Owens v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 01 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1-02-3765.,1-02-3765.
• Citation: 811 N.E.2d 738,349 Ill.App.3d 35,285 Ill.Dec. 251
• Parties: Tyrean OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald SNYDER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

811 N.E.2d 738

349 Ill.App.3d 35

285 Ill.Dec. 251

Tyrean OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald SNYDER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-02-3765.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

June 1, 2004.

As Corrected June 2, 2004.

James Geis, James Geis Law Office, Chicago, for Appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General; Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General; and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney, General, Chicago, for Appellee.

Presiding Justice WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Does a circuit court judge have the authority to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for mandamus before summons is issued to the defendant?

This question has been answered differently by two districts of this court, but is a matter of first impression in the First District. The Fourth District answered affirmatively, finding trial courts have the "inherent authority" to protect their dockets from the numerous, frivolous mandamus requests filed by inmates. Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill.App.3d 834, 840, 266 Ill.Dec. 351, 774 N.E.2d 457 (2002). The Second District disagreed, holding trial courts must follow the mandamus procedure, including service on the defendant, outlined by the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 280 Ill.Dec. 456, 802 N.E.2d 381 (2003) pet. for leave to appeal granted, No. 97831, 208 Ill.2d 538, 284 Ill.Dec. 345, 809 N.E.2d 1291 (March 24, 2004). We agree with the Fourth District's conclusion, but for different reasons.

FACTS

Plaintiff Tyrean Owens pleaded guilty to charges of delivery of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, and criminal damage to property on August 9, 2000. The circuit court sentenced him to three consecutive prison terms: five years for delivery of a controlled substance, two years for possession of a controlled substance, and three years for criminal damage to property. The circuit court also admonished plaintiff that he would be placed on mandatory supervised release for three years. Plaintiff never filed a motion to withdraw his plea and did not pursue a direct appeal.

Plaintiff did file a post-conviction petition contending that his sentence violated the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The trial court summarily dismissed his petition and this court affirmed on appeal. People v. Owens, No. 1-01-0772 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On October 9, 2002, plaintiff filed his pro se complaint for mandamus against defendant Donald Snyder, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). In his complaint, plaintiff alleged IDOC would improperly begin his mandatory supervised release after his discharge from prison. He contended his term of mandatory supervised release should run concurrently with his prison terms; otherwise, he could possibly serve more time than he agreed to in the plea agreement, because an inmate may be re-incarcerated if he violates the terms of the supervised release (see 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9 (West 2002)).

On October 18, 2002, the circuit court "summarily" denied plaintiff's complaint, a sua sponte dismissal, without prior notice to him. No reason for the dismissal appears in the record.

On October 30, 2002, the Circuit Court Clerk of Cook County sent plaintiff a letter advising him that "the Honorable Judge Stuart E. Palmer denied [his] motion for petition for Mandamus, off call." The record does not show summons to Director Snyder was issued or that he was served a summons or the complaint. Snyder never responded to the complaint. We assume there was no summons or service.

Plaintiff now appeals, contending the circuit court lacked the authority to summarily dismiss his complaint for mandamus under the relevant provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2002)).

DECISION

By challenging the circuit court's power to sua sponte dismiss his complaint for mandamus under the Code, plaintiff presents an issue of statutory construction. Questions of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Machine Corp., 345 Ill.App.3d 645, 648, 280 Ill.Dec. 707, 802 N.E.2d 1228 (2003)

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Mandamus is an extreme remedy used to compel a public official to perform a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill.2d 457, 464, 281 Ill.Dec. 581, 804 N.E.2d 546 (2004). To prove a legal right to relief by mandamus, the complainant must demonstrate a clear right to the requested relief, the respondent's clear duty to act, and the respondent's clear authority to comply with the terms of the order. People ex rel. Madigan, 208 Ill.2d at 465, 281 Ill.Dec. 581, 804 N.E.2d 546.

Article XIV (the mandamus statute) of the Code provides the procedural framework for mandamus actions. 735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2002). In section 14-102, the Code provides:

"Upon the filing of a complaint for mandamus the clerk of the court shall issue a summons, in like form, as near as may be as summons in other civil cases. The summons shall be made returnable within a time designated by the plaintiff not less than 5 nor more than 30 days after the service of the summons." 735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002).

Section 14-103 requires served defendants to answer or otherwise plead in response to the complaint within a set period of time. 735 ILCS 5/14-103 (West 2002). Other sections under the mandamus statute provide for the plaintiff's reply and amendments to an inadequate complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/14-104, 14-108, 14-109 (West 2002).

Plaintiff contends the summary dismissal is a void order because the trial court did not follow the proper procedure set forth in the Code. Plaintiff contends the Code requires the court to follow specific procedures, such as issuing defendant a summons (735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002)), prior to dismissing a complaint seeking mandamus.

When interpreting the statute, this court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, which usually is determined by applying the plain meaning of the statute's language. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 346 Ill.App.3d 18, 27, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914 (2004), citing Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314, 320, 273 Ill.Dec. 816, 789 N.E.2d 1248 (2003). We also adhere to the "deeply rooted" principle that statutes should not be construed in a way that produces absurd results. Emerald Casino, Inc., 346 Ill.App.3d at 34, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914, citing People v. Hanna, 207 Ill.2d 486, 279 Ill.Dec. 618, 800 N.E.2d 1201 (2003).

A statutory notice provision, like the summons requirement in section 14-102 (735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002)), serves three purposes: (1) the defendant is notified of pending litigation; (2) it enables the defendant to appear and defend; and (3) it vests jurisdiction in the trial court over the defendant. Nelson v. Keene Corp., 283 Ill.App.3d 7, 10-11, 218 Ill.Dec. 522, 669 N.E.2d 665 (1996) (interpreting section 2-201(1) of the Civil Practice Law which says, "Every action, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, shall be commenced by the filing of the complaint. The clerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff"). A judgment rendered against a defendant without proper service of a summons is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. Nelson, 283 Ill.App.3d at 11, 218 Ill.Dec. 522, 669 N.E.2d 665.

Although plaintiff contends the trial court's dismissal is void, he does not claim the trial court lacked jurisdiction. When issues implicating the circuit court's jurisdiction arise, a reviewing court has a duty to consider them. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325, 334, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002). We consider the jurisdictional issue before addressing plaintiff's contention that the dismissal is void because the court lacked statutory authority to sua sponte dismiss the complaint.

If a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction, any subsequent order is void ab initio, and can be attacked at any time. Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill.App.3d 129, 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 832, 777 N.E.2d 635 (2002). Subject matter jurisdiction is derived entirely from the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9), except in cases involving administrative review. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill.2d at 334, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177. The state constitution grants jurisdiction over all "justiciable matters." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. "A `justiciable matter' is a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill.2d at 335, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177.

In Belleville Toyota, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held that statutory provisions are not"conditions precedent" to subject matter jurisdiction, except in the area of administrative review. In other words, in cases that do not rely on special statutory jurisdiction, the failure to follow statutory requirements did not preclude the court's exercise of jurisdiction. Belleville Toyota, Inc.,199 Ill.2d at 336,264 Ill.Dec. 283,770 N.E.2d 177. Mandamus actions, such as this one, do not rely on special statutory jurisdiction; therefore, the failure to follow the summons and response requirements in the mandamus statute did not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Industrial Comm'n, 305 Ill.App.3d 657, 664, 238 Ill.Dec. 752, 712 N.E.2d 856 (1999)

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"Personal jurisdiction is conferred by service of summons or by a general appearance and is derived from the actions of the person sought to be bound." Meldoc Properties v. Prezell, 158 Ill.App.3d 212, 216, 110 Ill.Dec. 684, 511 N.E.2d 861 (1987)....