Oudekerk v. Doe
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:23-cv-00288 (BKS/TWD) |
| Parties | NICHOLAS OUDEKERK, Plaintiff, v. GLENS FALLS POLICE OFFICER DOE 1; GLENS FALLS POLICE OFFICER DOE 2; and WARREN PROSECUTOR DOE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
NICHOLAS OUDEKERK Plaintiff, pro se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court a civil complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Nicholas Oudekerk (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the Auburn Correctional Facility, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) He also requests the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 5.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application and recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be accepted in part for filing.
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010).[1] “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. ().
Because Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and has filed the inmate authorization form required in this District, he is granted permission to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.[2])
Having found Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action IFP, and because he seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
Sections 1915 and 1915A “provide an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action if the Court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants. See Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990). The court should exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While the Court will generally afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal, leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff utilized the Court's form complaint for civil rights actions under Section 1983 and attached additional pages to elaborate upon his claims against defendants Glens Falls Police Officer Doe 1, Glens Falls Police Officer Doe 2, and Warren Prosecutor Doe[3] (together “Defendants”). (See Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities. Id. at 1. Plaintiff asserts allegations of wrongdoing related to his arrest on February 18, 2020. Id. at 4.
On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested at his home by Glens Falld Police Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2. Id. at 2. “This arrest was for crimes [Plaintiff] did not commit” including “obstruction of breathing [and] blood flow” and “false imprisonment” of another individual. Id.
Plaintiff alleges the arrest was made in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because (1) Plaintiff did not commit the crimes, and (2) the alleged victim told the police she did not call 911, no crime was committed against her, and she wanted the police to leave. Id. Further, the police did not have a warrant or consent to enter Plaintiff's home. Id. Plaintiff alleges the police were “deliberately indifferent” because there was “no ground[s] for an arrest.” Id. Warren Prosecutor Doe also “motioned” the Court for an order of protection, which prevented Plaintiff from being around the alleged victim. Id. at 7.
In March of 2020, Plaintiff “was informed by the public defender that the charges/order of protection would be dismissed” stemming from the February 18, 2020, arrest. Id. However, the charges and order of protection were not dismissed until October of 2020. Id. at 8-9.
Through his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Glens Falls Police Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2 entered his home “without probable cause” and “arrested” him for “charges that were dismissed later” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 10. In his second cause of action, Plaintiff claims Glens Falls Police Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2 “punished” him “with a false arrest” based on charges he did not commit in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Through his third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges the Warren County Prosecutor violated his “due process” rights and his “rights to life, liberty, [and] property when they took 7 months to dismiss the charges [and] order of [protection].” Id. In his fourth cause of action, Plaintiff references the Eighth Amendment and claims the Warren County Prosecutor violated his rights against “cruel [and] unusual punishment” by “taking 7 months” to dismiss the charges and order of protection. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges the delay, allegedly due to Covid-19 related issues, “was a tactic used to punish” him for crimes he did not commit. Id.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges (1) Glens Falls Police Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2 falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted[4] him; and (2) Warren Prosecutor Doe denied Plaintiff due process and acted with deliberate indifference.[5] Plaintiff seeks significant monetary damages. See id. at 10-11. For a complete statement of Plaintiff's claims, reference is made to the complaint.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990).
To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct: (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whalen v Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). To establish liability under the statute, a plaintiff must plead that each government official defendant violated the Constitution through that official's own individual actions. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). An official may not be held liable for constitutional violations simply because he held a high position of authority. Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 2016). “Section 1983 claims against municipal employees sued in their official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality itself.” Ortiz v. Wagstaff, 523 F.Supp.3d 347, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). A...
To continue reading
Request your trial