Owens v. McLaughlin

• Decision Date: 24 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–12590.,12–12590.
• Citation: 733 F.3d 320
• Parties: Charles Edward OWENS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Gregory McLAUGHLIN, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

733 F.3d 320

Charles Edward OWENS, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Gregory McLAUGHLIN, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 12–12590.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 24, 2013.

Edward Henry Wasmuth, Jr., Smith Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for, Petitioner–Appellant.

Elizabeth Anne Harris, Paula Khristian Smith, Samuel Scott Olens, Attorney General's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Respondent–Appellee.

Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,^* District Judge.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Charles Edward Owens, a Georgia state prisoner sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. On appeal, Owens argues that (1) the state trial court's instructions to the jury on venue, an essential element of the crime charged, improperly shifted the burden of proof from the state to him in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); and (2) the state trial court's 25–year delay in resolving his motion for a new trial violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. After review of the parties' briefs, the appellate record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 31, 1981, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Rebecca Heath was found shot dead in the back seat of her green Oldsmobile on Smokey Road in Troup County, Georgia. At the time of her death, Ms. Heath was nine months pregnant with a baby boy. She lived with her husband Larry Heath in Phenix City, Alabama. ¹ Phenix City sits on the banks of the Chattahoochee River. The Alabama–Georgia line runs right through the river. Troup County, Georgia is roughly 47 miles from the Heaths' home.

In Georgia, venue is an essential element of the offense, so at Owens's trial, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Heath was killed in a Georgia county. Although Ms. Heath's body was found in Troup County, Georgia, Owens argued that there was some evidence to support a determination that the death may have previously occurred in Alabama. Therefore, venue became a hotly contested issue at trial, especially with regard to the instructions on venue given to the jury.

It was the state's theory that venue was proper in Georgia because that is, the state argued, where Ms. Heath was killed. At trial, the evidence demonstrated that Larry Heath hired Owens and Gregory Lumpkin to kill Ms. Heath.² A witness testified that on August 24, 1981, he observed Heath transact some type of business with three men who showed up at Heath's work. The men were driving a white Mustang. The witness later identified two of the men as Owens and Lumpkin.

Also at trial, a neighbor of the Heaths testified that on August 31, 1981, he observed a truck and the Heaths' green Oldsmobile parked on a road near the Heath home in Alabama. The two vehicles were side by side and the occupants appeared to be having a conversation. The time was approximately 7:15 a.m.

Another witness testified that around 9:00 a.m. on the same day, he was driving down Smokey Road in Troup County, Georgia, and observed a whitish-blue Mustang pull out from a wooded area. The witness thought this unusual. As soon as the driver of the Mustang saw the witness, he drove away at a high rate of speed. The witness then drove past a green car that was parked roughly 35 feet from the side of the road. The car's headlights were on and the engine was still running.

At 11:00 a.m. another motorist driving down Smokey Road noticed the green Oldsmobile off to the side of the road. He approached the car to help, observed that the person inside—later identified as Ms. Heath—was not moving, and called the Sheriff's Department. The motorist saw two sets of tire tracks. One clearly belonged to the Oldsmobile. The other set of tire tracks showed that a second car had been parked in front of the Oldsmobile. The Sheriff's Department responded almost immediately. The responding officer noted that the body was still warm, and based on his experience in the Sheriff's Department, determined that Ms. Heath had been dead for no more than two to three hours.

In April 1984, Owens was convicted in Georgia of malice murder and sentenced to life in prison. The next month, Owens moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the law and strongly against the weight of the evidence. For reasons unknown, this motion was never ruled upon. In February 1985, the state trial court issued an order directing that certain evidence be transferred to Alabama, where Owens had been indicted for the capital murder of Ms. Heath. The Alabama indictment alleged that Ms. Heath was murdered during a kidnapping in the first degree, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A–5–40(a)(1). A jury found Owens guilty, and recommended that he be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial judge determined, however, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Owens to death by electrocution. The conviction was later overturned on appeal, and on remand he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison.

Back to Georgia—Owens filed an amended motion for a new trial in February 2009. It was denied the following June, and on direct appeal, Owens contended that the jury instructions improperly shifted to him the burden of proving venue. Venue was a highly contested issue at his trial, as the parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether Ms. Heath was killed in Georgia or in her home in Alabama. Additionally, Owens claimed that the 25–year delay between 1984 and February 2009 in resolving his motion for a new trial violated his due process rights. Following oral argument, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Owens's conviction and sentence. Despite noting the problematic phrasing of the jury instruction at issue, the court found that the “charge taken as a whole plainly informs the jury that venue is a material allegation as to each crime charged and that, as such, the [s]tate bears the burden to prove venue as to each crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 693 S.E.2d 490, 495 (2010). As to the motion for a new trial, the court concluded that the 25–year delay did not violate Owens's due process rights. Id. at 494.

Owens then filed the instant § 2254 petition in federal court. A magistrate judge recommended denying his petition. The district court agreed, and adopted the magistrate's recommendation in full. Owens appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's denial or grant of a § 2254 habeas petition is reviewed de novo. McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir.2005). Where the defendant challenges the jury instructions as read, we review the legal correctness of the instruction de novo. See United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1292–93 (11th Cir.2007).

Owens's § 2254 petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which precludes federal courts from granting habeas relief on a state court claim adjudicated on the merits unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law when it arrives at an opposite result from the Supreme Court on a question of law, or when it arrives at a different result from the Supreme Court on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The decision of a state court is an “unreasonable application” of federal law when it:

[I]dentifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case, unreasonably extends the principle to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend it to a new context where it should apply.

Kimbrough v. Sec'y, DOC, 565 F.3d 796, 799 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Owens raises two arguments on appeal. We address each in turn.

A. Sandstrom Error

We first decide whether the state trial court's instructions to the jury improperly shifted the burden of proof to Owens on venue, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Sandstrom.

In Sandstrom, the trial court instructed the jury that “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” 442 U.S. at 512, 99 S.Ct. at 2453. At his trial, David Sandstrom admitted that he killed the victim, but argued that he did not do so “purposely or knowingly.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, he was not guilty of deliberate homicide but of a lesser offense. Id. The jury disagreed and Sandstrom was convicted of deliberate homicide and sentenced to 100 years in prison. Id. at 513, 99 S.Ct. at 2453.

Sandstrom appealed, arguing that the instruction shifted onto him the burden of disproving intent, an element of the crime charged, in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513, 99 S.Ct. at 2454. In Sandstrom, the Montana Supreme Court agreed “that these cases did prohibit shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption,” but nonetheless “held that the cases do not prohibit allocation of some burden of proof to a defendant under certain circumstances.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States found...