Owens v. Truckstops of America

• Citation: 915 S.W.2d 420
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,493 Joseph Carl OWENS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TRUCKSTOPS OF AMERICA, Truckstops of America, Inc., and B.P. America, Inc., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. B. MICHAEL DESIGN, INC., and Vitro Products, Inc., Third-Party Defendants/Appellees.
• Decision Date: 29 January 1996
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 420

915 S.W.2d 420

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,493

Joseph Carl OWENS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TRUCKSTOPS OF AMERICA, Truckstops of America, Inc., and B.P.

America, Inc., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. B. MICHAEL DESIGN, INC., and Vitro Products, Inc.,

Third-Party Defendants/Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Nashville.

Jan. 29, 1996.

Davidson Circuit, No. 01S01-9408-CV-00077; Marietta M. Shipley, Judge.

Steve North, Mark North, Nashville, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Barry L. Howard, Michael H. Johnson, Gracey, Ruth, Howard, Tate & Sowell, Nashville, for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellees.

Martin D. Holmes, Stewart, Estes & Donnell, Nashville, John M. Bryant, Jr., W. Bryan Brooks, Brewer, Krause & Brooks, Nashville, for Third-Party Defendants/Appellees.

OPINION

REID, Justice.

This interlocutory appeal presents for determination the principles of comparative fault applicable to the assessment of liability among joint tortfeasors and the application of those principles to this transitional case, in which the cause of action accrued prior to the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992). The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified and the case is remanded to the trial court.

Pleadings

In the original complaint, the plaintiff, Joseph Carl Owens, sued Truckstops of America, Inc. and B.P. America, Inc. ("Truckstops") ¹ for damages for personal injuries. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff sustained personal injuries on September 14, 1987, when a stool occupied by him in a restaurant owned and operated by Truckstops broke, causing the plaintiff to fall to the floor. The complaint, which was filed on September 14, 1988, the last day permitted by the statute of limitations, charges that Truckstops was negligent in that it failed to maintain the stool in a safe condition and it failed to warn the plaintiff of the danger of using the stool.

Truckstops responded to the complaint with a general denial of negligence and causation and the "affirmative defense" that the proximate cause of any injury sustained by the plaintiff was the acts of unidentified third parties for which Truckstops was not liable.

On August 2, 1989, Truckstops moved the court that it be allowed to file a third-party complaint against Vitro Products, Inc. ("Vitro"), which designed and manufactured the stool, and B. Michael Design, Inc. ("Michael"), which sold the stool to Truckstops. ² Based on allegations of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability, Truckstops asserts in the third-party complaint that it is entitled to indemnity from Vitro and Michael for any judgment that may be rendered against Truckstops and, alternatively, it is entitled to pro rata contribution by Vitro and Michael, pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act. ³ The motion was allowed on August 23, 1989.

This was the status of the pleadings on May 4, 1992, the date on which the decision of this Court in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992), was released.

On December 23, 1992, more than three years after Truckstops had filed its third-party complaint, Vitro filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that the rights of indemnity and contribution among tortfeasors were abolished by the decision in McIntyre. ⁴

On June 2, 1993, Truckstops moved that its answer be amended to assert that Vitro and Michael may have caused or contributed to the plaintiff's alleged injuries and resulting damages.

The plaintiff then, on June 4, 1993, relying upon Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (1994), ⁵ which was enacted by the legislature on May 13, 1993, one year after the decision in McIntyre, filed a motion to amend his complaint to add Vitro and Michael as defendants to the original suit. The amended complaint alleges that Vitro designed, manufactured, and sold the stool to Michael; that Vitro was negligent in the design and manufacture of the stool; and that the stool was a dangerous product. The amended complaint also alleges that Michael sold the stool to Truckstops and installed the stool in Truckstops' restaurant; that Michael was negligent in installing the stool and in failing to warn that the stool was dangerous; and that Michael breached an implied warranty of merchantability. Vitro and Michael opposed the motion to amend the complaint on the grounds that Section 20-1-119 was not applicable to this case, and therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action against them was barred by the statute of limitations, laches, and estoppel. The motion to amend the complaint was granted.

On interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Practice, the Court of Appeals found that the decision in McIntyre required that Truckstops' third-party claim against Vitro and Michael for contribution be dismissed, but the court refused to dismiss the claim for indemnity based on breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The Court of Appeals also held that any claim by the plaintiff against Vitro or Michael was barred by the statute of limitations and reversed the order making them defendants pursuant to Section 20-1-119.

Standard of Review

The issues presented are questions of law raised by the motions to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim and statutes of limitations. Consequently, the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993).

Issues

This suit had been pending for more than three and one-half years when the decision in McIntyre was released. Prior to the release of McIntyre on May 4, 1992, the essential issues raised by the pleadings were whether Truckstops was guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, and whether, in the event Truckstops was found liable to the plaintiff, Truckstops was entitled to indemnity or pro rata contribution from Vitro and Michael.

The holding in McIntyre, that the principles of comparative fault would apply to all cases tried after the decision in McIntyre was released, McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58, requires that the case before the Court be decided under a comparative fault analysis to the extent that the principles approved in McIntyre and subsequent decisions can be applied in this case without imposing substantial injustice on any party. Concepts of fairness and efficiency are the basis of comparative fault. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 67, at 468-470 (5th ed. 1984); McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 56, 58. Consequently, fairness and efficiency must be the controlling principles in adjudicating those cases commenced prior to the decision in McIntyre which cannot be conformed to all of the procedures contemplated by the doctrine of comparative fault. However, except where noted as a transitional procedure, the rules applied here will constitute precedents for subsequent cases.

When the alleged cause of action arose, the plaintiff had the right to assert a claim for damages against Truckstops, Vitro, and Michael, or any of them, and recover 100 percent of his damages from any of the parties found, upon any applicable legal basis, to have caused or contributed to his injuries, provided his claim was not barred by his own conduct. See e.g., Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 342-43 (Tenn.1976); Johnson v. King, 221 Tenn. 292, 426 S.W.2d 196, 198 (1968). Notwithstanding these options as to parties and causes of action, Truckstops was the only party sued, and negligence was the only cause of action alleged in the original complaint, filed the last day allowed by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff obviously expected no recovery against any party other than Truckstops and on no theory of liability other than negligence. Nevertheless, the law in effect when the plaintiff filed suit against Truckstops would have allowed him to obtain from Truckstops full recovery for his damages upon proof that Truckstops' negligence proximately caused or contributed to his injuries, in the absence of a defense based on his own conduct. See id.

Even though, according to the law then applicable, any claim that the plaintiff had against Vitro and Michael had been lost by his failure to sue them prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, Truckstops still had the right, pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, which right it exercised, to assert claims against Vitro and Michael for contribution and indemnity. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-11-104 (1980).

If the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued after the decision in McIntyre and after the effective date of Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the rights and liabilities of the parties would be significantly different. The plaintiff would have a cause of action which would not be barred by his negligence unless his negligence was not less than the negligence of those responsible for his injuries, but his recovery would be reduced in direct proportion to the extent his negligence contributed to the injuries sustained. See McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57. Also, except as discussed subsequently, ⁶ the defendants would not be jointly liable, but each defendant's liability would be in proportion to that party's fault. See id. at 58. Truckstops still would have the right to assert that Vitro and Michael caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and the plaintiff would have the right, for 90 days under Section 20-1-119, to assert a claim against such person or persons, by amendment to the complaint or by a separate action, even if the applicable statute of limitations had run. See Rule 8.03 and Rule 14.01, Tenn.R.Civ.P.

Disposition of the motions presented on this appeal requires the resolution of issues relating to comparative negligence, statutes of limitations, third-party practice, joint tortfeasors, strict liability in tort,...