Owens v. Pyeatt

Decision Date27 February 1967
Citation57 Cal.Rptr. 100,248 Cal.App.2d 840
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesDewey OWENS and Herb Owens et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Lloyd B. PYEATT et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants, and Appellants, Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant, Cross-Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 8406.
OPINION

COUGHLIN, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Owens brought this action to recover the reasonable value of automobile repairs, storage charges and interest; alleged the reasonable value of the repairs was $1843.25; and also alleged the repairs and storage were requested by the defendants Pyeatt, owners of the automobile that had been damaged by upset, and by the defendant Allstate Insurance Company, the insurer under an automotive policy insuring Pyeatts against such loss. Defendants Pyeatt denied the automobile was repaired or stored at their request, and cross-complained against Allstate Insurance Company for the value of the automobile at the time of upset. Defendant Allstate admitted liability for the repair to the extent of $1743.25, being the cost thereof less $100 deductible under the policy; denied liability for the storage charges and interest; alleged its liability under the policy was limited to the cost of repair; and denied liability for the value of the automobile.

The upset-accident occurred May 7, 1963. Thereafter the automobile was repaired by plaintiffs. In July it was inspected and test-driven by Pyeatts who refused to accept it on the ground the repairs were incomplete. Subsequently additional work was performed. In October the repairs were completed but plaintiffs, acting on instructions from Allstate, refused to permit Pyeatts to take possession unless the latter would sign a release of their claim under the insurance policy. In the meantime he insurance company had delivered to plaintiffs the release in question, together with a draft in the sum of $1533.64 payable to Pyeatts and plaintiffs, with instructions not to deliver the automobile or the draft until the release was signed. Pyeatts desired to test drive the automobile before accepting it but permission to do so was refused. Thereafter another release was prepared which reserved to Pyeatts the right to make a claim for defects that might be discovered within 30 days. Pyeatts refused to execute this release. Plaintiffs retained possession of the automobile.

The pretrial order enlarged Pyeatts claim against Allstate to include damages for loss of use of the automobile.

The case was tried by a jury which rendered verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and against Allstate for $1743.25; in favor of plaintiffs and against Pyeatts for $982; and in favor of Pyeatts and against Allstate for $1250. Separate judgments were entered upon each verdict. Pyeatts appealed from the judgments.

No contention is made with respect to the judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Allstate and it should be affirmed.

Pyeatts contend the judgment against them in favor of Owens, and in their favor against Allstate should be reversed because of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts.

To determine whether a general verdict is supported by the evidence it is necessary to ascertain the issues embraced within the verdict and measure the sufficiency of the evidence as related to those issues. For this purpose reference may be had to the pleadings, the pretrial order and the charge to the jury. (Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446, 448, 31 P.2d 198.) A general verdict implies a finding of every fact essential to its validity which is supported by the evidence. (Gen. see Estate of Rule, 25 Cal.2d 1, 10, 152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319; Consolidated Steel Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 6 Cal.2d 368, 369, 57 P.2d 919; Fries v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 190 Cal.App.2d 667, 681, 12 Cal.Rptr. 336; Lewetzow v. Sapiro, 188 Cal.App.2d 841, 845, 11 Cal.Rptr. 126.) Where several issues responsive to different theories of law are presented to the jury and the evidence is sufficient to support facts sustaining the verdict under one of those theories, it will be upheld even though the evidence is insufficient to support facts sustaining it under any other theory. (Gen. see Tucker v. Landucci, 57 Cal.2d 762, 766, 22 Cal.Rptr. 10, 371 P.2d 754; Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.2d 359, 368--369, 317 P.2d 601; Posz v. Burchell, 209 Cal.App.2d 324, 335, 25 Cal.Rptr. 896.) On the other hand, if the evidence does not support facts authorizing recovery on any theory, the verdict must be rejected. Where a verdict awarding a lump sum is dependent upon a factual determination in favor of the prevailing party on more than one issue and the evidence is not sufficient to support such a determination as to one of the issues, it must be rejected In toto unless the amounts included within the lump sum are clearly separable.

In the case at bench, the verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against Pyeatts in the sum of $982 involved three issues, viz., whether, Pyeatts were liable for (1) repair of the subject automobile, (2) storage thereof, and (3) interest. The evidence supports the conclusion Allstate and Pyeatts were jointly and severally liable for the repairs. However, the forms of verdict submitted to the jury did not provide for a finding of joint and several liability. A form of verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against both defendants was not supplied. Instead, on this issue the jury received two separate forms of verdict, one against Pyeatts, and the other against Allstate. The evidence also supports the conclusion the reasonable value of the repairs was $1843.25. It would appear the jury may have concluded Allstate and Pyeatts were jointly and severally liable for the repairs; Allstate should pay $1743.25, which was the amount of the total bill less the $100 policy deduction; and Pyeatts should pay the remaining $100. On this basis the award against Allstate did not include storage or interest charges. On the other hand, the award against Pyeatt may have included the remaining $100 payment due on the repairs, and an additional amount for either storage or interest charges, or both.

Assuming the verdict against Pyeatts in the sum of $982 included a storage charge, the verdict is contrary to the evidence and against the law. There is no evidence that Pyeatts expressly or impliedly requested storage of the automobile. Until October, 1963 the automobile was being repaired. No charge for storage is implied during the period of time it was undergoing repairs. After the repairs had been completed Pyeatts unsuccessfully attempted to obtain possession of the automobile. Plaintiffs refused to permit them to have possession unless they would execute the release prepared by Allstate. Pyeatts should not have been required to execute this release as a condition to obtaining possession of their automobile. As hereinafter noted, contrary to the contention of Allstate, the policy did not authorize it to impose such a requirement. It also appears plaintiffs retained possession of the automobile to protect their garagekeeper's lien. (Gen. see Civ.Code, § 3051.) The court instructed the jury about their rights in this regard. A garageman who retains possession of an automobile repaired by him in the exercise of his right to claim a lien thereon is not entitled to the reasonable value of the storage thereof during the time he keeps it in his possession. (Civ.Code § 2892; see also Moss v. Odell, 141 Cal. 335, 337, 74 P. 999.) Plaintiffs' claim against Pyeatts for storage is not supported by the evidence.

If it be assumed the verdict included a charge for interest, it is against law and not supported by the evidence. Interest is not allowable upon a claim for the reasonable value of automobile repairs, when the amount thereof is not determinable by reference to well-established market values, until this amount has been determined by agreement, verdict or judgment. (Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 208--211, 195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380; Perry v. Magneson, 207 Cal. 617, 622--623, 279 P. 650; Parker v. Maier Brewing Co., 180 Cal.App.2d 630, 634, 4 Cal.Rptr. 825; Garrie v. McCauley, 163 Cal.App.2d 273, 276--277, 328 P.2d 1013; Johnson v. Marr, 8 Cal.App.2d 312, 315, 47 P.2d 489.) The repairs in question are within this category. The quality, extent and value thereof were disputed.

Although it may be assumed the verdict in favor of plaintiffs included payment of $100 on the repairs, being the $100 deductible item provided by the insurance policy, there is no way of determining whether this is a fact because the total amount of the verdict, i.e., $982, could have been the product of an erroneous award for storage and interest. Under these circumstances the verdict must be rejected In toto.

The attack upon the verdict in favor of Pyeatts against Allstate is directed to the alleged inadequacy of the award under the contention the verdict in this regard is not supported by the evidence. Pyeatts premised their claim for damages against Allstate upon an alleged breach of the insurance contract, contending the automobile was a total loss entitling them to the actual value thereof at the time of accident which Allstate refused to pay; even though the automobile was repairable, Allstate breached its contract in failing to pay the amount of its repair within a reasonable time; and in either event, they were entitled to the value of the automobile at the time of accident with interest, and damages for its loss of use. These contentions and corresponding issues were developed through the cross-complaint, pretrial order and instructions...

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