P.R.L. v. Juvenile Officer, St. Charles County
| Decision Date | 04 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 51364,51364 |
| Citation | 719 S.W.2d 144 |
| Parties | P.R.L., a Juvenile, Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, ST. CHARLES COUNTY, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Darrill S. Beebe, St. Charles, for appellant.
Nancy L. Schneider, St. Charles, for respondent.
Juvenile, age fourteen, appeals disposition order of Juvenile Court which found the juvenile in need of care and treatment, ordered the child placed in the custody of his natural parents, and further ordered that the juvenile be under supervision of the court until further order.
Pursuant to § 211.031.1(3) RSMo Cum.Supp.1984, the juvenile was alleged to be in need of care and treatment for violating § 566.060.1(2) RSMo 1978, which prohibits as a felony deviate sexual intercourse with a person who is less than fourteen years of age. The petition alleged violations in two counts; one alleging criminal activity involving a child six years of age and the other involving a child five years of age. The juvenile denied the charges and a hearing on the court's jurisdiction was held. The court found the child in need of protection. After a disposition hearing the order now appealed was entered.
Counsel for the juvenile arranged for and took the depositions of the minor boys for whom the juvenile was a baby-sitter on the occasion at which it is alleged the juvenile committed deviate sexual intercourse. At the jurisdictional hearing no objection was made contesting the competency of the six year old and the five year old to testify. It is understandable that by reason of the subject matter and the age of the witnesses, six years of age on Count I and five years of age on Count II, the testimony is in part inconsistent and confusing.
The six year old testified that appellant was his next door neighbor and on two occasions his baby-sitter. The last occasion, according to the witness, took place in September. The hearing occurred on October 31, 1985. Those present in the home were appellant, the witness and his brother. After the parents left for the evening they watched T.V. and played games. The witness testified that the juvenile committed an act of sodomy when the witness, at the request of the appellant, went into the bathroom. On cross examination the six year old witness confirmed the story with greater detail.
The second child, age five, also testified without objection on grounds of competency. Many of his answers were "yeah", "Um-hmm", "no". The Juvenile Court did not find against the juvenile on the charge relating to the five year old. Accordingly, the question of whether this complainant's testimony was sufficient on his behalf is unimportant to this appeal except for testimony that he was aware that appellant and his older brother were in the bathroom together with the door closed. To some extent, testimony of different acts than those charged were denied by the six year old but affirmed by the five year old.
The two young boys' mother testified. She had retained appellant as a baby-sitter for September 3, 1985. She departed at approximately 6:15 and returned home at 10 minutes after 10:00 p.m. She detected that appellant avoided looking at her and appeared anxious to leave and go home. The six year old described the events leading to the present charges to his mother at 5:00 p.m. the next day after she returned home from work. She examined her son and saw a soapy filmy residue around his rectum. The six year old testified that the appellant used soap as a lubricant. She saw no physical sign of injury. She did not disclose these matters to her husband until nine or ten days later. Subsequently a report was made to juvenile authorities.
The juvenile testified and strenuously denied any misconduct.
Appellant claims error in that (1) the decision of the juvenile court was against the weight of the evidence and, (2) appellant was denied constitutional rights to a fair hearing because the six and five year old were incompetent witnesses.
Where the issue before a juvenile court is the need for care and treatment and the basis upon which jurisdiction is invoked rests upon the alleged commission of a felony, the burden is on juvenile authorities to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. In the matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Rule 117.05(a). And, where, as here, the Juvenile Court after hearing the proof makes a specific finding "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the child did commit the felony alleged, we treat the finding "as equivalent to a jury verdict" and this court considers "the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable there to." In re Fisher, 468 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Mo.1971). We review under Rule 73.01 as interpreted in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976).
We find the testimony of the six year old child and his mother sufficient to support the finding and judgment of the...
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O.B., In Interest of, No. 62390
...could have found beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant committed the offense charged. Id. at 409. See P.R.L. v. Juvenile Officer, St. Charles County, 719 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Mo.App.1986). The principal had conversations with students regarding a weapon at school. Based upon information from one ......