Owens v. State, A89A0983
Decision Date | 05 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. A89A0983,A89A0983 |
Citation | 385 S.E.2d 761,192 Ga.App. 671 |
Parties | OWENS v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
William E. Frey, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Clifford A. Sticher, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Defendant was charged in two counts for trafficking in cocaine and for violating Georgia's Controlled Substances Act ( ). The evidence adduced at a motion to suppress hearing revealed the following:
While working in plain-clothing at the Atlanta airport, Agent Terrell Toles of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Airport Task Force observed defendant deplane from a flight arriving from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Defendant was dressed casually and he was carrying "a small suitcase...." As defendant approached airline employees who were assisting passengers with their connecting flights, Agent Toles positioned himself behind and to the side of defendant. Agent Toles discovered that defendant's travel arrangements and itinerary matched those of a typical drug courier, i.e., defendant's flight reservation was one-way passage from a known drug source city, defendant had paid cash for his airline ticket and defendant had purchased his ticket shortly before the flight.
Agent Toles and Agent Gil Lollimere, another plainclothes drug enforcement officer, proceeded to the boarding gate of defendant's connecting flight. As the agents approached the area, Agent Toles noticed defendant walking in their direction and, from a distance of "[a]bout fifty feet ...," he observed defendant stop and turn around "as if he was just looking around...." Defendant then "circled" and the agents "walked up beside ..." defendant; identified themselves as law enforcement officers and Agent Toles "asked [defendant] if [he] could speak to him for a second." Defendant consented and Agent Toles asked defendant for his airline ticket. Defendant produced his ticket and Agent Toles noticed that defendant had no baggage claim receipts attached to the ticket, another characteristic of a drug courier. Agent Toles returned the ticket to defendant and asked defendant for identification. Defendant produced a "State of Florida birth registration card ..." and, after inquiry, defendant indicated that he had no "pictured identification...." Agent Toles returned the birth registration card to defendant and informed defendant that he and Agent Lollimere "were narcotics officers looking for drugs and or the proceeds from drug transactions going through the airport." At that point, defendant's "breathing became real heavy and his hands were shaking." Agent Toles asked defendant if "he would cooperate and allow a search of himself and of the suitcases that [defendant] was carrying." Defendant responded, "yeah, okay." Agent Toles "then explained to [defendant] that the search could be done there in the public area ... or that [they] could go to a small private office that was just a few feet away...." Defendant "indicated that he preferred a private office."
After the men entered the private office, Agent Toles again asked defendant for permission to conduct a search. Defendant agreed and, "[a]s [Agent Toles] began to unzip the bag, [defendant] made the statement, you guys go ahead and arrest me." Agent Toles asked, "why is that ..." At that moment, Agent Toles looked in defendant's suitcase and discovered two packages which contained "approximately five hundred and sixty grams of a white powder" which he suspected to be cocaine. Defendant was placed under arrest and a search of defendant's clothing revealed that he was also carrying a substance which appeared to be marijuana. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The case was later tried before the court without a jury and defendant was found guilty on both counts of the indictment. This appeal followed. Held:
1. Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that "there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion a crime was about to be committed[, that his] detention ... violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and therefore the evidence should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree."
Moran v. State, 170 Ga.App. 837, 839(1), 840, 318 S.E.2d 716 (1984). See also McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga.App. 23, 25(1), 295 S.E.2d 114 (1982).
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Hernandez-Espino v. State, A13A1434.
...otherwise terminate the encounter.” Cutter, 274 Ga.App. at 592(1), 617 S.E.2d 588 (citation omitted). Compare Owens v. State, 192 Ga.App. 671, 673–674(1), 385 S.E.2d 761 (1989) (circumstances showed first-tier encounter where plain-clothed officers who were not displaying guns walked up bes......
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Thomas v. State, A13A0308.
...to “come here” and “stop” required particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity). Compare Owens v. State, 192 Ga.App. 671, 673(1), 385 S.E.2d 761 (1989) (concluding encounter was first-tier based in part upon officer's failure to “summon defendant to their presence;” ......
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Stokes v. State
...an officer's "appropriately deferential" request for cooperation and a demand rising to the level of a stop. Owens v. State, 192 Ga.App. 671, 673(1), 385 S.E.2d 761 (1989). Barnes v. State, 228 Ga.App. 44, 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997), relied on by Stokes, is inapposite. Barnes was standing alone ......
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