Owsley v. Heirs of Hawkins Smith

• Decision Date: 31 March 1851
• Citation: 14 Mo. 153
• Parties: J. B. OWSLEY ET AL. v. THE HEIRS OF HAWKINS SMITH.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

14 Mo. 153

J. B. OWSLEY ET AL.

v.THE HEIRS OF HAWKINS SMITH.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1851.

APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

PRATT & REDD, for Appellants.

1st. Was there a failure of title? If there be no failure, then there is no misrepresentation and the question of caveat emptor cannot arise. The deed of Moore passed no title to Douglass. The deed from Douglass and wife to Flint is defective, and does not pass any title to certificate or land in question. The deed from Flint and wife has the same defect. The admission in the bill filed in Kentucky by Pendergrass' heirs, that Moore was the administrator, and the decree against him does not estop said heirs from setting up their title. The decree rendered in the suit of Smith against the widow and heirs of Pendergrass does not bar them from setting up their title.

2nd. Where the title has failed will the court permit the pretended owners and vendees to coerce the payment of the purchase-money? The rule of caveat emptor is founded on the hypothesis that both parties are equally innocent; that the vendee in the absence of all misrepresentation, and relying solely on his own judgment, makes the purchase as a risking bargain. In such a case, the rule applies in equity as strictly as at law, but this rule does not apply in judicial sales for partition, for, as observed by the court in Jackson v. Edwards, 22 Wend. 509, “that the purchaser is not bound to take a doubtful title; that it is the understanding of bidders that they are to receive a good title--such a one as the court will approve, and that the interest of both vendors and vendees requires such a rule; that property would not bring a fair value if the purchaser was bound to take a doubtful or a bad title.”

3rd. There was fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the defendants, in connection with, and prior to, the purchase. Under the law, they could not have procured a judgment for the sale, without first representing and setting out the nature of their title. Rev. Stat. 1835. Complainant holds the rule to be, that whether defendants made the representation knowing it to be false, or not knowing whether it was true or false, is wholly immaterial; and that though they made the representation innocently, it concludes them; for it operated as a surprise and imposition on the complainant. 1 Story's Eq., § 193, p. 209; 1 Vernon, 136, Hobs v. Norton; 2 Vernon, 150, Hunsden v. Cheney; 9 Vesey, 21-23, Ainslee v. Medlicott; 4 Johns. Ch. R. 543, Lawrence v. Cornell.

4th. The vendee was not guilty of any indiscretion or laches in relying on the representation--the means of knowledge are not equally open to both. The vendor has the best means of knowing his own title, and is bound in good faith to know it before he undertakes to enhance its value by representing it to be good.

GLOVER & CAMPBELL, for Appellee. 1. The title exhibited by the appellees was valid in law and equity. The patent issued to Jesse Pendergrass as grantor after his death, was not void, but enured to his heirs or assignees. See act of Congress, approved May 20, 1836. The record of proceedings in the case of Hawkins Smith v. Pendergrass and others, is a complete bar to the assertion of any claim by defendant named therein to the land in dispute. 2. The appellants contend that Owsley cannot get the rights of those heirs of Smith who did not join in the petition for partition. The answer to that may be, that he did not purchase their rights; but since they have offered in their answer to convey, he can ask no more. 3. As the vendee went into possession, and refused to perform his own part of the contract, he will not be permitted to rescind, if the vendors produced a good title on the hearing of the cause. 4. That where the vendee has taken no covenants, and relies on neither fraud, accident or mistake; but relies solely on the fact, as does this man, that he paid a good price, he can be relieved neither in law or equity. Caveat emptor is the invariable rule applied to such cases. 5. That the defendants filed their petition for partition in the Circuit Court averring they had a perfect title to the property is nothing to this controversy. They thought so, and so did the court; but opinions addressed to the party to the contract have no weight on the question before us, nor can they when addressed to third persons. 6. That the appellant's bill should have been dismissed for his iniquitous conduct at the biddings; and for his interference to prevent the defendants from clearing what was supposed to be difficulties in the title. 7. The appellants make an objection to a form of a portion of the proceedings upon which an opinion is respectfully desired of the court, though it should not be absolutely necessary to the decision of the cause--it is this: The defendants in the court below being sued for want of title, and having the right under the circumstances of the case to perfect their title if they could, and to compel the plaintiffs to wait until it was perfected, made the answer a cross-bill against the persons alleged by plaintiffs to have claims upon the lands in the decree. The plaintiffs, without questioning the right of defendants to do this in a separate suit, and to delay the plaintiff's bill till it can be done, object to the form of the proceeding, say it is not technically a cross-bill, and that therefore it cannot be done. We contend that the jurisdiction of the court being undoubted, the “form” is within the discretion of the court.

NAPTON, J.

This was a proceeding to obtain an injunction against a judgment at law rendered against the complainants. The judgment sought to be enjoined, had...