Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Grafilo
| Decision Date | 11 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-02217-JAM-GGH,2:17-cv-02217-JAM-GGH |
| Citation | 315 F.Supp.3d 1195 |
| Parties | PACIFIC COAST HORSESHOEING SCHOOL, INC.; Bob Smith; and Esteban Narez, Plaintiffs, v. Dean GRAFILO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Bradley A. Benbrook, Stephen M. Duvernay, Benbrook Law Group, Sacramento, CA, Keith Diggs, Paul V. Avelar, Institute for Justice, Tempe, AZ, for Plaintiffs.
Peiyin Patty Li, California Department of Justice, Ofice of the Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Pacific Coast Horseshoeing School (the "School") and its owner, Bob Smith ("Smith"), seek to enroll a potential student, Esteban Narez ("Narez"). Under California's Private Postsecondary Education Act of 2009 (the "Act"), CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94800 et seq., the School may not enroll students unless they meet ability-to-benefit requirements. Because Narez did not meet those requirements, the Act required the School to deny his application. Plaintiffs elected to legally challenge the Act by filing a Complaint in this Court which alleges that the Act abridges the School's and Smith's First Amendment right to teach horseshoeing and Narez's First Amendment right to learn horseshoeing.
Defendants have moved to dismiss. Mot., ECF No. 15. Plaintiffs oppose dismissal. Opp'n, ECF No. 18. For reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants' motion.1
In the Act, the California legislature expressed concern about the value of degrees issued by private postsecondary schools and the lack of protection for the schools' students and consumers of their services. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94801(b). In promulgating the Act, the legislature sought to ensure:
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94801(d).
The Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education (the "Bureau") regulates private postsecondary educational institutions. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94875. The Bureau approves regulated institutions that meet minimum operating standards. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94887. Defendant Michael Marion serves as Chief of the Bureau, which is located within California's Department of Consumer Affairs. Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 2 ¶ 11. Defendant Dean Grafilo is the appointed Director of California's Department of Consumer Affairs. Id. ¶ 12.
Before a regulated institution can execute an enrollment agreement with a student who did not graduate high school or pass an equivalency examination, such as the General Educational Development (GED) test, that student must pass "an independently administered examination from the list of examinations prescribed by the United States Department of Education" or a Bureau-approved examination relevant to the intended occupational training. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94811, 94904(a–b) ; 5 CAL. CODE REGS. § 71770(a)(1).
Horseshoeing is the practice of shaping metal to be fitted and nailed into a horse's hoof. Compl. at 2 ¶ 16. A person who shoes horses is called a farrier. Id. ¶ 17. In California, farriering does not require a license. Id. ¶ 21.
Smith founded the School in 1991. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 26–27. Five times each year, the School offers a full-time eight-week curriculum to about 12 to 14 students. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. That curriculum includes classroom session and practice removing, shaping, and applying horseshoes to horses. Id. ¶ 28. Classroom sessions focus on horseshoeing theory; horse anatomy, movement, and lameness; and business advice on client management, self-employment, and interaction with barns, trainers, and veterinarians. Id. ¶ 30. The School evaluates students by written or oral examinations. Id. ¶ 31. As of this year, the School's tuition costs $6,000. Id. ¶ 33.
The School qualifies as a regulated institution under the Act because it (1) is a private entity located in California that (2) offers a curriculum to the public for a vocational purpose and (3) charges tuition. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 34–36; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94857, 94858. The Act thus requires the School only enroll students who have high school diplomas or recognized equivalents, or have passed ability-to-benefit examinations. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94904.
Plaintiffs assert that earning a passing score on an ability-to-benefit examination is unnecessary for horseshoeing. Compl. at 5 ¶ 46. The School, which previously did not impose educational prerequisites to admission, does not accept state or federal student loans. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 52–53. Smith does not charge students who are unable to benefit from the School's curriculum because he refunds all but $250 of tuition paid if continuing the course is not in the student's best interest after the first week. Id. ¶ 54.
The School was first inspected by the Bureau in 2016. Id. ¶ 55. The Bureau determined that the School's admissions requirements did not comply with the Act because it lacked admission prerequisites. Id. ¶ 56. Smith inquired whether the Bureau would recognize his practice of partially refunding tuition after the first week to non-benefiting students as an alternative to having students pass an ability-to-benefit examination. Id. at 6–7 ¶ 57. The Bureau did not accept Smith's proposal as an alternative to the Act's requirements. Id. Accordingly, in 2017, Smith modified the School's admissions standards to call for a high school diploma, its equivalent, or passage of an ability-to-benefit examination, as required for Bureau approval. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 58–59. Because of this change, the School has since rejected otherwise qualified students who did not meet these academic qualifications. Id. ¶ 60.
One such student turned away due to admissions standards changes is Plaintiff Esteban Narez. Narez dropped out of high school and has not subsequently earned his high school diploma or GED. Compl. at 7–8 ¶¶ 63–64, 75. Jobs in the equine field sparked Narez's passion for horses. Id. ¶¶ 67–68. After working alongside a farrier, Narez sought to become a farrier himself. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 70–73. Narez believes studying for and taking the GED or an ability-to-benefit examination would conflict with his work schedule and would not substantially advance his career. Id. at 8–9 ¶¶ 78–79. Although the School wanted to admit Narez, it rejected his application because he did not meet the Act's ability-to-benefit requirements for enrollment at a private postsecondary educational institution. Id. ¶¶ 76–77, 81.
Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks a judicial declaration that the ability-to-benefit requirement is unconstitutional and injunctive relief to this effect. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ A, C.
Plaintiffs argue that California's ability-to-benefit requirement as applied violates their First Amendment rights by restricting Smith and the School from teaching their horseshoeing curriculum and preventing the enrollment of Narez, who has not proven his ability to benefit under the Act. Compl. at 9–11 ¶¶ 89–101. Defendants move to dismiss because they assert the Act regulates non-expressive conduct and survives rational basis review. Mot. at 3–7. Alternatively, Defendants argue that the Act is content-neutral and satisfies the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Id. at 8–11.
Plaintiffs counter that the Court should not resolve First Amendment claims at the motion to dismiss stage. Opp'n at 10. Nevertheless, where a court accepts all of the plaintiffs' allegations as true and construes all facts in their favor, the Ninth Circuit has not found early resolution of First Amendment claims to be problematic. See, e.g., San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 881 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2018) (); Taub v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 696 F. App'x 181, 184 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
"The First Amendment applies to state laws and regulations through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) ("NAAP"). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "a statute is required to bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, unless it makes a suspect classification or implicates a fundamental right." Id. at 1049. Because horseshoeing schools, their purveyors, and aspiring farriers are not members of suspect classes entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court must examine whether the ability-to-benefit requirement implicates the fundamental right of free speech.
The Court must first determine whether the Act regulates speech or conduct. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court instructs that "restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive conduct." Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011). In the case of the latter, "the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing...
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