Owen v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1891
• Citation: 16 S.W. 114
• Parties: OWEN v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

16 S.W. 114

OWEN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 3, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Robertson county; A. H. MUMFORD, Judge.

Joel B. Kort, for appellant. Atty. Gen. Pickle, for the State.

SNODGRASS, J.

The appeal in error is from a conviction and sentence of 14 years in the penitentiary for incest. Errors assigned relate to rejection of defendant's wife as a witness in his favor, and to the charge of the court. There was no error in excluding the wife on objection. At common law she could not be a witness for her husband in such case, and we have no statute changing the rule. The circuit judge charged that "the law presumes every defendant to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt by proof. In other words, when the state prefers a charge against a citizen, before he can be convicted the burden is upon the state to show by proof to your satisfaction the material elements of the offense charged. If the proof in this case satisfies you that at any time previous to the finding of the indictment the defendant, James O. Owen, had carnal knowledge of Mattie Randolph,—that is, had sexual intercourse with her,—in Robertson county, and that at the time she was the daughter of his wife, the defendant is guilty, and you should convict him; if not, then you should acquit him." This charge is erroneous. It is not sufficient to say that if the proof shows guilt "to your satisfaction," or "if the proof satisfies you of defendant's guilt," you must convict. There are degrees of satisfaction, and that which the law requires is "satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt." It has been often said by this court that this phrase, well understood, should not be departed from; but, if it is, then the full equivalent of the term must be used. In one case it is intimated that "fully satisfied" might be equivalent, or a charge that the facts must be "fully proved" might fairly imply the same character of proof, and, in the absence of special request for further instruction, a charge in these forms of "fully satisfied" or "fully proved" might be good. Lawless v. State, 4 Lea, 180-182. But even this is doubtingly suggested, and courts are admonished to adhere to the ancient and "well-understood" phrase. Id. 179, 180. The preceding general statement quoted from the charge, to the effect that "every defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt by proof," does not do away with the imperfection of the charge in reference to how far the jury must be satisfied. In this case, after making such statement, the judge explains what he means by it by saying: "In other words, * * * the burden is on the state to show by proof to your satisfaction," and that, "if the proof in this case satisfies you, * * * you should convict." These were stated as definitions of his meaning, or equivalents, and, as such, limited his statement to their effect, and thereby made it erroneous. Railroad Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn....