Overstreet v. Sea Containers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1406,76-1406
• Citation: 348 So.2d 628
• Parties: R. K. OVERSTREET, as Tax Collector of Dade County, et al., Appellants, v. SEA CONTAINERS, INC., a New York Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 628

348 So.2d 628

R. K. OVERSTREET, as Tax Collector of Dade County, et al., Appellants, v. SEA CONTAINERS, INC., a New York Corporation, Appellee.

No. 76-1406.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 19, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1977.

Stuart L. Simon, County Atty., and Robert L. Krawcheck, Miami, for appellants.

Lapidus & Hollander and Richard L. Lapidus, Miami, for appellee.

Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and BARKDULL, JJ.

HENDRY, Chief Judge.

This appeal is taken by Dade County from a final judgment which voided an assessment of ad valorem personal property taxes on marine container equipment owned by appellee, Sea Containers, Inc.

The facts, stated as succinctly as possible, are as follows. Appellee owns and leases marine cargo containers to shipping lines for international commerce. In 1972, appellee closed its Miami depot and has since neither maintained an office here nor realized any pecuniary benefit from its Miami operations. Appellee has, however, maintained an on-going relationship with its former agent for the purpose of overseeing the many containers that had been stored in warehouses at the Port of Miami by virtue of the terms of certain leases entered into by appellee and various shipping lines prior to the time appellee closed its Miami office. Said leases called for Miami as the "drop-off" point for leased containers at the termination of the leasing period.

During the years 1974 and 1975, Dade County assessed and taxed appellee's personal property (containers) at the Port of Miami. The assessments were not apportioned by any formula, but were instead based upon the actual number of containers owned by appellee at the port on the applicable taxing dates. The containers taxed were of two varieties. The record supports the view that most, if not all, of the containers taxed were of the "off-lease" variety, i. e., containers stored at the port awaiting either transport out of Miami to another port or reassignment at Miami via a new lease agreement.

The other variety of container was that which was "on-lease" to a third person (lessee). Appellee could not determine whether any of the containers actually taxed at the port were of that variety, as it did not maintain a check on either the presence or whereabouts of containers while on lease to third persons. The assessor for the county did not impose the tax on the basis of an "off-lease" versus "on-lease" distinction, but rather, solely on the basis of ownership, i. e., the number of containers present at the port, owned by appellee.

This suit was filed challenging the assessment as void on the grounds, inter alia, that the assessed property was not permanently located in Dade County on the taxing dates in question, for the years 1974 and 1975, pursuant to Section 192.032(2), Florida Statute (1975). Dade County argued below, and on appeal, that the permanency requirement of the above statute is inapplicable sub judice, as that statute only pertains to competing counties attempting to tax the same personal property. The county was and is of the view that the general taxing statute, Section 192.011, Florida Statutes (1975), prevails, authorizing the ad valorem tax assessed on appellee's property.

The trial judge, after a non-jury trial and with benefit of lengthy and scholarly memoranda of law determined that Section 192.032(2) prevailed and no tax could be levied upon appellee, as the property in question was not permanently located in Dade County on the taxing dates. The assessment was held void and this appeal follows.

Initially, we must note that many other points were raised in both the trial court and on appeal concerning the validity of the assessment. One point in particular questioned the method of assessment utilized by the Dade County Assessor as being in violation of both the interstate and foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution, art. I § 8, in that the tax was unapportioned, creating the possibility of multiple taxation and unduly burdening the instrumentalities of commerce. In rejecting that contention on appeal, we observe that the record is completely devoid of any testimony concerning the use of the stored containers in either foreign or interstate commerce. In fact, there was ample testimony to support the view that the taxed containers were doing nothing more than awaiting re-assignment to a port where appellee maintained an active business. (As will be discussed later, this period of limbo lasted, in most cases, for more than two years.) As such, we believe that the constitutional contention of unapportioned taxation is completely without merit and shall be mentioned no further.

We now come upon the crux of this appeal: the questions of whether Section 192.032, Florida Statute (1975) requires that personal property taxed must be permanently located in the county which assesses the tax and whether the property in question was, for tax purposes, permanently located in Dade County.

Section 192.032, Florida Statutes (1975) provides, in pertinent part:

"Situs of property for assessment purposes. All property shall be assessed according to its situs as follows:

"(2) Tangible personal property, in that county and municipality in which it is permanently located on January 1 of each year. Property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1 of any year shall be considered to have been in the...