Ouellette v. Union Tank Car Co.

• Citation: 902 F. Supp. 5
• Decision Date: 27 October 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-30227-MAP.
• Parties: Joanne OUELLETTE, Plaintiff, v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY, John Doe Company and Consolidated Rail Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts

902 F. Supp. 5

Joanne OUELLETTE, Plaintiff, v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY, John Doe Company and Consolidated Rail Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 93-30227-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

October 27, 1995.

Michael T. Sarnacki, Chartier, Ogan, Brady & Lukakis, Holyoke, MA, Samuel A. Marsella, Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff Joanne Ouellette.

Charles K. Bergin, Jr., Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Springfield, MA, William N. Erickson, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Boston, MA, for Defendant Union Tank Car Company.

Judith Buckley Hayman, Leonard F. Zandrow, Robert L. Farrell, Kevin J. O'Leary, Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, MA, for Defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation.

Kevin C. Maynard, Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas, Springfield, MA, for Third-Party Defendant Monsanto Company.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court are plaintiff Joanne Ouellette and defendant Union Tank Company's ("UTC") objections to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman's Report and Recommendation regarding the motions for summary judgment of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") and defendant UTC. In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting Conrail's motion for summary judgment and denying UTC's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, this court will adopt the portion of the Report and Recommendation recommending summary judgment in favor of defendant Conrail. The court will, however, decline to adopt the recommendation with regard to UTC's motion and will grant summary judgment as to defendant UTC, based on the August 14, 1995 decision in Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.1995).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual background, which is not disputed by the parties, was determined by the Magistrate Judge to be as follows:

Plaintiff brought claims against UTC alleging negligence, failure to warn and breach of warranty. Plaintiff alleged that UTC provided inadequate safety appliances on a tank car that UTC had manufactured and leased to Plaintiff's employer, Monsanto Chemical Corporation ("Monsanto"). Conrail was a rail carrier that delivered the tank car to Monsanto's plant. Plaintiff also asserted claims against Conrail for negligence, failure to warn, and breach of warranty. Plaintiff commenced her action in the Massachusetts Superior Court, Hampden County, but the case was removed to this Court in October of 1993 based on diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

The facts of the accident at issue are as follows: On August 13, 1990, Plaintiff was an employee of Monsanto at its Indian Orchard facility in Springfield, Massachusetts. Plaintiff was a material handler for Monsanto and one of her tasks required her to ascend and descend tank cars. While on the tank cars, Plaintiff has to set and release the brake, as well as uncouple cars for loading and unloading. On the day of her accident, Plaintiff ascended a tank car (designated UTLX 85130) in order to release a brake so that the tank car could be uncoupled. Once on the tank car's walkplate, Plaintiff disengaged the brake, turned around and walked back to the vertical handhold and ladder. Plaintiff began to descend the tank car, holding the side handhold, and attempted to turn her body around to step down to the sill step. She lost her grip and fell to the ground, sustaining injuries to her leg. Plaintiff alleges that her fall was a result of an ill-placed handhold and claims that a side railing would have been a safer and preferable feature.

The car designated UTLX 85130 is classified as a 10,000-gallon tank car with side platforms. This UTLX-style tank car was required to have a vertical handhold located on the belly of the tank, rather than a side railing along the end of the car's walkplate. All UTLX tank cars of this class were of the same design. The size and location of the tank cars' safety appliances are governed by federal law. Before modifications can occur, designs and blueprints must first be submitted and approved by the Tank Car Committee of the Association of American Railroads ("AAR").

When the UTLX 85130 tank car was originally built in 1965, the design of the safety appliances, including the handhold designs, was governed by the 1950 edition of the United States Safety Appliance Act. 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The portion of the Act entitled "Tank Cars with Side Platforms" sets forth the dimensions, location, and manner of application of the side handhold for tank cars with side platforms. In 1970, the Secretary of Transportation promulgated regulations governing handholds pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 4.¹ The regulations are identical to the provision in the Safety Appliance Act, providing in specific detail the location, size, and number of handholds. 49 CFR § 231.7 (1989 edition).²

The subject tank car was manufactured and owned by UTC through the date of the accident. The tank car was delivered to Monsanto by Conrail on August 8, 1990, five days prior to Plaintiff's fall. Plaintiff's claims against Conrail arise solely from the fact that Conrail delivered the tank car to Monsanto. Monsanto leased the tank car from UTC from 1981 through February of 1993. Conrail had no role in the design, manufacture, marketing or merchandising of the subject tank car.

Monsanto's practice at the time of the accident was to require an inspection of every rail car prior to entry into its plant. Rail cars had to comply with the applicable federal regulations, the rules of the Association of American Railroads ("AAR Interchange Rules"), and Monsanto's Logistics, Distribution and Shipping guide ("LDS guide"). If a car was not in compliance with any of the regulations, it was not allowed into the Monsanto plant until the defective condition was repaired.

Monsanto contracted with the Carl Fisher Company ("Fisher") to perform all of its rail car inspections and minor repairs. Monsanto also required Fisher to conduct annual inspections on Monsanto's leased and owned rail cars. Fisher had inspected tank car UTLX 85130 numerous times prior to Plaintiff's accident and found upon each inspection that it complied with federal safety regulations concerning the requisite safety devices, including the regulations governing handrails, ladders and platforms. The tank car also passed the more thorough annual inspection performed by Fisher in April, 1990, four months prior to the Plaintiff's accident.

When the subject tank car was delivered to Monsanto by Conrail on August 8, 1990, it passed Monsanto's inspection and was allowed into the plant. Earlier, the tank car had passed inspection when Conrail inspected it in Conrail's yard. Employees of both Fisher and Monsanto inspected and passed the tank car within a day or two of the Plaintiff's accident. The tank car similarly passed an annual inspection in April of 1991, after the Plaintiff's accident.

Report and Recommendation at 2-5.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. De Novo Review

A dissatisfied litigant may obtain review of a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive motion issued by a magistrate judge by filing an objection to the report and recommendation in the district court. The district court applies a de novo standard of review, which does not require a new hearing. Rules for United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 3(b); see also Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court may accept, reject or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See Paterson-Leitch v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-991 (1st Cir.1988) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 72); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) when the "pleadings and the affidavits raise no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1994). "The non-moving party bears the burden of placing at least one material fact into dispute after the moving party shows the absence of material fact." Id., citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In this setting, "`genuine' means that `the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party,' and a material fact is one which `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir.1993), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Additionally, "mere allegations or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact." August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1992). Finally, questions of law are appropriate for resolution on summary judgment, barring a genuine dispute of material fact. Jimenez v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 974 F.2d 221 (1st Cir.1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

Both plaintiff's and defendant UTC's objections to the Report and Recommendation hinge on what effect UTC's alleged noncompliance with federal regulations has on the preemption provisions of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA"). 45 U.S.C. §§ 421 et seq. The short answer is none. All plaintiff's claims against UTC are preempted regardless of whether the placement of the handrail was in compliance with the federal regulations. Given this, UTC's motion for summary judgment must as a matter of law be granted on all counts.

A. Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that a...