Owen v. Casey

• Decision Date: 13 March 1908
• Parties: OWEN v. CASEY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

94 P. 473

48 Wash. 673

OWEN v. CASEY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 13, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, Adams County; W. T. Warren, Judge.

Action by A. W. Owen against O. B. Casey and another. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

O. R Holcomb, for appellants.

Lovell & Davis, for respondent.

CROW J.

This action was commenced by A. W. Owen against O. B. Casey and P H. Casey to foreclose a lien for labor in clearing certain land on which the defendants held a leasehold estate. After denying the allegations of the complaint the defendants pleaded two affirmative defenses, to which demurrers were sustained. After hearing the evidence the trial court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendants have appealed.

The respondent has moved to strike the statement of facts, for the reason that it was not filed and served within 90 days after the entry of the decree, or the entry of the order overruling appellants' motion for a new trial. The record shows that the decree was entered October 1, 1906; that the order overruling the motion for a new trial was entered February 1, 1907; and that the proposed statement of facts was filed and served June 10, 1907. Although a written stipulation in the record purports to extend appellants time until June 10, 1907, the statement must nevertheless be stricken, as under Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5062 the time cannot be extended beyond 60 additional days, or 90 days in all, either by order of court or stipulation of the parties. Loos v. Rondema, 10 Wash. 164, 38 P. 1012; State v. Seaton, 26 Wash. 305, 66 P. 397.

The statement being stricken, the only questions we can consider are the appellants' contentions that the court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the affirmative answers, and that the respondent is not entitled to foreclose a lien on a leasehold estate. By their first affirmative answer the appellants attempted to plead a counterclaim for damages sustained by them by reason of the respondent's failure to complete the work in sufficient time to enable appellants to raise a crop from the land in the year 1906. The contract pleaded neither stipulated nor contemplated that the land was to be ready for crop in 1906, but shows that the work was to be done within a reasonable time. The alleged damages did not, if sustained, proximately or necessarily result from any act or negligence of the...