Parsons v. Ryan

Decision Date29 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-16424,18-16368,No. 18-16358,Nos. 18-16365,18-16358,s. 18-16365,18-16424
Citation949 F.3d 443
Parties Victor Antonio PARSONS; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Arizona Center For Disability Law; Charlotte Wells, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Charles L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. Victor Antonio Parsons; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Arizona Center For Disability Law, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. Victor Antonio Parsons; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Arizona Center For Disability Law, Plaintiff, v. Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Timothy J. Berg (argued), Todd Kartchner, Courtney R. Beller, and Shannon McKeon, Fennemore Craig P.C., Phoenix, Arizona; Nicholas D. Acedo (argued), Daniel P. Struck, and Rachel Love, Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo PLC, Chandler, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Corene T. Kendrick (argued), Donald Specter, and Rita K. Lomio, Prison Law Office, Berkeley, California; David C. Fathi, Amy Fettig, and Jennifer Wedekind, ACLU National Prison Project, Washington, D.C.; Maya S. Abela and Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Arizona Center for Disability Law, Tucson, Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and J. Clifford Wallace and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

The consolidated appeals in this comeback case arise from a class-action by prisoners in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) against senior ADC officials (Defendants), in which certain prisoners (Plaintiffs) challenged ADC’s provision of healthcare. Defendants appeal from eleven district court orders imposing contempt sanctions, awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs, appointing expert witnesses, and otherwise enforcing obligations under a settlement agreement Defendants entered into with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the attorneys’ fees order. We affirm in part, reverse in part, dismiss in part, and remand.

I.

In 2012, Plaintiffs brought a class action alleging, in relevant part, that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm that ADC’s healthcare delivery policies and practices posed to Plaintiffs. On the eve of trial, the parties settled and entered into an agreement (the Stipulation), in which Defendants agreed to comply with 103 "Performance Measures" designed to improve the healthcare system at ten ADC-operated prisons.

The Stipulation provides the process by which the parties must resolve disputes over compliance. In the event Plaintiffs believe Defendants are in non-compliance with one or more of the Performance Measures, the Stipulation requires Plaintiffs to first provide Defendants a written statement describing the alleged non-compliance, to which Defendants must provide a written response. Plaintiffs and Defendants must then meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the dispute informally and, if informal efforts fail, participate in formal mediation. If the dispute is not resolved through formal mediation, either party may file a motion to enforce the Stipulation in the district court. If the district court "finds that Defendants have not complied with the Stipulation, it shall in the first instance require Defendants to submit a plan approved by the Court to remedy the deficiencies identified by the Court."

If "the Court subsequently determines that the Defendants’ plan did not remedy the deficiencies, the Court shall retain the power to enforce the Stipulation through all remedies provided by law." However, "the Court shall not have the authority to order Defendants to construct a new prison or to hire a specific number or type of staff unless Defendants propose to do so as part of a plan to remedy a failure to comply with any provision of this Stipulation." The Stipulation also provides for attorneys’ fees and costs for Plaintiffs’ successful enforcement efforts.

Since executing the Stipulation, the parties have engaged in multiple disputes stemming from Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with some of the Performance Measures. We addressed a number of these disputes in our prior decision, Parsons v. Ryan , 912 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 2018) ( Parsons I ). Because the facts and procedural history of this case were detailed in that decision, we discuss them here only as necessary to explain our decision in the consolidated appeals currently before us.

On October 10, 2017, the district court issued an order (the Order to Show Cause), in which it explained that, although Defendants had been given "wide latitude to revise their remediation plans over the last two years," for "a subset of performance measures, these remediation plans have failed." The district court ordered that "effective immediately, Defendants shall comply with" eleven specified Performance Measures "for every class member" at specified prisons. The district court also ordered Defendants to "file a list of every instance of noncompliance with this Order during December 2017," and ordered Defendants to "show cause why the Court should not impose a civil contempt sanction of $1,000 per incident of non-compliance commencing the month of December 2017."

Following hearings on Defendants’ compliance with the Order to Show Cause, the district court determined that Defendants had not taken all reasonable steps to comply with the Order to Show Cause and their compliance remained below 85% for certain of the Performance Measures listed in that order.

Accordingly, on June 22, 2018, the district court issued an order holding Defendants in contempt (the Contempt Order). The district court imposed "a financial penalty of $1,000 per failed instance" for each Performance Measure listed in the Order to Show Cause "that fell below the Stipulation’s threshold of 85%." Cataloguing 1,445 such violations, the district court ordered Defendants to pay $1,445,000 "to be kept in the Registry until further order of the Court." The district court entered final judgment against Defendants the same day.

Also on that same day the district court issued the following orders: an order awarding Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for work performed post-Stipulation in the amount of $1,259,991.98 (the Attorneys’ Fees Order); an order partially granting and partially denying Defendantsmotion to terminate the monitoring of certain Performance Measures (the Termination Order); an order requiring Defendants to reinstall Health Needs Request boxes (HNR-boxes) for prisoners to submit forms requesting medical assistance (the HNR-Box Order); an order requiring Defendants to file a plan to implement the recommendations made by BJ Millar of Advisory Board Consulting (the Millar-Plan Order);1 and an order requiring the parties to submit proposed experts to analyze "why deficiencies persist and to opine as to the policies and procedures necessary to compel compliance with the Stipulation" (the Compliance-Expert Order).

On December 11, 2018, the district court appointed Dr. Marc Stern as a Rule 706 expert to provide remediation plans and to review ADC’s monitoring process, and it ordered the parties to confer regarding the scope of Dr. Stern’s engagement (Stern-Appointment Order). On January 31, 2019, the district court issued an order accepting Dr. Stern’s engagement as agreed to by the parties in a joint submission, and resolved some disputes regarding the scope of Dr. Stern’s engagement (Stern-Terms of Engagement Order). On April 30, 2019, upon a request from Dr. Stern, the district court again clarified the scope of Dr. Stern’s work (Stern-Standard of Care Order). On May 30, 2019, the district court—in response to an additional issue raised by Dr. Stern concerning his ability to assess mental health delivery—appointed Dr. Bart Abplanalp as a Rule 706 expert (Abplanalp-Appointment Order) focusing on mental health.

In this opinion, we address four consolidated appeals. First, Defendants appeal from the Contempt Order (the Contempt Appeal, No. 18-16358). Second, Defendants and Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the Attorneys’ Fees Order (the Attorneys’ Fees Appeals, Nos. 18-16365 & 18-16424). Finally, Defendants appeal from the following orders related to the ongoing enforcement of the Stipulation (the Medical Needs Appeal, No. 18-16368): the Termination Order, the HNR-Box Order, the Millar-Plan Order, the Millar-Appointment Order, the Compliance-Expert Order, the Stern-Appointment Order, the Stern-Terms of Engagement Order, the Stern-Standard of Care Order, and the Abplanalp-Appointment Order.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Contempt Order, affirm in part and reverse and remand in part the Attorneys’ Fees Order, affirm the Termination Order and the HNR-Box Order, and dismiss the remainder of the...

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