P.L.S. v. Koster

• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. WD 73275.,WD 73275.
• Citation: 360 S.W.3d 805,277 Ed. Law Rep. 1173
• Parties: P.L.S. A Minor Child by and Through Donna SHELTON, her Mother and Next Friend, Appellant, v. Chris KOSTER, Attorney General of the State of Missouri; and Kelvin L. Simmons, Commission of Administration, State Of Missouri, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

277 Ed. Law Rep. 1173

360 S.W.3d 805

P.L.S. A Minor Child by and Through Donna SHELTON, her Mother and Next Friend, Appellant,

v.Chris KOSTER, Attorney General of the State of Missouri; and Kelvin L. Simmons, Commission of Administration, State Of Missouri, Respondents.

No. WD 73275.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Dec. 13, 2011.As Modified Jan. 31, 2012.Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 31, 2012.

Application for Transfer Denied

April 3, 2012.

Kenneth Allen Wagoner, West Plains, MO, for appellant.

Ronald R. Holliger, Jefferson City, MO, for respondents.

Division Three: JAMES E. WELSH, P.J., JAMES M. SMART, JR., and JOSEPH M. ELLIS, JJ.

JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge.

This case presents the issue of whether the holder of a judgment obtained against a school district's former bus driver is entitled to collect that judgment from the State Legal Expense Fund, established by section 105.711 RSMo.¹

Factual Background

In the fall of 2006, Robert Griffith, a school bus driver for the Doniphan R–I School District, molested a four-year-old preschool girl (“the Child” or “the Plaintiff”) while she was on the school bus. Griffith was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to incarceration. The Child, through her mother and next friend, sued Griffith in U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Child's civil rights. She did not sue the School District, the school board members, or the State of Missouri. Griffith was sued as an individual and not in an official capacity. Griffith defaulted. The court entered judgment in the Child's favor against Griffith in an individual capacity, reciting that Griffith had been hired by the School District to provide transportation and that his actions “arose out of his official duties in behalf of the State of Missouri.”

Thereafter, the Child brought another action—a declaratory judgment action—in circuit court. The named defendants were Chris Koster, Attorney General, and Kelvin Simmons, Commissioner of Administration. Koster, as Attorney General, is assigned certain responsibilities with regard to the State Legal Expense Fund. See, e.g., § 105.716 RSMo. The Commissioner of Administration has the responsibility of making the payments from the Legal Expense Fund. § 105.711.5. The Child sought in her action a declaration that the State Legal Expense Fund is obligated to satisfy the judgment entered against Griffith individually in United States District Court.

The petition in the circuit court alleged that Griffith had requested that a defense be provided by the Fund and that the Attorney General had declined to provide a defense. Plaintiff stated that the School District is an “agency or arm of the State, created by statute, and that therefore the judgment awarded is covered by the State Legal Expense Fund.”

Defendants, in their response, admitted the fact that Griffith was a bus driver employed by the School District, and admitted that Griffith molested Plaintiff. Defendants denied, and still do not concede, that Griffith's conduct “arose out of or was performed in connection” with any “official duty on behalf of the State of Missouri.” The Defendants affirmatively pleaded that Plaintiff's petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that Plaintiff's claims were subject to governmental immunity, and that Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.

Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in her behalf. The State also moved for summary judgment. The trial court, after consideration of the dispositive motions, agreed with the Defendants, entering judgment for Defendants.

The Plaintiff appeals.

Standard of Review

The parties agreed as to the essential facts and submitted the case on competing motions for summary judgment. Therefore, our review is de novo. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).

This is a case of statutory construction, in that the disposition of the case as submitted hangs on the meaning of the phrase “agency of the state.” Thus, we apply the rules of statutory interpretation, but we do not do so “haphazardly or indiscriminately” in order to achieve a desired result. See Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Mo. banc 2011). “Instead, the canons of statutory interpretation are considerations made in a genuine effort to determine what the legislature intended.” Id. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. Id. Legislative intent also is “determined by considering the whole act and its purposes and by seeking to avoid unjust or absurd results.” Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo. banc 2007). “In determining the meaning of a particular statute, [we] may look to the established policy of the legislature as disclosed by a general course of legislation.” Id. “All consistent statutes relating to the same subject are construed together as though constituting one act, and [t]he rule of construction in such instances proceeds upon the supposition that the statutes in question are intended to be read consistently and harmoniously in their several parts and provisions.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). And to the extent that section 105.711 constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is to be strictly construed. Ford Motor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 97 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Mo. banc 2003).

“ Agency of the State ”

Plaintiff does not contend that Griffith was an “officer or employee of the State of Missouri” as to whom a duty extends under section 105.711.2(2). Rather Plaintiff asserts that Griffith was an employee of an “agency of the state” under that same subsection. Both parties treat the case as boiling down to that one legal issue: whether a public school district is an “agency of the state” for purposes of the State Legal Expense Fund.²

State Legal Expense Fund

Sections 105.711–105.726 create the “State Legal Expense Fund,” which consists of sums appropriated by the General Assembly and any funds otherwise credited to the Fund by certain departments pursuant to section 105.716. The assets in the Fund are to be available for the payment of any claim, or any amount required by any final judgment against (1) the State, or any agency of the State (to the extent that the claim against the State is authorized pursuant to section 537.600, the sovereign immunity statute); and (2) against “any officer or employee of the State or any agency of the State,” as provided and as limited in the statute.

Because issues of statutory interpretation as to particular sections are addressed best when those sections are considered in light of the entirety of the relevant statutory scheme, we must consider the operative language in light of all the provisions relating to the State Legal Expense Fund. See Neske, 218 S.W.3d at 424 (the court may look to the established policy as disclosed by a “general course of legislation”).

In 1983, the State created the Legal Expense Fund to replace the “Tort Defense Fund,” section 105.710 RSMo Supp.1982, repealing the former statute at the same time.³ The Legal Expense Fund statutes have been amended on multiple occasions since that time. Also, along the way, the legislature enacted a similar statute ( sections 537.700, et seq.) designed to provide protection for employees of municipalities and other political subdivisions in Missouri. Both of these statutes amount to a partial waiver of the sovereign immunity applicable to the state to the extent that it provides for payment of a judgment obtained against a governmental officer or employee. See State ex rel. Cravens v. Nixon, 234 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Mo.App.2007).

The first reported Missouri judicial decision construing the portions of the Legal Expense Fund statute pertinent to this case came in Dixon v. Holden, 923 S.W.2d 370 (Mo.App.1996). Dixon held that a judgment creditor having a judgment against two senior highway patrol officers for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could collect his judgment directly from the State Legal Expense Fund. In reviewing the statutory provisions, the court described the main operative terms as follows:

First, section 105.716 provides for a legal defense of employees covered by the Fund. Second, section 105.721 provides for the purchase of insurance for the State of Missouri, its agencies, officers, and employees. Third, section 105.711 provides for the payment of judgments against various employees and the State under section 537.600.

Id. at 381. The Dixon court then opined:

All of these statutory purposes seem to flow from one policy-to promote governmental efficiency and protect State business by protecting employees.

Id.

Other cases have followed Dixon's understanding of the Act and have addressed similar issues. The issue before us in this case (whether a public school district is an “agency of the state” for Fund purposes) has not been directly addressed. The reported Missouri cases previously decided involved highway patrol officers ( Dixon ), state hospital workers employed by the Department of Mental Health ( Betts–Lucas⁴), employees of the Missouri Department of Corrections ( Cravens⁵), and members and employees of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners ( Smith⁶).

Plaintiff in this case claims that the School District is an “agency of the state” for purposes of the Legal Expense Fund. The State counters with the observation that public school districts have been created as political subdivisions of the State, not as executive agencies, and school districts are not “agencies” except where a statute may specifically provide otherwise. Employees of political subdivisions, the State points out, have generally not been considered employees of “state agencies.” The State suggests that to interpret “state agency” for Fund purposes to include a local school district would be a...