Owens v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. NA 01-164-C H/H.,NA 01-164-C H/H. |
| Parties | OWENS, Jo, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Randy Owens, Deceased, Owens, Jo, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Randy Owens, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Unknown Manufacturer of Air Bag, Unknown Designer of Air Bag, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Nicholas Pappas, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S RULE 702 CHALLENGE AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jo Owens, individually and as personal representative of the estate of her late husband Randy Owens, has sued defendant Ford Motor Company in diversity alleging a defect in the manufacture of the air bag in plaintiff's 1991 Ford Taurus GL. This defect, Mrs. Owens claims, caused the air bag to fail to deploy completely in an accident, causing additional injury to Mr. Owens and perhaps even contributing to his later death. Ford has moved to exclude plaintiff's proffered expert witnesses, challenging both their qualifications and the reliability of their opinions. On the basis of this challenge, Ford has further moved for summary judgment. As explained below, plaintiff has not come forward with expert opinions founded on sufficient facts or data, or derived from reliable principles or methods, to show that the air bag failed to deploy properly in the Owens accident. Without admissible expert testimony on that key point, plaintiff cannot present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ford's product was defective. Accordingly, Ford's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, leaving the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must first come forward and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which the party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Where the moving party has met the threshold burden of supporting the motion, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Local Rule 56.1 requires the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to identify specific and material factual disputes. The non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits." Chemsource, Inc. v. Hub Group, Inc., 106 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir.1997).
In reviewing the parties' submissions, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. However, the existence of some metaphysical doubt does not create a genuine issue of fact. "A party must present more than mere speculation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment motion." Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 107 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.1997). The issue is whether a trier of fact could reasonably find for the party opposing the motion with respect to the particular issue. The court should neither "look the other way" to ignore genuine issues of material fact, nor "strain to find" material factual issues where there are none. Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (7th Cir.1988). Where expert opinions are employed to oppose summary judgment, the proffered opinions must be "admissible or usable at trial." Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir.2001).
On June 2, 1999, Randy Owens was driving his 1991 Ford Taurus GL on State Road 111 near New Albany, Indiana. His wife Jo Owens was in the passenger seat. The Owens' car collided with a car that had pulled into their path from a side road.
The damage to the Owens' Taurus was extensive and "totaled" the car. The windshield had an impact fracture on the driver side. Also on the driver side, the knee bolster was significantly caved in and the sun visor vanity mirror was cracked. Photographs of the car taken immediately after the accident show that the driverside air bag mounted in the steering wheel had deployed. The extent of the deployment — which is the primary issue in this case — cannot be judged from the photos. A safety feature built into all air bags causes them to deflate after deployment in a collision. The upper rim of the steering wheel itself was also bent.
After the accident, Mr. Owens was taken to a hospital emergency room where he complained of pain to his back, knee, forehead and cervical spine. Bessen Dep. at 15. He was diagnosed with a mild concussion, multiple contusions, abrasions, and a lumbar sprain. Id. at 14. No mention was made at the hospital of any chest pain or trauma. He was treated and released later the same day.
About seven months later, on January 25, 2000, Mr. Owens underwent a routine electrocardiogram (EKG) in preparation for orthopedic surgery. The EKG and subsequent testing revealed that Mr. Owens had severe heart disease and had suffered a heart attack at some previous time. Mr. Owens indicated to the consulting cardiologist that he had suffered chest trauma from impact with the steering wheel in the June accident and complained that he had been feeling chest discomfort ever since. Mr. Owens' medical history showed that he was a smoker and had borderline hypertension. Bypass surgery and a cardiac catheterization were recommended and performed.
Mr. and Mrs. Owens filed this action on May 31, 2001 in the Superior Court of Washington County, Indiana. Defendant Ford then removed the case to this court. Despite surgery and medication, Mr. Owens' condition deteriorated. He complained of continuing chest pain, fatigue, and depression, and he was diagnosed with congestive heart failure. More than three years after the accident, on June 25, 2002, Mr. Owens died. In October 2002, Mrs. Owens was substituted as plaintiff in her capacity as representative of Mr. Owens' estate. Other facts are noted below, keeping mind the standard that applies on summary judgment.
Plaintiff's theory of the case is that the Taurus air bag had a manufacturing defect that prevented the completion of the chemical reaction needed to fully inflate the air bag. Thus, when Mr. Owens was thrown forward by the force of the collision, according to plaintiff, the partially inflated air bag did not properly cushion his chest's impact with the steering wheel, which proximately caused his heart attack and eventual death. Plaintiff offers three expert witnesses to support the different steps of this theory. Plaintiff's case is built on the assumption that the air bag failed to deploy completely, but plaintiff cannot support that assumption with reliable, admissible expert testimony.
To establish a claim for strict product liability under Indiana law a plaintiff must show: (1) the product was defective; (2) as a result of the defect, the product was unreasonably dangerous; (3) the defect existed when the product left the control of the defendant and reached the plaintiff without substantial alteration; (4) plaintiff was injured; and (5) plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the product. Ind.Code § 34-20-2-1. Ford concentrates its attack on the first element, contending that plaintiff has not raised a triable question as to whether the air bag was defective.1
"Expert testimony is not always required to establish an element of a products liability action if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence within a lay person's understanding that would constitute a basis for a legal inference and not mere speculation." Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ind.App.2002), citing U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Nulls Mach. & Mfg. Shop, 736 N.E.2d 271, 285 n. 3 (Ind.App.2000). In Cansler, for example, the Court of Appeals found that expert testimony was not needed to find a manufacturing defect in an air bag that failed to deploy where the evidence indicated that the car was traveling 45 to 50 miles per hour at the moment of impact, the impact bent the car's frame, and the air bag was designed to deploy in frontal collisions at speeds greater than nine to fifteen miles per hour.
Where the existence of a defect depends on matters beyond the common understanding of a lay juror, however, admissible expert testimony is required to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof on the question. See Cansler, 765 N.E.2d at 706; U-Haul, 736 N.E.2d at 284-85 ().
In this case, the pivotal question is whether the air bag deployed completely, so as to provide the full intended cushioning effect in the Owens' accident. There is no direct evidence that the air bag failed to deploy completely. Whether the circumstantial evidence from the accident — such as the condition of the air bag mechanism, damage to the interior of the car, and injuries to Mr. Owens — would support a finding that the air bag failed to deploy completely is a question beyond the common understanding and everyday experience of lay jurors. One would need to...
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