Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers
| Decision Date | 19 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-3324,84-3324 |
| Citation | 765 F.2d 578 |
| Parties | Issac OVERBEE, Jr.; Betty S. Overbee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VAN WATERS & ROGERS; Univar, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Bernard K. Bauer, argued, O'Brien & Bauer Co., L.P.A., Findlay, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.
M. Donald Carmin, argued, Eastman and Smith, Toledo, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before MERRITT, and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and GILMORE, District Judge. *
In this second appeal to this court, plaintiffs present the question of whether relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) in a diversity action should be granted, where during the first appeal to this court, the Ohio Supreme Court settled a question of law adversely to the plaintiffs, but during the remand from this court on an unrelated issue, the state court reversed itself with the result that the federal district court was clearly in error on a question of Ohio state law.
Plaintiffs originally filed this products liability action in Ohio state court seeking recovery in strict liability and negligence for injuries received by Mr. Overbee in an industrial accident. The case was subsequently removed to federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. At the close of plaintiffs' proof, the defendants obtained a directed verdict on the issue of strict liability. At the end of all proof, the plaintiffs requested an instruction on comparative negligence; however, the court instructed the jury on contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of negligence and the court entered judgment on April 3, 1981. Plaintiffs then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an evidentiary hearing pursuant to a Rule 59 motion for a new trial based on the allegation that extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought before the jury. The court denied all motions without conducting a hearing on the jury misconduct issue. Plaintiffs then filed their first appeal.
Effective June 20, 1980, the Ohio legislature substituted comparative negligence for contributory negligence. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2315.19 ("Act"). The legislation was unclear, however, as to whether the new Act applied only to those causes of action that accrued after June 20, 1980, or to actions tried after that date. (This cause of action accrued on November 11, 1977; trial began on March 31, 1981.) On August 11, 1982, while the case sub judice was on the first appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Act establishing comparative negligence applied only to causes of action which accrued after June 20, 1980. Viers v. Dunlap, 1 Ohio St.3d 173, 438 N.E.2d 881 (1982). Although in their post-trial motions and in their brief in the first appeal to this court plaintiffs urged the applicability of comparative negligence, the plaintiffs conceded during oral argument that the issue was settled as a result of the Viers decision. Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768, 770 n. 2 (6th Cir.1983).
On May 10, 1983, this court affirmed the district court's directed verdict on the issue of strict liability, but reversed the court's denial of the motion for a new trial holding that the district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of jury misconduct and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. While the case was on remand to the district court for reconsideration of the motion for a new trial, but prior to the evidentiary hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed itself and held that the Act, supra, applied to all actions tried after June 20, 1980. Wilfong v. Batdorf, 6 Ohio St.3d 100, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (1983). Consequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment requesting a new trial in order that the jury might be instructed on comparative negligence.
Upon remand the district court conducted the evidentiary hearing and thereafter held that there was no basis for setting aside the jury verdict. In the same opinion and order, the court overruled the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment without analysis. Judgment was entered for the defendants and this appeal followed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part, that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate to accomplish justice in an extraordinary situation and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976). Numerous courts have held that the mere showing of a change in the law is not enough to demonstrate such an extraordinary situation when the judgment has become final. See, e.g., id. However, we are of the opinion that the unique facts of this case compel the granting of the motion and accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
in our view, at the time the plaintiffs filed the motion, the judgment was not final. On the date of the filing of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the district court had not held the evidentiary hearing on the issue of jury misconduct pursuant to this court's reversal of the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. A motion for a new trial suspends the finality of a judgment. See Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151, 46 S.Ct. 241, 70 L.Ed. 518 (1926) ().
Second, we think this case presents extraordinary...
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...it applied to causes of action that accrued after the effective date, or to actions tried after that date. On August 11, 1982, while the Overbee case was on its first appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Act applied to causes of action that accrued after the June 20 effective dat......
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Mitchell v. Rees
...151 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir.1998)(extraordinary circumstances based upon a post-judgment change in the law); Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985)(finding extraordinary circumstances and granting relief from judgment based on intervening decision of Ohio Supreme Co......
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Ward v. Chapman
...under Rule 60(b)(6) when it determines in its sound discretion that substantial justice would be served. Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). Finally, as with a Rule 59(e) motion (and L.R. 7.1), a party may not use Rule 60(b) "as an occasion to relitigate its ca......
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Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 81-423C(1).
...examined by this Court, the courts refused relief based upon a change in decisional law, not statutory law. E.g. Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.1985); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C. Cir.1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3147, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 ......