U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. NULLS MACHINE AND MANUFACTURING SHOP, 49A02-9908-CV-569.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9908-CV-569.,49A02-9908-CV-569. |
| Parties | U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC., U-Haul Co. of North Carolina, Inc., U-Haul Co. of the West Coast of Florida, and U-Haul Co. of Michigan, Appellants-Defendants, v. NULLS MACHINE AND MANUFACTURING SHOP, Kraft Fluid Systems, Inc., and Hydraforce, Inc., Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rodney V. Taylor, Michael C. Peek, Christopher & Taylor, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.
M. Michael Stephenson, McNeely Stephenson Thopy & Harrold, Shelbyville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees.
This action stems from a vehicular collision that caused the deaths of Francis J. Radwan and his passenger, Kathy Wade. Radwan's estate (the Estate) filed suit against forty-five defendants, including the parties in this appeal. Defendants U-Haul International, Inc., U-Haul Company of North Carolina, Inc., U-Haul Company of the West Coast of Florida, Inc, and U-Haul Company of Michigan (hereinafter collectively referred to as "U-Haul") filed this appeal against co-defendants Nulls Machine and Manufacturing Shop (Nulls), Kraft Fluid Systems, Inc. (Kraft), and Hydraforce, Inc. (unless otherwise indicated, hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Valve Defendants"). U-Haul and, upon cross-appeal, the Valve Defendants present the following restated issues for review:
1. Did U-Haul have standing to challenge the summary judgment ruling in favor of the Valve Defendants?
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Valve Defendants?
We affirm.
The facts1 favorable to the nonmoving parties are as follows. On June 8, 1995, Radwan was operating an automobile eastbound on Interstate 74 in Dearborn County, Indiana. Willie Felton, who was operating a rented U-Haul truck, was also traveling eastbound on I-74 and was following immediately behind Radwan's automobile. Felton's U-Haul truck was towing a U-Haul auto transport trailer (the trailer). Radwan approached a road construction zone where the highway narrowed to one lane in each direction. He slowed his vehicle in compliance with the reduced speed signs controlling traffic in the construction zone. Felton attempted to slow his vehicle, but the brakes on the trailer did not work. The U-Haul truck struck Radwan's automobile from behind, sending Radwan's auto across the road and into westbound traffic. Radwan's vehicle struck head-on a vehicle being driven by Billy Savage. Radwan and Wade were fatally injured in the accident. Police officers present at the scene of the accident examined the trailer's brake system and observed that the master cylinder was dry, with some surface rust apparent inside the master cylinder.
The Estate originally sued U-Haul, among others. In its answer, U-Haul asserted nonparty defenses naming several entities, including the Valve Defendants. The nonparty defenses against the Valve Defendants were premised on the claim that if the brakes on the trailer were inoperable, it was in part because of a defective backup return valve (the valve) on the left front brake caliper, which was a component of the trailer's brake assembly. The valve was manufactured by Hydraforce, which sold it to Kraft, which sold it to Nulls, which sold it to U-Haul. The Estate amended its complaint, adding as defendants all of the entities that U-Haul indicated it would name as nonparty defendants, including the Valve Defendants. The Estate asserted a products liability theory of negligence against the Valve Defendants, claiming that the valve was defective. The allegations against each of the Valve Defendants were identical, and included the following:
(a) negligently designed, manufactured, tested, and assembled the valve (b) failed to use reasonable care in the testing, manufacturing, and marketing of said valve, which was inherently, imminently, and unreasonably dangerous;
(c) negligently designed the valve when they knew or should have known that the design would result in the breakdown of certain components within the brake system and expose users to unreasonable risk of harm from the valve's design and manufacture;
(d) failed to properly inspect and test the brake valve and to use a manufacturing process that ensured reasonable safety and prevented injury to persons such as the Plaintiff;
(e) failed to properly test and inspect the brake valve which would have revealed its dangerous and defective condition and malfunction;
(f) failed to properly assemble the valve;
(g) failed to use reasonable care in the testing and inspection of the brake valve in its inherent, imminent and unreasonably dangerous condition;
(h) distributed the defective brake valve to U-Haul International, Inc. or other U-Haul entity [sic] when they knew or should have known that the brake valve was defective and that it would result in the breakdown of the trailer brake system and expose users to an unreasonable risk of harm which in this case resulted in the deaths of two (2) people;
(i) failed to adequately warn of the brake valve's defective nature when it knew or should have known that the defective brake valve would expose users to an unreasonable risk of harm in the absence of adequate and proper warnings and instructions; and
(j) failure [sic] to exercise reasonable care in selling, leasing, or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to the user's or consumer's property, subjecting the [defendant] to liability for physical harm caused by the defective condition under I.C. 33-1-1.5-3.
Each of the Valve Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment, claiming that the Estate's products liability action failed because the Estate had failed to designate evidence tending to show that the brake valve was defective and was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court granted each of the Valve Defendant's motions. Although summary judgment was granted in favor of the Valve Defendants and against the Estate, co-defendant U-Haul filed a motion to correct error challenging the ruling. The trial court denied U-Haul's motion to correct error and U-Haul filed the instant appeal.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply a well-settled standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate if the "designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). The moving party bears the burden of specifically designating materials that make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Interstate Cold Storage, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 720 N.E.2d 727 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). If these two requirements are met, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth designated facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue." Id. at 729. Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate where the record reveals that the law was not correctly applied. General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Hughes, 706 N.E.2d 208 (Ind.Ct.App.1999),trans. denied.
Our task when reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those matters which were designated to the trial court, and liberally construing the designated evidentiary material in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. The party against whom summary judgment was granted has the burden to persuade us that the trial court erred. Id. The trial court is not required to enter specific findings and conclusions. We are not limited to granting or denying summary judgment upon the same basis that the trial court made its decision. Jones v. Western Reserve Group, 699 N.E.2d 711 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. denied. Rather, a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed upon any theory supported by the designated materials. Interstate Cold Storage, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 720 N.E.2d 727.
As a threshold issue, the Valve Defendants contend that co-defendant U-Haul lacks standing to challenge the grant of summary judgment in the Valve Defendants' favor. In order to have standing to challenge the dismissal of a co-defendant from a lawsuit, the challenging party must demonstrate that it has a stake in the outcome of the ruling. Shand Mining, Inc. v. Clay County Bd. of Comm'rs, 671 N.E.2d 477 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. To show that it has a personal stake, a party must demonstrate, at a minimum, that it was in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue. Id. Generally, "[o]ne defendant does not have standing to appeal a judgment rendered in favor of a co-defendant unless the defendant suffers some prejudice as a result of the entry of judgment in favor of the co-defendant." Id. at 479. Therefore, in order to have standing, U-Haul must demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the Valve Defendants' summary dismissal from the case.
U-Haul contends that it was prejudiced by the summary dismissal because of the application of Indiana's Comparative Fault Act (the Act). See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-2 et seq. (West 1999). In an action brought under the Act, the jury must allocate 100 percent of the fault among all culpable parties and nonparties. IC § 34-51-2-8. A nonparty is a party that caused or contributed to the cause of the alleged injury, but which has not been joined in the action as a defendant. IC §...
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