Oxford v. Nw. Med. Ctr. Springdale
| Decision Date | 31 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:16-CV-05022,5:16-CV-05022 |
| Parties | PATSY ANN OXFORD, individually and as administrator of the estate of James R. Oxford, deceased; and JAMES T. OXFORD PLAINTFFS v. NORTHWEST MEDICAL CENTER - SPRINGDALE; NORTHWEST HEALTH SYSTEM; MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; SHERIFF PHILLIP MORGAN, in his official capacity as Madison County Sheriff; MR. ANDY MITCHELL, Individually and in his official capacity as a deputy in the Madison County Sheriff's Office; JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANIES I-V; JOHN AND JANE DOE PHYSICIANS AND MEDICAL STAFF FOR NORTHWEST MEDICAL CENTER - SPRINGDALE; and JOHN DOE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court are Defendant Northwest Medical Center - Springdale's ("NWMC") motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) and second motion to dismiss (Doc. 16). NWMC has filed briefs in support. The motion to dismiss seeks dismissal on statute of limitations grounds and the second motion to dismiss argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and service of process was insufficient. Plaintiffs Patsy Ann Oxford and James T. Oxford have filed responses (Docs. 21, 23). NWMC has filed a reply (Doc. 25) with respect to its first motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.1 The reply was filed without leave of Court and so has not been considered. See W.D. Ark. R. 7.2(b) (). Also pending is a motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) Northwest Health System filed by the Oxfords.
As an initial matter, NWMC's overzealous approach to document-filing has created a procedural issue in this lawsuit that must be addressed. The Oxfords correctly argue that the second motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) must be denied.2 "[A] party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). The exceptions to this general prohibition do not apply to this motion, and it is appropriately denied because it is disallowed by the Rules. This leaves for consideration the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) on statute of limitations grounds, which suffers from a similar procedural weakness. NWMC filed an answer (Doc. 13) prior to filing its Rule 12 motions. Any Rule 12 motion asserting a 12(b) defense "must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). An answer is a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(2). NWMC's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was filed after its responsive pleading. If this motion had been filed on a different Rule 12(b) basis, the Court would deny it as disallowed, just as it is required to do with NWMC's other motion. However, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is also a basis for relief under Rule 12(c), which allows a post-answer motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the grounds for dismissal set out in that motion have merit, the Court will construe the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds as a Rule 12(c) motion. Cf. Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 703-04 (10th Cir. 2014) ().
The standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim apply to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mickelson v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2016). "[W]hen it appears from the face of the complaint itself that the limitations period has run, a limitations defense may properly be asserted through a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted); see also Thach v. Tiger Corp., 609 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2010) (). In reviewing the complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving party and grant[s] all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party." Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). "Federal courts apply the law of the forum to determine statutes of limitation." Harris v. Mortg. Prof'ls, Inc., 781 F.3d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 2015); accord Metro. Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. M/V Royal Rainbow, 12 F.3d 58, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1994) ().
The Oxfords allege that on February 1, 2014, James R. Oxford ("Mr. Oxford") made suicidal comments to his son and to Madison County Sheriff's deputies. The deputies called emergency medical services and directed them to transfer Mr. Oxford to NWMC for a 72-hour hold. Mr. Oxford had previously been a patient of NWMC and had been treated for depression, anxiety, and other medical issues. He was transported and admitted to the emergency room at NWMC for depression, suicidal ideation, and alcohol intoxication. He was admitted at 11:06 pm on February 1, and was released and discharged at 11:39 pm that same day. NWMC called his family to have him picked up, and was informed that Mr. Oxford was supposed to be on a 72-hour hold. Mr. Oxford was allowed to leave the hospital in a taxi cab. On February 2, Mr. Oxford's family was able to contact him, and discovered that he was in a hotel in Springdale, Arkansas. On February 3, Mr. Oxford's family brought his truck and travel trailer to an RV park in Springdale and arranged for him to be brought to the trailer. Later that day, Mr. Oxford's son visited the RV park, and both Mr. Oxford and his truck were not there. On February 4, Arkansas State Police informed Mr. Oxford's family that he had been in an automobile accident and was in the intensive care unit at Washington Regional Medical Center in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Mr. Oxford died on February 5, 2014. This action was filed on February 3, 2016. The Oxfords assert a medical negligence claim against NWMC. In particular, the Oxfords allege that by discharging an inebriated and suicidal Mr. Oxford instead of holding him for 72-hours, NWMC and its personnel fell below the standard of care.
NWMC argues in support of its motion to dismiss that this is a medical malpractice action for "medical injury." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-201(e) (). Actions for medical injury accrue on "the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(b). They must be commenced within two years after the date of accrual. Id. § 16-114-203(a). NWMC argues that any wrongful act on its part occurred at the latest on February 1, 2014, when it discharged Mr. Oxford rather than holding him for 72 hours.
The Oxfords respond that NWMC's duty of care extended through the entire 72-hour hold period and the cause of action did not accrue until the end of that period, on February 4, 2014. In support, they cite to Fleming v. Vest, 475 S.W.3d 576 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). Fleming discussed the "continuous-course-of-treatment" exception, which tolls the statute of limitations "in medical-malpractice cases where there is medical negligence followed by a continuing course of treatment for the malady which was the object of the negligent treatment or act." Fleming, 475 S.W.3d at 581 (quotation omitted); see also Lane v. Lane, 752 S.W.2d 25 (Ark. 1988) (). The Oxfords argue that because Mr. Oxford suffered his fatal injury during the 72-hour period during which he should have been admitted to NWMC, the statute of limitations for claims against NWMC did not begin to run until his death.
The negligent act alleged by the Oxfords is NWMC's discharge of Mr. Oxford on February 1, 2014. Following that act, the Oxfords' allegations make abundantly clear that there was no course of treatment from NWMC. Therefore, the continuing-course-of-treatment exception does not apply, and the cause of action accrued on February 1, 2014. Because the two-year limitations period expired prior to the filing of the complaint, the Oxfords' action against NWMC is time-barred and must be dismissed.
The Oxfords attempt to overcome this issue by arguing for the first time in their response to the motion to dismiss that they have a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. The Oxfords did not identify this claim in their complaint, but a complaint is tested on its factual allegations, and not on express invocations of the law or detailed exposition of legal theory. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., --U.S.--, 135 S.Ct. 346 (2014); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011). However, an action under EMTALA requires a plaintiff to show that a hospital did not apply the same screening procedures to him that it applies to similarly situated patients, and that this has had a disparate impact on the plaintiff. Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996) (...
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