not present; and "impersonated a Circuit Judge" by granting Defendant Jakes' motion for a protective order forty-eight (48) hours after Defendant Harlan was added as a defendant in the case.

As to Defendant Cope, Plaintiff alleges that relief is permitted because Defendant Cope failed to admonish Defendant Becker when Defendant Becker "brazenly filed frivolous motion[s]" for a temporary injunction and protective order and asked Defendant Cope to discriminate against Plaintiff and require Plaintiff to have his pleadings signed by a member of the Florida Bar. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Cope "re-instituted the Star Chamber and granted [D]efendants' a temporary injunction without notice and enjoined [Plaintiff] from filing any pleadings not signed by a member of [the Florida Bar]."

Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint also contains allegations, similar to those previously mentioned, against Defendants Jakes, Humann, and Becker. In addition to those previously discussed Plaintiff alleges that relief is proper because Defendants Jakes, Humann, and Becker failed to report the alleged misconduct of each other, as well as the alleged misconduct of the previously mentioned Defendants.

Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint contains allegations nearly identical to those contained within Count I. However, Plaintiff asserts that relief is warranted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "the Civil Rights Act"). Count II asserts allegations against Defendants, the Florida Bar, Farnell, Harlan, Cope, Jakes, Humann, and Becker.

Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint states that Defendants, the Florida Bar, Farnell, Harlan, Cope, Jakes, Humann, and Becker, have violated the Fifth Amendment by treating Plaintiff more harshly than those individuals who seek access to the court while being represented by an attorney. Plaintiff further states that the Supreme Court of Florida's involvement with the Florida Bar makes this a constitutional issue.

Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges breach of a unilateral contract. Count IV is the only count that contains an allegation against Defendant Flynt. Count IV alleges that: (1) in or about February 1978, Defendant Flynt offered a one million dollar reward for "information leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone involved in the planning or execution of President Kennedy's murder, or for information which makes it possible for the truth to come out"; (2) on or about December 25, 1996, Columbia pictures released a motion picture about the life of Larry Flynt titled The People v. Larry Flynt, in which Defendant Flynt was portrayed by actor Woody Harrelson; (3) while acting in the motion picture, Woody Harrelson, stated "Why not, it would be worth a million dollars to know who killed Kennedy"; (4) the motion picture The People v. Larry Flynt reenacted Defendant Flynt's decision to publish the reward and a copy of the reward was publicized; (5) Plaintiff learned of the reward in February 1998, when a cable television network broadcast the motion picture; (6) Plaintiff acted in response to the offer contained within the motion picture and performed the services that Defendant Flynt allegedly requested; (7) on March 13, 1998, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Flynt's attorney and claimed the reward; (8) Plaintiff traded his thirty-five (35) years of assassination research for Defendant Flynt's reward; (9) Defendant Flynt was notified of Plaintiff's intent to sue if the reward was not paid; (10) and on April 27, 1998, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Flynt's attorney that stated, "Mr. Flynt is not interested in pursuing the matter about which you wrote. Accordingly, I am returning your materials to you."

Count V of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Florida Bar has an unlawful monopoly power over justice. Plaintiff further alleges that the Supreme Court of Florida has acted outside of its jurisdiction by informing state bar officials that they could form a unified bar association. Plaintiff alleges that the Florida Bar has not allowed a non-lawyer pro se plaintiff to have a jury trial in the forty-nine (49) years the Florida Bar has been in existence. Plaintiff states that the Florida Bar has no purpose except to "suppress and eliminate non-lawyer pro se plaintiff competition and overcharge its captive rate-paying non-lawyer customers."

In connection with Counts I, II, and III, Plaintiff requests three million five-hundred thousand dollars ($3,500,000.00). Plaintiff requests one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in connection with the allegations contained within Count IV. In addition to the monetary requests, Plaintiff also requests that this Court: (1) declare that the Supreme Court of Florida acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it informed bar officials that they could make a unified bar association; (2) declare that mandatory membership in the...

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