Oxley v. Department of Military Affairs
| Decision Date | 20 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 111508, Calendar No. 17. |
| Citation | 460 Mich. 536,597 N.W.2d 89 |
| Parties | Claude OXLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Newton & Emmons, P.C. (by Gary C. Newton), Portage, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and George H. Weller and Charles L. Jones, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, for the defendant-appellant.
At issue is whether plaintiff, Claude Oxley, allegedly injured in the course of his work as a National Guard technician, was a covered employee for purposes of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), M.C.L. § 418.101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.237(101) et seq. We conclude that Oxley, in his capacity as a civilian technician, was not in the service of the state and is therefore ineligible for benefits under M.C.L. § 418.161(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.237(161)(1)(a) of the WDCA. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC), which affirmed the magistrate's ruling.
Oxley's full-time job during the period at issue was as a National Guard technician. Since 1969, such technicians have been classified as federal employees under 32 U.S.C. § 709(d). This position required that he be a member of the Michigan Air National Guard. See 32 U.S.C. § 709(b)(1). As a member of the Michigan Air National Guard, Oxley served one weekend a month plus fifteen days of summer camp each year.
Oxley's technician position involved computer operations. He had received four weeks of training, but felt that he was insufficiently trained and supported in his job. He alleged that the resulting stress caused him to suffer a myocardial infarction on November 13, 1985. While he returned to work after the heart attack, Oxley contended that his return to the same job subjected him to the same stress and resulted in further disability.1 He was terminated from military service because of medical disqualification on October 17, 1986, and terminated from his federal civil service status on February 27, 1987. He receives federal pension benefits.
On September 27, 1990, Oxley sought Michigan worker's compensation benefits, alleging continuing disability due to work-related injuries. However, Oxley did not seek federal worker's compensation benefits for the injuries at issue.2
The magistrate denied Oxley's claim for worker's compensation benefits, ruling that he was not an employee covered under Michigan's WDCA. She concluded that Oxley was a federal employee for purposes of the WDCA. In reaching this conclusion, she relied on 32 U.S.C. § 709, which states that a technician is a federal employee. She noted that Oxley received his pay and annual W-2s from the federal government and that his sick and vacation time and other benefits were provided through the federal civil service system. She also found, significantly, that the state adjutant general, Oxley's supervisor, is a federal employee for purposes of administering technicians.
The WCAC affirmed the magistrate's analysis and conclusion. 1996 Mich. ACO 675. Additionally, it acknowledged Tulppo v. Ontonagon Co., 207 Mich.App. 277, 523 N.W.2d 883 (1994), which indicated that wages earned for service in the National Guard should be included in the computation of weekly wage-loss benefits under the WDCA when a claimant is injured in the course of concurrent employment that is covered under the WDCA. However, on the basis of limiting language in Tulppo, the WCAC concluded that Oxley was limited to the worker's compensation benefits available under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.
The Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed. 227 Mich.App. 528, 575 N.W.2d 820 (1998). It concluded that Oxley was both a federal and a state employee and was therefore eligible for worker's compensation benefits under Michigan's WDCA. It relied on federal authority indicating that 32 U.S.C. § 709 made technicians "nominal" federal employees for the limited purpose of making them eligible for federal fringe and retirement benefits and for coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act. It rejected defendant's contention that technicians like Oxley wear two hats—they are civilian federal employees while acting as technicians, but members of the military, arguably employed by the state, while engaging in National Guard duties, i.e., when in military training or actual military service. Rather, the Court of Appeals held that Oxley's work as a technician was military in character and required that he be a member of the National Guard. Applying the economic reality test, it concluded that Oxley was employed by the state because he was voluntarily in the service of the state and subject to its control and direction in his work. It stated that the limiting language in Tulppo, relied upon by the WCAC, was dicta. Finally, it noted that Oxley was not receiving federal worker's compensation benefits and that there was accordingly no danger of double recovery, which was the basis of Tulppo`s limiting language.
This Court granted leave to appeal. 459 Mich. 923, 589 N.W.2d 781 (1998).
Whether Oxley was an employee of the state for purposes of Michigan's WDCA is a question of law. This Court has the authority to review questions of law involved in any final order of the WCAC. M.C.L. § 418.861; M.S.A. § 17.237(861). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Hagerman v. Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich. 720, 727, 579 N.W.2d 347 (1998).
In order to be eligible for Michigan WDCA benefits, a claimant must be a "covered" employee. Oxley contends that he was a covered employee because he was in the service of the state pursuant to M.C.L. § 418.161(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.237(161)(1)(a).3
Before beginning to analyze whether Oxley was a covered employee under § 161(1)(a),4 it is helpful to frame the issue by reiterating some facts that are undisputed.
Oxley's allegations in his petition for worker's compensation benefits acknowledge that the injuries at issue arose in the course of his civilian technician work, i.e., his forty hour a week job; not in the course of his military National Guard service, i.e., his service one weekend a month and fifteen days of summer camp each year. Further, both parties agree that, pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 709, technicians are federal employees and are under the authority of the state adjutant general.5 It is undisputed that Oxley's wages were paid by federal funds on a federal paycheck and that his sick and vacation time and other benefits were provided through the federal civil service system. Further, defendant concedes that Oxley was a state employee with respect to his military National Guard duties.
Given these facts, the issue is whether Oxley was exclusively a federal employee or simultaneously a federal employee and a state employee when the injuries at issue arose. It is agreed that if these injuries arose in the course of work as to which he was exclusively a federal employee, Oxley would not be a covered employee under § 161(1)(a) and thus would be ineligible for Michigan WDCA benefits. However, if they arose in the course of work as to which he was both a federal and a state employee, he would be eligible to pursue Michigan WDCA benefits under § 161(1)(a).6
As to whether Oxley's civilian technician work can be differentiated from his military National Guard service, Oxley argues that the civilian and military aspects of his work cannot be separated and that he was simultaneously a federal employee and a state employee. Defendant, of course, contends that Oxley's work can be bifurcated into its civilian and military elements. It claims that Oxley was a federal employee in his capacity as a technician and a state employee with respect to his military National Guard service.
The only Michigan case cited by the parties as bearing on this issue is Tulppo, 207 Mich.App. 277, 523 N.W.2d 883. In Tulppo, a sheriff, who was also a member of the National Guard, sought Michigan worker's compensation benefits for an injury suffered in the course of his sheriff's duties. There was no dispute that his sheriff position was clearly covered employment under § 161(1)(a). The only question was if, in setting his worker's compensation benefits, the plaintiff's pay for National Guard service should be considered. The Tulppo Court answered in the affirmative, holding that "for the limited purpose of determining average weekly wage loss under § 371 of the WDCA, Michigan National Guard members are state employees and ... fall within the express language of § ... 161." Id. at 282, 523 N.W.2d 883. Thus, the Tulppo Court dispositively concluded that where a claimant is injured in the course of covered employment, the claimant's pay for National Guard service may be considered in calculating worker's compensation benefits. While it discussed the Legislature's intent to provide worker's compensation benefits to National Guard members "injured or killed in the course of other concurrent employment covered by the act," the question whether such other concurrent employment is covered by the act, as is at issue here, simply was not before the Tulppo Court.7 207 Mich.App. at 285, 523 N.W.2d 883. Thus, Tulppo provides no guidance regarding whether a technician position constitutes other concurrent employment that is covered by Michigan's WDCA. Nor does Tulppo shed any light on the specific question whether Oxley's civilian technician work can be separated from his military National Guard service.
Given the paucity of Michigan authorities addressing the issues we confront, we turn to cases from other jurisdictions for guidance. Some federal cases have indicated a categorical conclusion that the civil and military aspects of a technician position are inseparable. However, even c...
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