Oyakawa v. Gillett, 1

• Decision Date: 10 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CV,1
• Citation: 854 P.2d 1212,175 Ariz. 226
• Parties: Ray T. OYAKAWA, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard GILLETT, M.D., Aracely Gillett, Defendants-Appellees. 91-0160.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1212

854 P.2d 1212

175 Ariz. 226

Ray T. OYAKAWA, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard GILLETT, M.D., Aracely Gillett, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 91-0160.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department A.

June 10, 1993.

[175 Ariz. 227] Lawrence Silver, Los Angeles, CA, Wachtel, Biehn & Malm by Steven A. Biehn, Lake Havasu City, and Howard Snyder, Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellant.

David Wm. Engelman, P.C. by David Wm. Engelman, Phoenix, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

LANKFORD, Presiding Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the superior court's order staying enforcement of his California judgment and vacating that judgment as to one of the defendants, Mrs. Gillett. We confront the following question: Is the California judgment entitled to full faith and credit under Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution?

We hold that the California judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. It is therefore valid and enforceable against the defendants' marital community. Accordingly, we reverse.

Defendants Dr. Richard Gillett and Aracely Gillett were married in 1979 and have remained married continuously. In 1984, the plaintiff, Dr. Ray Oyakawa, sued Dr. Gillett for defamation in a California superior court. All parties then resided in California. Dr. Oyakawa neither named nor served Dr. Gillett's wife, Aracely Gillett. After a verdict in his favor, Dr. Oyakawa obtained a judgment against Dr. Gillett alone for $325,000 in damages, including $175,000 punitive damages.

The Gilletts moved from California to Arizona. Pursuant to the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. ("A.R.S.") section 12-1701 et seq. (1982), Dr. Oyakawa domesticated the California judgment in Arizona--acquired an Arizona judgment in Mohave County Superior Court to the same effect as the California judgment--and obtained an Arizona writ of garnishment against Dr. Gillett's wages. The Gilletts moved to quash the writ, arguing that because the California judgment was against Dr. Gillett only it could not support garnishment of wages which were community property. Dr. Oyakawa agreed to quash the writ and returned to the California superior court where he obtained an amended judgment, stating that it was valid against the community. He then domesticated the amended California judgment in Arizona.

The Gilletts filed a motion in the Arizona superior court to stay enforcement of the new Arizona judgment and to vacate that portion of the judgment against Aracely Gillett. The superior court granted the motion and Dr. Oyakawa appealed.

We must decide whether the California judgment against the Gilletts' marital community is valid. The defendants argue that the Arizona courts must apply Arizona law, which requires the plaintiff to have proceeded against both spouses for the judgment to be valid against the community. The plaintiff argues that applying Arizona law would deny the judgment the full faith and credit to which it is entitled under the Federal Constitution. Therefore, our first task is to determine whether the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution obliges the states to respect and enforce judgments rendered in the courts of their sister states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1966) ( [d]uly authenticated judgments "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken"). The foreign state's judgment need not be enforced if the rendering court lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, the judgment was obtained through fraud or is invalid or unenforceable, or the defendant's due process rights were violated. E.g., Phares v. Nutter, 125 Ariz. 291, 293, 609 P.2d 561, 563 (1980); Bebeau v. Berger, 22 Ariz.App. 522, 523, 529 P.2d 234, 235 (1975).

The Gilletts contend that the judgment is effective only against Dr. Gillett and cannot be enforced against the community because Aracely Gillett was not joined in the original California defamation suit. In Arizona, a plaintiff desiring to obtain a judgment against the marital community for a community debt must join both spouses:

[E]ither spouse may contract debts and otherwise act for the benefit of the community. In an action on such a debt or obligation the spouses shall be sued jointly and the debt or obligation shall be satisfied: first, from the community property, and second, from the separate property of the spouse contracting the debt or obligation.

A.R.S. § 25-215(D) (1991).

However, the rule is different in California. The legislature of that state has provided:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community property is liable for a debt ¹ incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless which spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt.

CAL.CIV.CODE § 5120.110(a) (West Supp.1992) (emphasis added). Thus, California law provides that the Gilletts' community property is liable for the debt established by a judgment solely against Dr. Gillett.

The question arises whether enforcing the original California judgment against both Dr. and Mrs. Gillett is not required by full faith and credit because it would violate Mrs. Gillet's right to due process of law. According to the Gilletts, the California judgment cannot be enforced against Mrs. Gillett's interest in the community property because she was neither named nor served in the California action. The Gilletts also argue that the amended California judgment (which added her as a judgment debtor) violated due process because it deprived her of important rights: the right to a jury trial; the right to a full and fair hearing; and the defense of the statute of limitations. They cite Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 139 Ariz. 35, 676 P.2d 669 (App.1984), as condemning the addition of a non-named party after judgment.

The California judgment is entitled to a presumption of validity. A party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment bears the burden of proof. Banco de Sonora v. Morales, 23 Ariz. 248, 203 P. 328 (1922). A duly authenticated judgment of a sister state is prima facie evidence of that state's jurisdiction to render it and of the right which it purports to adjudicate. Schilz v. Superior Ct., 144 Ariz. 65, 71, 695 P.2d 1103, 1109 (1985); cf. Stirewalt v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 138 Ariz. 257, 259, 674 P.2d 320, 322 (App.1983) (statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid and party challenging statute's constitutionality has burden of satisfying court beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional).

Aracely Gillett's due process rights were not violated. Her separate property is unaffected by the judgments. See CAL.CIV.CODE § 5120.110. Although the judgment binds her interest in the property of the marital community, California statutes provide constitutionally adequate procedures to protect that interest.

The effect of California Civil Code section 5120.110 is to make the spouse who appears in the action the representative of the marital community. Although the statute provides that only one spouse need be named and served, the statute also gives notice to all married persons that a judgment binding both spouses can be obtained by suing only one spouse.

The Gilletts have failed to offer any reason why either this scheme in general, or Richard Gillett's representation of the community in this particular case, was inadequate. No evidence suggests that he failed to protect any community interests or that his interests were so unrepresentative of the community's interest that the judgment unfairly harmed the community.

Under certain circumstances, one party may be represented by another in a lawsuit without a violation of due process. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that:

(1) ... A person is represented by a party who is:

. . . . .

(c) The executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or similar fiduciary manager of an interest of which the person is a beneficiary; ...

. . . . .

(2) A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment even though the person himself does not have notice of the action, is not served with process, or is not subject to service of process.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 41 (1982). Moreover, a comment to section 41 specifically addresses the relationship between spouses in a community property state: "Fiduciary authority and responsibility for management of interests of others may repose in relationships other than a trust. One such relationship is that arising from community property ownership between spouses, in which a spouse has managing authority over the community property." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 41, comment b (1982).

Several courts have applied this principle. For example, in Komm v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 23 Wash.App. 593, 597 P.2d 1372 (1979), the court held that judgment against a wife for a community obligation could be satisfied through garnishment of her husband's wages, which were community property. This garnishment did not violate due process because the wife, as the agent of the community, represented both spouses' interests in the action. 597 P.2d at 1376. And in Hebert v. Unser, 593 So.2d 977 (La.App.1992), the court found that garnishment of a judgment debtor's wife's wages did not violate due process. "[S]ince either party is the proper party in an action to enforce a community obligation, the wife here was not required to be notified of the suit or garnishment." Id. at 980. These cases illustrate the principle that a judgment against one spouse may...