P.N. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1

• Citation: 474 F.3d 1165
• Decision Date: 29 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-36141.,04-36141.
• Parties: P.N., parent of T.N., a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, NO. 1, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

474 F.3d 1165

P.N., parent of T.N., a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, NO. 1, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-36141.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 9, 2006.

Filed January 29, 2007.

Amended January 29, 2007.

Charlotte Cassady, Seattle, WA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Lawrence B. Ransom and Tracy M. Miller, Karr Tuttle Campbell, Seattle, WA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; John C. Coughenour, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-00258-JCC.

Before DAVID R. THOMPSON, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND AMENDED OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Our opinion filed August 15, 2006, is amended to include the following at the end of footnote 7.

We further note that 20 U.S.C. § 1415 was amended subsequent to the underlying events in this case. We have no occasion to consider whether these amendments alter the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys' fees under the IDEA.

With the filing of the amended opinion, Judges Thompson, Tashima, and Callahan vote to deny the petition for rehearing, and the petition for rehearing is denied.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing en banc is denied. FED. R. APP. P. 35.

No further petition for rehearing will be entertained.

OPINION

P.N., plaintiff-appellant, filed an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., to recover attorneys' fees incurred in resolving a conflict with the Seattle School District ("SSD") over her child's education. The conflict was resolved by a settlement agreement signed only by the parties. The district court held that P.N. was not a prevailing party, and thus, not entitled to attorneys' fees under the IDEA because the settlement agreement lacked any judicial imprimatur. We affirm. We hold, consistent with our own precedent and decisions by our sister circuits, that (a) the definition of "prevailing party" set forth by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), applies to the IDEA's attorneys' fees provision, (b) the determination that a parent is a prevailing party requires that there be some judicial sanction of the settlement agreement, and (c) there is no judicial imprimatur of the settlement agreement in this case.

I

The IDEA seeks "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To implement the IDEA, schools must prepare a written Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for each disabled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir.1993). "[T]he IEP sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable each child to meet these objectives." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). The statute guarantees parents of disabled children an opportunity to participate in the identification, evaluation, and placement process. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i), 1415(b)(1). Parents who object to their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement," or have a complaint regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education for their child, can file an administrative complaint and are entitled to an impartial due process hearing. Id. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1); Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1469. At the due process hearing, parents have a right to be accompanied and advised by counsel, present evidence, and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(h). Parents aggrieved by a hearing officer's findings and decision can file a civil action in either federal or state court. Id. § 1415(i)(2); Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1469.

The IDEA also provides that the parents of a child with a disability who is the "prevailing party" may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Here, we are called upon to determine the legal definition of "prevailing party" as used in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and whether P.N. meets this legal definition.

II

For many years, P.N.'s child, T.N., experienced difficulty in school, and P.N. repeatedly asked the SSD to evaluate T.N. for learning disabilities and to provide appropriate special education. When SSD failed to do so, P.N. obtained a psychological evaluation and enrolled T.N. in a private school. In March 2003, P.N. hired an attorney to represent her in attempting to obtain special education for T.N. from SSD and reimbursement for the costs of psychological evaluation and private schooling.

Over the next seven months P.N. and her attorney corresponded and met with SSD personnel. By the end of September 2003, SSD had agreed to fund T.N.'s placement in the private school for the summer of 2003 and for the 2003-2004 school year on a part-time basis, but had not agreed to reimburse P.N. for the expenses associated with T.N.'s private evaluation and his enrollment in the private school from March through June 2004.

In November 2003, P.N., through counsel, requested a due process hearing under the IDEA. In early January 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby SSD agreed to reimburse P.N. for the costs associated with T.N.'s psychological evaluation and attendance at the private school. The settlement agreement expressly reserved "any issue of attorneys' fees and costs." On January 23, 2004, the administrative law judge, at P.N.'s request, dismissed the due process hearing proceeding.

On February 4, 2004, P.N. filed in this action for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs under the IDEA. She sought $13,653.00 in attorneys' fees incurred in the due process proceedings and attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the federal action to recover fees. In October 2004, the district court denied P.N.'s summary judgment motion for attorneys' fees and subsequently dismissed P.N.'s claims with prejudice. P.N. filed a timely notice of appeal.

III

Although we review a district court's denial of attorneys' fees and costs for an abuse of discretion, any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation underlying the district court's attorneys' fees decision are reviewed de novo, and factual findings underlying the district court's decision are reviewed for clear error. Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2005); Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2003).

IV

A. P.N., as an alleged prevailing party, was entitled to file an action for attorneys' fees under the IDEA

P.N.'s complaint specifically sought only attorneys' fees and costs under the IDEA.¹ Although it was revised in 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) continues to provide that the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of costs to a prevailing party who is a parent of a child with a disability.²

We have held that the phrase "action or proceeding brought under this section" in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes the filing of a complaint by a prevailing party seeking only attorneys' fees and costs. In Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir.2000), parents of an autistic son complained to the school district that their son was not receiving the special education benefits to which he was entitled under the IDEA. Id. After the parents filed a complaint with the state Department of Education pursuant to the state's Complaint Review Procedure, the parents prevailed upon the school district to complete a revised IEP for their son. The parents then filed an action in a district court seeking to recover attorneys' fees. Id. The district court granted the parents' request for attorneys' fees and the school district appealed. Id. On appeal we addressed whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) authorized an action solely for attorneys' fees, and concluded:

Although we have not expressly so held before today, our prior cases imply that the district court has jurisdiction over a case in which fees are sought although liability is established outside the district court proceeding itself. See Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1991) (allowing "the prevailing parents to recover attorneys' fees when settlement is reached prior to the due process hearing"); McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary Sch. Dist., 897 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1989) (awarding the parents of a disabled child attorney fees incurred in an administrative due process hearing under the Handicapped Children's Protection Act [the predecessor of the IDEA]).

Id. at 1026. Accordingly, we hold that the IDEA authorizes an action solely to recover attorneys' fees and costs, even if there has been no administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce a student's rights under the IDEA. See Barlow-Gresham, 940 F.2d at 1285 ("We . . . conclude that [the predecessor of § 1415(i)(3)(B)] allows the prevailing parents to recover attorneys' fees when settlement is reached prior to the due process hearing."). We turn next to defining "prevailing party."

B. The Supreme Court has defined "prevailing party" to require a judicial imprimatur of the material alteration of the parties' legal relationship

The critical question is whether P.N. is a "prevailing party" and thus eligible for an award of attorneys' fees as part of costs under the IDEA. The term was addressed by the Supreme Court in B...