A.P.S. v. State

• Decision Date: 05 August 2022
• Docket Number: CR-21-0024
• Parties: A.P.S. v. State of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

A.P.S. v. State of Alabama

No. CR-21-0024

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

August 5, 2022

Appeal from Blount Juvenile Court (JU-18-7.01)

McCOOL, JUDGE

A.P.S appeals an order of the Blount Juvenile Court transferring him to the Blount Circuit Court for prosecution as an adult on a charge of capital murder. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the transfer order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

Around midnight on December 15, 2017, Ricardo Santiago Gonzalez and Adalberta Chavez Ruiz were murdered in their residence; the murder weapon was a handgun. In January 2018, Gonzalez and Ruiz's 17-year-old son Leo Chavez was charged with capital murder in connection with his parents' deaths.^[1] In a delinquency petition filed that same month, A.P.S., who was 14 years old when the murders occurred, was also charged with capital murder. The State subsequently filed a motion to transfer A.P.S. to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult. See § 12-15-203(a), Ala. Code 1975. Before the transfer hearing occurred, Chavez was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

As with all transfer hearings, the transfer hearing in this case consisted of two phases: (1) a probable-cause phase, during which the juvenile court was required to determine "whether there is probable cause to believe that [A.P.S.] committed the alleged crime," and (2) a dispositional phase, during which the juvenile court was required to determine "whether it is in the best interest of [A.P.S.] or the public to transfer [A.P.S.] to the circuit court to stand trial as an adult." J.S.A. v. State, 615 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). The State's only witness at the probable-cause phase of the transfer hearing was Investigator Leonard Chambless of the Blount County Sheriff's Department, whose testimony provided the following facts.

On December 17, 2017, Inv. Chambless responded to Gonzalez and Ruiz's residence because members of Ruiz's family had found blood in the residence and had filed a missing-persons report. Upon entering the residence, Inv. Chambless found "a blood-soaked couch," "a chunk of hair and scalp on the top of the stove," and "bags of bloody rags and a bloody mop." (R. 27-28.) Neither Gonzalez nor Ruiz was in the residence, and two vehicles - a Chevrolet S-10 truck and a Cadillac Escalade sportutility vehicle - were missing from the property.

Two days later, law enforcement officers in Chattanooga Tennessee, stopped Chavez while he was driving the Escalade and took him into custody, and the officers subsequently found the S-10 truck, which was also in Tennessee. After obtaining a search warrant, Inv Chambless searched both vehicles and found blood in the bed of the S-10 truck and various receipts in both the truck and the Escalade; Chattanooga law enforcement officers had also found two handguns in the Escalade when they arrested Chavez. However, according to Inv. Chambless, at the time of the transfer hearing it was "undetermined" whether either of those handguns had been used to murder Gonzalez and Ruiz. (R. 94.)

Based on the receipts he found in the vehicles, Inv. Chambless obtained surveillance videos from a Mapco gasoline service station in Collinsville and a Cricket brand cellular-telephone store in Oneonta. The surveillance video from the Mapco service station reflects that, at some unspecified time on the morning of December 16, 2017 - after Gonzalez and Ruiz had been murdered - both the S-10 truck and the Escalade were at the service station, and A.P.S. can be seen on that video. (R. 37.) The surveillance video from the Cricket store reflects that Chavez, A.P.S., and Jose Villanueva were in the store on the morning of December 17, 2017, and that Chavez made a purchase with his father's credit card. (R. 3840.) However, the receipt for that purchase indicated that the purchase occurred on December 16, 2017, at 7:24 p.m. (R. 43-44.) No explanation was provided for the discrepancy between the time stamp on the surveillance video and the time stamp on the receipt.

As part of his investigation, Inv. Chambless spoke with Jose Valadez, and the State asked Inv. Chambless to testify to the substance of Valadez's out-of-court statement. A.P.S. objected to the admission of Valadez's statement on the grounds that the statement was hearsay and that the admission of the statement would violate his right to confront the witnesses against him. The juvenile court overruled that objection, and Inv. Chambless testified as follows regarding Valadez's statement:

"[Valadez] said he went to Villanueva's house and picked up Villanueva and [A.P.S.] on or about the 15th of December. They went to [Chavez's] house sometime around midnight-ish. When they got to [Chavez's] house, [Valadez] stayed in the car. [A.P.S.] and Villanueva exited the vehicle and went in the house. [Valadez] heard gunshots. Then they came and got him and brought him into the house at which point he saw [Chavez's] mom and dad dead in the house. Dad was on the couch and mom on the floor. They cleaned up as best they could. They put the two bodies in a white S-10 pickup, took them out and buried them."^[2]

(R. 85.) On cross-examination, Inv. Chambless testified that A.P.S.'s DNA was not on either of the handguns found in the Escalade and that there was no physical evidence that connected A.P.S. to the murders of Gonzalez and Ruiz. (R. 91, 95.)

Following Inv. Chambless's testimony, the juvenile court conducted the dispositional phase of the transfer hearing and, following that phase, took the matter under advisement. In an order issued on October 1, 2021, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe A.P.S. had committed capital murder and transferred him to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult. A.P.S. filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

On appeal, A.P.S. claims that the juvenile court's transfer order must be reversed because, he says, the court erred by allowing Inv. Chambless to testify to the substance of Valadez's out-of-court statement. In support of that claim, A.P.S. argues that Valadez's statement was hearsay and that the admission of the statement violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."); and § 12-15-202(f)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that, in a juvenile-transfer hearing, the accused "has the right to confront all witnesses against the child, subject to limitations recognized by the United States Supreme Court").

Before transferring an accused juvenile to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult, a juvenile court "'must determine that there is probable cause that the child committed the alleged offense.'" D.M. v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0261, Oct. 8, 2021]___So. 3d___,___(Ala.Crim.App.2021) (quoting J.F.B. v. State, 729 So.2d 355, 356 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)). See Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala. 1981) ("The finding of probable cause is an essential element of the decision to transfer."). "In a juvenile transfer hearing, hearsay evidence is admissible to show that there is probable cause that the accused committed the crime, but it cannot constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause." Q.J.S. v. State, 12 So.3d 164, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). However, pursuant to § 12-15-202(f)(3), the Alabama Legislature has provided an accused juvenile with a statutory right to confront the witnesses against him in a transfer hearing. Thus, "'hearsay evidence that violates the child's right of confrontation may not even be admitted, much less constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause to transfer the child to circuit court.'" C.E.B. v. State, 661 So.2d 786, 787 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (quoting O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 518 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)) (emphasis added). See also W.T.J. v. State, 665 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) ("'The Alabama Supreme Court has made it clear that evidence which could not be constitutionally admitted at a criminal trial should be excluded from a transfer hearing.'" (quoting O.M., 595 So .2d at 517) (citing Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1985)))).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "'prohibits the admission of ... testimonial hearsay [statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted],'" Turner v. State, 115 So.3d 939, 943 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004)), "unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Ex parte Phillips, 287 So.3d 1179, 1207 (Ala. 2018) (citing Crawford, supra). Thus,

"'when offered for the truth of the matter asserted, a nontestifying codefendant's statement to police implicating the accused in the crime is inadmissible against the accused; it does not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and ... its introduction violates the accused's confrontation rights. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); R.L.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 803 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Ephraim v. State, 627 So.2d 1102 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).'"

C.L.H. v. State, 121 So.3d 403, 406 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 979, 1024 (Ala.Crim.App.2000)).

In this case, the State does not contend that Valadez was unavailable to testify at the transfer hearing; indeed, the State conceded during oral argument before this Court that Valadez "was apparently available for testimony." The State also conceded during oral...