Oviatt v. Reynolds
Decision Date | 07 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-4124,17-4124 |
Parties | KONNA C. OVIATT; EDSON G. GARDNER; LYNDA M. KOZLOWICZ; ATHENYA SWAIN, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. WILLIAM REYNOLDS, in his official capacity as Judge of the Ute Trial Court; SHAUN CHAPOOSE; EDRED SECAKUKU; TONY SMALL; BRUCE IGNACIO; CUMMINGS J. VANERHOOP; RONALD WOPSOCK; CLEVE HATCH, Defendants - Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D. Utah)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
As a result of these orders allegedly being carried out, the plaintiffs sued certain tribal officials under the Indian Civil Rights Act and United States Constitution, alleging that the officials had violated the Fourth Amendment by incarcerating and searching the plaintiffs.1 The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirm.
Two of the plaintiffs have also requested appointment of the U.S. Attorney as counsel in this appeal. Exercising our discretion, we deny the request.
After the appeal was fully briefed, two plaintiffs (Mr. Edson Gardner and Ms. Lynda Kozlowicz) moved for appointment of the U.S. Attorney to represent them. The motion was grounded in 25 U.S.C. § 175, whichauthorizes the U.S. Attorney to represent Indians on allotted lands. But, as the plaintiffs acknowledge, appointment under the statute is not mandatory. See Siniscal v. United States, 208 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1953) (); see also Thad Blank, Time to Recommit: The Department of Justice's Indian Resources Section, the Trust Duty, and Affirmative Litigation, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 391, 409 (2012) (). Instead, we exercise discretion in deciding whether to appoint the U.S. Attorney. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ( ); United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1553 (9th Cir. 1994) ().
We exercise discretion to deny the requested appointment for two reasons.
First, the plaintiffs have sued Indian officials who enjoy an equal right to representation by the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney could not ethically represent both sides of the suit.
Second, the plaintiffs waited too long to seek appointment. They did not ask for appointment of the U.S. Attorney in district court and asked in this court only after the appeal had already been fully briefed. Appointment of the U.S. Attorney would require the court to scrap the existing briefs and start over, which would unfairly burden the defendants and create unwarranted delay.
For both reasons, we deny the motion to appoint the U.S. Attorney for Mr. Gardner and Ms. Kozlowicz.
The district court dismissed this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We review jurisdiction de novo. Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539, 541 (10th Cir. 2017).
The plaintiffs bear the burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Merida-Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005). To satisfy their burden, the plaintiffs rely on the Indian Civil Rights Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This reliance is misguided. The Indian Civil Rights Act authorizes relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2012). But habeas relief is limited to individuals who are detained when the petition is filed, and the plaintiffs have not alleged they were detained when they filed the habeaspetition. And to otherwise invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the plaintiffs must invoke a colorable basis for a federal claim. In our view, the plaintiffs have not alleged a colorable claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act or any other federal provision.
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs could pursue habeas relief only "to test the legality of [their] detention." 25 U.S.C. § 1303; see Broomes v. Ashcraft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004) (, )abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). We consider the plaintiffs "detained" only if they were subject at the time to "a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty." Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996).
The plaintiffs have alleged past arrests and incarceration. But they do not allege that they were under arrest or incarcerated when they sought habeas relief.
Instead, the plaintiffs argue that they were "banished," relying on the Second Circuit's opinion in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). We have not decided whether banishment satisfies the statutory requirement of detention. See Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) ( ). But even in the Second Circuit, a tribal member is considered "detained" only when permanently banished from the tribe. Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998).
On appeal, the plaintiffs use the word "banishment." But in district court, the plaintiffs did not allege banishment. Nor have they presented evidence of a permanent prohibition from entering the Ute Tribe's land. As a result, even if we were to follow Poodry, the plaintiffs' new allegation of "banishment" would not satisfy the detention requirement. See Walton, 443 F.3d at 1279 n.2 ( ); Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Faced with these allegations, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had not faced a severe actual or potential restraint on their liberty, stating: "In contrast [to the Poodry plaintiffs], plaintiffs in the instant case have not alleged that they were banished from the Nation, deprived of tribal membership, convicted of any crime, or that defendants attempted in anyway [sic] to remove them from Oneida territory." Id.
Though the plaintiffs use the word "banishment," they have not alleged any facts creating a colorable basis for jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
The plaintiffs also invoke federal-question jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This section does not provide subject-matter jurisdiction.2
Section 1331 creates federal jurisdiction for a civil action arising under the United States Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty.3 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The plaintiffs base their substantive claims not only on the Indian Civil Rights Act but also on the Fourth Amendment.
Generally, § 1331 creates federal jurisdiction over claims based directly on the United States Constitution. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). But § 1331 does not create jurisdiction when the constitutional claim is "wholly unsubstantial and frivolous." JuniorChamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1974).
The constitutional claims here are frivolous because the Fourth Amendment does not bind Indian tribes. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978) (); Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2012) (); see also United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005) ( ); United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (...
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