Owen v. City of Sioux City

• Decision Date: 18 May 1894
• Citation: 91 Iowa 190,59 N.W. 3
• Parties: OWEN v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 Iowa 190

59 N.W. 3

OWEN

v.CITY OF SIOUX CITY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 18, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Woodbury county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.

The plaintiff is the owner of certain lots on Jennings street, in the defendant city. The city of Sioux City is one of the first class, and the authorities of the city caused Jennings street to be graded, and provided that the cost thereof should be assessed to the adjoining property, in pursuance of which there was assessed against the plaintiff's lots, in the way of a special assessment, the sum of $1,062.37. The plaintiff applied to the district court for a temporary writ of injunction to restrain the collection of the assessment, which the court denied, and from its order the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.Strong & Owen, for appellant.

Wright, Hubbard & Yeomans and J. L. Kennedy, City Sol., for appellees.

GRANGER, C. J.

The authority of the city council to make the special assessment is by virtue of an act of the 20th General Assembly (chapter 20), containing the following provision: “Section 1. That cities of the first class, that have been or may be organized since Jan. 1st, 1881, shall have power to open, widen, extend, grade, construct permanent sidewalks, curb, pave, gravel, macadamize and gutter, or cause the same to be done in any manner they may by ordinance deem proper, any street, avenue, highway, or alley within the limits of the city, and may open, extend, widen, grade, park, pave, or otherwise as aforesaid, improve any part of any such street, highway, avenue, or alley, and where said improvements are proposed to be made, to pay the expenses of the same.” It is contended that the act is “special legislation under the guise of a general law,” and is therefore in contravention of the constitutional provision contained in the bill of rights that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” The particular ground upon which it is claimed that the act under consideration is without uniform operation is that the act, by its terms, limits its operations to cities of the same class “organized since Jan. 1st, 1881.” It is said that such a distinction, based alone on a date of organization, is an evasion of the constitutional provision, and makes the act special and partial in its operation. The question has received extensive consideration from counsel, and the citations of authorities are numerous. That the law in question is special in its nature does not render it vulnerable to the constitutional inhibition. That it is special as to the subject-matter to which it applies is not to be doubted. Our constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature, but a mere limitation on such power, and, wherein the legislative power as to such legislation is not limited by the constitution, it exists. Article 3 of the constitution treats of the legislative department of the state, and section 30 thereof specifies wherein the “general assembly shall not pass local or special laws.” Nothing in the specifications is in any way a prohibition on the legislative authority to legislate specially with reference to cities of a particular class nor as to particular cities of a class, by any form of designation; hence we may dismiss the claim as to the act being of a special nature as to the subject of legislation so as to render it void. It may be said that most of our legislation is special in the sense of the subject-matter to which it applies, and much caution should be exercised in the application of the constitutional provision to avoid any undue infringement of legislative power.

We are, then, to inquire if, because cities of the first class, so organized prior to January 1, 1881, are excluded from its operations, the act is without such “uniform operation throughout the state” as to render it vulnerable to the constitutional inhibition. The act in question is a general law as to powers of cities organized under the general incorporation act, and it has no reference to cities under special charters. Excluding cities under special charters, and but one city of the state (Des Moines), of the class designated, is not within the operation of the act. The cities and towns of the state, when incorporated, are classified as cities of the first and cities of the second class, and incorporated towns, the classification being based on difference in population; and the exercise of corporate powers by each, under legislative authority, is in pursuance of such classification. Hence it seems to be conceded that legislation applicable to these different corporations answers the constitutional requirements as to uniformity of operation. It should be said in this connection that this basis of classification is one based on legislative enactments, and has no express constitutional sanction. The thought is important as bearing on the authority of the legislature to make other classifications in defining the operation of its enactments.We quote the following from appellant's argument as a fair way of meeting his contention: “This act ignores the classification of cities by population for the purpose of exercising corporate powers, and creates a new classification, based not upon difference in population, not upon difference in surroundings, situation, or peculiar circumstances, nor upon any difference whatever, but based wholly and solely upon an arbitrary date, which bears no relation to the legislative purpose, and has no connection with the needs or wants of a city with respect to...