Owen Indus. Products, Inc. v. Sharpe

Decision Date16 January 1980
Docket NumberNo. 21123,21123
Citation274 S.C. 193,262 S.E.2d 33
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesOWEN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent-Appellant, v. Marjorie H. SHARPE, Treasurer of Lexington County, Appellant-Respondent.

Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen., Joe L. Allen, and Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Columbia, and T. H. Rawl, Jr., of Rawl, Purcell & Harman, Lexington, for appellant-respondent.

George S. King, Jr., of Boyd, Knowlton, Tate & Finlay, Columbia, for respondent-appellant.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

This appeal concerns twenty-one separate actions for the refund of property taxes paid under protest by various industrial enterprises located in Lexington County. The actions were consolidated by order of the court and bear the above caption by stipulation of the parties. This action is treated as though it were a refund claim for the tax years 1972 through 1976 for all actions.

The Taxpayers seek to recover taxes paid under protest, as permitted by statute, on property claimed to be exempt from taxation by Act 1095, Acts and Joint Resolutions of South Carolina (1966). The General Assembly therein provided an exemption from certain property taxes for new industrial enterprises locating in Lexington County and for certain additions to existing industrial enterprises situate in Lexington County. The Act reads in pertinent part:

"All new industrial enterprises (which qualify) . . . shall be entitled to a period of exemption from payment of all county taxes, except for school purposes."

The Taxpayers met the conditions of the Act and were granted the exemption for those taxes the parties agreed to be "County Taxes." The exemption was not granted for taxes levied for: (1) the retirement of bonds of the Lexington County Hospital (Hospital Bond Tax); (2) the operation of the Lexington County Hospital (Hospital Operating Tax), and (3) the operation of the Lexington County Fire Protection System (Fire District Tax).

A special referee heard evidence in the matter and recommended that each of the questioned taxes be treated as a county tax for purposes of the exemption. In ruling upon the exceptions to the special referee's report, the circuit judge concluded that the Hospital Bond Tax and the Fire District Tax were county taxes, while the Hospital Operating Tax was not. Both the Taxpayers and the County have appealed.

When the matter came for argument before this court, the County conceded that under the authority of West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co. v. Riddock, 225 S.C. 283, 82 S.E.2d 189 (1954), the Hospital Bond Tax was indeed a county tax and thus within the exemption. As to the two remaining issues, we reverse the circuit court as to each and find that the Hospital Operating Tax is a county tax, while the Fire District Tax is not such within the meaning of the statute.

The sole issue before this court is whether the questioned taxes are county taxes within the meaning of the exemption statute. As a general rule, the language of a tax exemption statute must be given its plain, ordinary meaning and must be construed strictly against the claimed exemption. Chronicle Publishers, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 244 S.C. 192, 136 S.E.2d 261 (1964). Since these types of taxes have not been before this court previously, we must determine their status from the plain meaning of the exemption statute.

The Taxpayers contend that the taxes are county taxes because the County levies and collects them. The County asserts that the determinant factors include not only the taxing body, but also the geographical area of the tax and the purpose of the tax. We agree with the County that the levying authority is not determinative.

A review of numerous legislative acts indicate that the creation of the Lexington County Hospital was approved by a countywide referendum in 1966. The following year the General Assembly enacted a bill creating a Board of Trustees to...

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5 cases
  • State v. Groome
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1980
  • Bovain v. Canal Ins.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 8, 2009
    ...operation." Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992); see Owen Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Sharpe, 274 S.C. 193, 195, 262 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1980) (stating the general rule that a statutory exemption "must be given its plain, ordinary meaning and must be c......
  • John D. Hollingsworth on Wheels, Inc. v. Greenville County Treasurer
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 18, 1981
    ...exemption. Chronicle Publishers, Inc. v. S. C. Tax Commission, 244 S.C. 192, 136 S.E.2d 261 (1964); Owen Industrial Products, Inc. v. Sharpe, 274 S.C. 193, 262 S.E.2d 33 (1980). In Owen, we held a taxpayer was entitled to the manufacturer's exemption because the challenged tax was levied by......
  • Michelin Tire Corp. v. Spartanburg County Treasurer, 22055
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 10, 1984
    ...proper county purpose. Hollingsworth v. Greenville County Treasurer, 276 S.C. 314, 278 S.E.2d 340 (1981); Owen Industrial Products, Inc. v. Sharpe, 274 S.C. 193, 262 S.E.2d 33 (1980). In Owen, this Court concluded that a fire district tax was not a county tax because the taxing district inc......
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