Oyola v. State

• Decision Date: 19 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC13–2048.,SC13–2048.
• Citation: 158 So.3d 504
• Parties: Miguel OYOLA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

158 So.3d 504

Miguel OYOLA, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC13–2048.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 19, 2015.

Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Patrick M. Delaney, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from the trial court's Second Revised Sentencing Order that sentenced Miguel Oyola to death for the first-degree murder of Michael Lee Gerrard. In Oyola v. State, 99 So.3d 431 (Fla.2012), this Court affirmed Oyola's convictions for first-degree murder, false imprisonment, armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. However, we reversed and remanded the original sentencing order to the trial court on the basis that it violated Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla.1990). On remand, the trial court again sentenced Oyola to death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

FACTS

Original Guilt and Penalty Phases

On the day he was murdered, Gerrard called Wakulla Bank with regard to unusual transactions on the debit card used for his landscaping business. Oyola, 99 So.3d at 435. Evidence established that Oyola, an employee of Gerrard's landscaping business who had been in possession of a debit card on the business account, had recently used the card for purchases that totaled approximately $900 and withdrew an additional $900 in cash using the debit card. Later that day, a truck driver in a remote area of Jefferson County saw two men later identified as Oyola and Gerrard engaged in a bloody fight in a trailer attached to a truck. The truck driver left to summon help, but by the time he returned, Gerrard was alone. Oyola had left with the truck and attached trailer, which were later determined to have belonged to Gerrard. The truck driver called 911, but Gerrard died before police arrived. The medical examiner determined that Gerrard had been stabbed several times with a knife and hit with a blunt, shovel-like object. Id. at 435–38.

Other evidence suggested that Oyola attempted to dispose of evidence of the crime. His girlfriend testified that she saw him bathing in bleach; when she asked about a trash bag with pants inside, he told her that if she knew what was inside, she would be sick. Another witness found the trailer that had been attached to Gerrard's truck abandoned and on fire in Leon County. From the pattern of blood stains in the trailer, investigators deduced that someone had been locked inside and attempted to force his way out. Id. at 436–37.

When suspicion fell on Oyola for the murder, he proclaimed his innocence. He told officers that he had spoken to Gerrard on the phone that day, but had otherwise mostly remained at home. He claimed that Gerrard had instructed him to use the business debit card to purchase Christmas gifts. Oyola also proclaimed his innocence to a family friend of Gerrard and asserted that Gerrard had left money in Oyola's mailbox on the day of the murder. However, after he was arrested for murder, Oyola confessed to his cellmate that he had killed Gerrard, stolen his truck and $375, and disposed of some of the evidence. He also told his cellmate that he planned to plead insanity or self-defense during trial. Id. at 437–38.

The jury found Oyola guilty of first-degree murder, false imprisonment, armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. During the penalty phase, Oyola presented his brother, Manuel, and a forensic psychologist, Dr. Thomas D'Errico, as witnesses. Manuel testified to the abuse he and Oyola suffered as children at the hands of their parents, which Manuel believed negatively affected his brother's intellectual development and ability to cope with stress. Id. at 439.

Dr. D'Errico testified concerning Oyola's mental condition, which included a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder

, low test scores in school, and borderline intellectual functioning.¹ Oyola had also given Dr. D'Errico an inconsistent account of his activities on the day of the murder and how he had killed Gerrard. Because Oyola had not taken his medication when he murdered Gerrard, Dr. D'Errico concluded that it was likely that Oyola overreacted to the perceived threat of an angry Gerrard and was less able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. However, during cross-examination, Dr. D'Errico admitted that Oyola attempted to destroy evidence and that Oyola told him a version of events that was inconsistent with the evidence. The jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder of Gerrard by a vote of nine to three. Id. at 439–42.

In the original sentencing order, the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while Oyola was on felony probation;² (2) the murder was committed during a robbery,³ which merged with the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).⁴ The court assigned great weight to each aggravating factor. The court rejected the mental health of Oyola as a statutory mitigating circumstance, but did consider some factors in Oyola's background as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:

The Defendant prepared a sentencing memorandum suggesting all non-statutory mitigation he believed had been presented to either the jury or the Court at the separate sentencing hearing. The defendant submitted a transcript of an interview of Manuel Oyola and Leonardo Oyola,^{[ 5 ]} for this Court's consideration. Such transcripts were reviewed and considered. Each suggestion of non-statutory mitigation will be addressed in this order.

The alleged non-statutory mitigation included serious drug abuse, an abusive home life as a child, created a cycle of violence [sic], and mental disorder. While the evidence did establish such circumstances, the Court gives such circumstances slight weight in weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.

Neither the circumstances in the defendant's character, background or life, nor the circumstances of the offense mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty.

Oyola's first direct appeal proceeding followed this order that sentenced him to death.

First Direct Appeal

Oyola presented several issues in his first direct appeal to this Court. He asserted that: (1) the trial court improperly assigned great weight to the HAC aggravating factor; (2) the trial court improperly rejected his mental health status as both a statutory and a nonstatutory mitigating factor; (3) the sentencing order violated Campbell; and (4) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Oyola, 99 So.3d at 442. We held that sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction for first-degree murder, affirmed the assignment of great weight to the HAC aggravating circumstance, and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave slight weight to Oyola's mental health status as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. Id. at 444–49. We also rejected the Ring claim. Id. at 449. However, we reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing order that complied with the procedures prescribed by Campbell.⁶ Id. at 447.

The Resentencing

This Court issued its opinion on September 20, 2012. Id. at 431. On October 30, 2012, the trial court issued a Revised Sentencing Order that again sentenced Oyola to death, but the trial court had not conducted a new Spencer⁷ hearing or a new sentencing hearing. After Oyola filed a Motion for Reconsideration that asserted that he was entitled to a new Spencerhearing,⁸ the court held both a Spencer hearing and a new sentencing hearing, at which both parties were present.

The trial court issued a Second Revised Sentencing Order on April 29, 2013, that again sentenced Oyola to death.⁹ The trial court found the same three aggravating circumstances: Oyola was on probation for a felony (great weight); the murder was committed during a robbery, merged with pecuniary gain (great weight); and HAC (great weight). In the analysis of the aggravating factor that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery, the trial court expressed concern that Oyola was already sentenced to life imprisonment for the armed robbery, which was previously affirmed by this Court:

A life sentence is a possible sentence for either an armed robbery or first degree murder. If there is to be any additional consequence for actually murdering the person who is the victim of an armed robbery, the death penalty should be imposed.... If there is to be any consequence for taking Gerrard's life, after [Oyola] robbed him, or during the robbery, while armed, the death penalty should be imposed.

The trial court again found no statutory mitigating factors. The court also found that the sole nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of general mental condition merited only slight weight. In the conclusion of the analysis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court wrote that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances:

This court does sentence the defendant to life imprisonment for the armed robbery. The premeditated murder of the victim of the robbery should result in some additional consequence. The imposition of a life sentence for the murder, overriding the jury's recommendation for the death penalty, would result in no additional consequence for the murder. The imposition of only a life sentence for the first degree murder committed by Oyola would be a reward to him for his elaborate scheme to use a mental health expert to thwart justice. A life sentence for the first degree murder by Oyola would be contrary to this court's finding that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

After the trial court issued...