Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Citation: 56 Cal.2d 219,363 P.2d 596,14 Cal.Rptr. 548
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 17 July 1961
• Parties: , 363 P.2d 596 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and Sally Mary Drew et al., Respondents. S. F. 20728.

Page 548

14 Cal.Rptr. 548

56 Cal.2d 219, 363 P.2d 596

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and Sally Mary Drew et al., Respondents.

S. F. 20728.

Supreme Court of California, In bank.

July 17, 1961.

Richard H. Peterson, San Francisco, Raymond W. White, Atherton, Hogen J. Kallemeyn, San Mateo, and Bruce P. Sadler, Berkeley, for petitioner.

Everett A. Corten, Emily B. Johnson, Neyhart & Grodin and Richard R. Heath, San Francisco, for respondents.

DOOLING, Justice.

Petitioner seeks review and the annulment of an award and decision made by the Industrial Accident Commission. The award gave a full death benefit to the deceased's widow and minor children. The award was based on a finding that the employee's death was the result of the industrial injury 'combined with a non-industrial cancer.'

Prior to October 1957 deceased was suffering from a non-industrial kidney carcinoma. In Cotober 1957 he fell while at work, injuring his back, but he continued to work and did not seek medical care until some time later when he began to suffer back pains. X-rays taken on February 23, 1958, revealed a fracture of the seventh dorsal vertebra of his thoracic spine. His condition deteriorated so that he became a paraplegic in April 1958 and he died in January 1959. The medical testimony indicates that while the industrial injury brought about the death sooner than it would otherwise have occurred, and was thus one of the proximate causes of death, if there had been no injury the carcinoma would of itself probably have resulted in the employee's death within a year after its actualk occurrence.

Petitioner does not question the finding that the industrial injury was a proximate cause of the death or that the dependents were for the reason entitled to an award of death benefits. Its sole argument is directed to the claim that where an industrial injury combines with a pre-existing disease to cause the death of an employee, the death benefits must be apportioned by the commission in the proportion that each factor contributes to bring the death about.

Petitioner relies on section 4663 of the Labor Code, which provides: 'In case of aggravation of any disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only for the proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease which is reasonably attributed to the injury.' An examination of the relevant provisions of the Labor Code makes it perfectly clear, however, that section 4663 deals only with the apportionment of compensation to the injured employee for disability suffered by him, and has no reference to the benefits to be paid to an employee's dependents where his death is industrially caused. Section 4663 is a part of article 3, part 2, division 4 of the Labor Code, the sections of which deal exclusively with the compensation to be paid to injured employees for industrially caused disability, i. e., incapacity to work, both temporary and permanent. The succeeding article 4 deals exclusively with payments to be made to the dependents of employees following the employees' death. It is clear from a reading of these articles that 'disability' is used throughout to refer to the disabling effect of industrial injuries as they entitle the employee to compensation during his life, and can by no plausible construction be extended to include the death of the employee. If there could be any doubt of the correctness of this construction, section 4700 of the Labor Code must put it at rest. That section reads: 'The death of an injured employee does not affect the liability of the employer under articles 2 and 3 of this chapter (i. e., for medical treatment and disability payments) so far as such liability has accrued and become payable at the date of the death. Any accrued and unpaid compensation shall be paid to the dependents, or, if there are no dependents, to the personal representative of the deceased employee or heirs or other persons entitled thereto, without administration, but such death terminates the disability.' (Emphasis added.) There could be no clearer indication than that furnished by the emphasized words that the Legislature itself intended the words 'death' and 'disability' as used throughout the statute to be mutually...