Oyekwe v. Research Now Grp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-886-S-BN
• Citation: 542 F.Supp.3d 496
• Parties: McDavid OYEKWE v. RESEARCH NOW GROUP, INC. a/k/a Dynata, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

542 F.Supp.3d 496

McDavid OYEKWE

v.RESEARCH NOW GROUP, INC. a/k/a Dynata, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-886-S-BN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed June 2, 2021

McDavid O. Oyekwe, Rowlett, TX, Pro Se.

Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr., Brackett & Ellis PC, Fort Worth, TX, Alex Drummond, Pro Hac Vice, Christina Meddin, Pro Hac Vice, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Research Now Group Inc., Seyfarth Shaw.

ORDER

Karen Gren Scholer, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation in this case. Plaintiff filed objections, and the District Court has made a de novo review of those portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objections were made. The objections are overruled, and the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge.

SO ORDERED.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID L. HORAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff McDavid Oyekwe filed this lawsuit pro se in state court in Dallas County against his former employer, Defendant Dynata, LLC, and Defendant Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Dynata's counsel in an employment case filed by Oyekwe in state court and then removed to this Court, which has now been dismissed. See Dkt. No. 1-3; Oyekwe v. Research Now Grp., Inc. , No. 3:19-cv-1085-S-BN, 2021 WL 1566459 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021), rec. accepted , 2021 WL 1564327 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021), notice of appeal filed Apr. 27, 2021 ( Oyekwe I ).

After Defendants removed Oyekwe's current lawsuit, see Dkt. No. 1, the presiding United States district judge referred it to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

Defendants now move to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based in part on that the current claims are barred by collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) because "[a]ll of the claims and factual issues raised in Plaintiff's Petition were previously raised, considered, and rejected by this Court in Oyekwe I. " Dkt. Nos. 8 & 9.

After the Court entered an order requiring briefing on the motion to dismiss, see Dkt. No. 11, Oyekwe responded, see Dkt. No. 12, moved the Court to appoint him counsel, see Dkt. No. 13, filed an amended complaint, see Dkt. No. 14, and moved for default judgment, see Dkt. No. 15.

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons explained below, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice, terminating Oyekwe's pending motions.

Applicable Background

Through an amended petition that he filed in state court in Dallas County on April 15, 2019, Oyekwe raised three claims against Dynata: "[1] racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.001 et seq. (the TCHRA), ... [2] retaliation after he engaged in protected activity, under the same provisions of law, and ... [3] that Dynata failed to properly compensate him for overtime, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the FLSA)." Oyekwe I , 2021 WL 1566459, at *1.

After removal to federal court, the parties participated in a telephonic scheduling conference with the undersigned, see Dkt. Nos. 24 & 25, after which the undersigned memorialized that, "[b]ecause Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court may hold Plaintiff's filings to a less stringent standard than papers drafted and filed by an attorney. But this is Plaintiff's lawsuit, and, ultimately, Plaintiff must prove an entitlement to relief. Neither the Court (or any of its staff) nor counsel for Defendant(s) will serve as de facto counsel for Plaintiff," Dkt. No. 26, ¶ 1 (citing Barker v. Norman , 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 n.26 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) ).

Oyekwe proceeded to actively prosecute his case, during which time the parties participated in an unsuccessful settlement conference with another United States magistrate judge, see Dkt. Nos. 27, 29, & 37, and the Court denied Okeywe's requests to sanction Dynata, see Dkt. Nos. 58, 65, 66, 68, & 72. And, after Dynata moved for summary judgment, see Dkt. Nos. 73, 74, & 75, the undersigned entered a briefing order setting out in full the detailed summary judgment standards above and the full text of Rule 56, see Dkt. No. 76.

But neither has Oyekwe filed a verified complaint (the pro se amended petition filed in state court) [Dkt. No. 3-9] nor has he submitted competent evidence to oppose summary judgment, see Dkt. Nos. 77 & 79.

As the briefing order cautioned Oyekwe, "there is a point at which even pro se litigants must become responsible for the prosecution of their own cases if their claims are to warrant the court's attention." Bookman , 945 F. Supp. at 1002. In this case, that point is now, because "[i]t is not unjustifiably onerous to require pro se parties to respond to proper motions for summary judgment." Id. "All summary judgment nonmovants shoulder the same obligation," id. – to oppose "summary judgment through the use of competent summary judgment evidence," Malcolm v. Vicksburg Warren Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. , 709 F. App'x 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)

Id. at *4 (citation modified).

The Court granted Dynata summary judgment on all claims made in Oyekwe I , dismissing that action with prejudice on April 20, 2021. Oyekwe appealed and moved for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Oyekwe I , Dkt. Nos. 101 & 103. And the Court denied the Rule 59(e) motion. See id. , Dkt. No. 105.

After the undersigned recommended that the Court dismiss the claims in Oyekwe I , but prior to the Court accepting that recommendation, Oyekwe filed this action pro se in state court, on March 17, 2021. See Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 1-3 (realleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and FLSA claims through counts labeled breach of contract, defamation of character, and False Claims Act); Dkt. No. 1-2 (state court docket sheet reflecting that Oyekwe initiated the state case through an affidavit of inability to pay).

Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). Such a motion is therefore "not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the merits of a lawsuit" and "instead must show that, even in the plaintiff's best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief." Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd. , 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020). Even so, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Sewell , 974 F.3d at 582 ("Although this framework is one-sided, the issue ‘is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.’ The other side will have its say later." (quoting Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist. , 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds , 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) )).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ " Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc. , 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co. , 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) ("Where the well-pleaded facts of a complaint do not permit a court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting, in turn, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ))).

While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of a plaintiff's allegations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. Instead, "to survive a motion to dismiss" under Twombly and Iqbal , a plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that the plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss. , 574 U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e) ); see also Inclusive Communities Project , 920 F.3d at 899 (" ‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and...